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Abstract
This dissertation explores the impact o f power and politics in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
institutionalisation. We argue that this process can be understood in power and politics terms 
because the infrastructure skews the control o f organisational action in favour o f dominant 
individuals and groups. Indeed, as our case studies show, shifting power balances is not only 
a desired outcome of PKI deployment, power drives institutionalisation. Therefore, despite 
the rational goals of improving security and reducing the total cost o f ownership for IT, the 
PKIs in our field organisations have actually been catalysts for power and politics.
Although current research focuses on external technical interoperation, we believe emphasis 
should be on the interaction between the at once restrictive and flexible PKI technical 
features, organisational structures, goals of sponsors and potential user resistance. We use the 
Circuits o f Power (CoP) framework to explain how a PKI conditions and is conditioned by 
power and politics. Drawing on the concepts of infrastructure and institution, we submit that 
PKIs are politically explosive in pluralistic, distributed global organisations because by 
limiting freedom of action in favour o f stability and security, they set a stage for disaffection.
The result o f antipathy towards the infrastructure would not be a major concern if  public key 
cryptography, which underpins PKI, had a centralised mechanism for enforcing the user 
discipline it relies on to work properly. However, since this discipline is not automatic, a PKI 
bereft o f support from existing power arrangements faces considerable institutionalisation 
challenges. We assess these ideas in two case studies in London and Switzerland. In London, 
we explain how an oil company used its institutional structures to implement PKI as part o f a 
desktop standard covering 105,000 employees. In Zurich and London, we give a power 
analysis o f attempts by a global financial services firm to roll out PKI to over 70,000 users.
Our dissertation makes an important contribution by showing that where PKI supporters 
engage in a shrewdly orchestrated campaign to knit the infrastructure with the existing 
institutional order, it becomes an accepted part of organisational life without much ceremony. 
In sum, we both fill gaps in information security literature and extend knowledge on the 
efficacy o f the Circuits o f Power framework in conducting IS institutionalisation studies.
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CHAPTER 1 : 
RESEARCH ISSUES
Introduction
Information Systems are essential for the coordination (Earl and Feeny 1994, Nutt et a l 
2000) and control o f activity (Ciborra 2000, Meyer and Rowan 1991) in formal organisations 
(Morgan 1997, Pfeffer 1992). As such, complex networks o f computer-based information 
systems (IS) are the engine o f large modem organisations. The technologies both improve 
communication potential and modify its patterns. A key attraction is that, “Because 
technology reduces the cost and unreliability o f relaying orders, management can tighten 
control (Hinds and Kiesler 1999).” Thus, because IT is immensely transformative (Kling 
1990, Kling and lacono 1984, Kling and Jewett 1994), management should carefully consider 
the social, economic and organisation implications o f new systems (Angell 2000). However, 
fashion and fads drive innumerable IS projects (Abrahamson 1991). Kling (1990) traces the 
syndrome to early days o f computing. He argues,
“Early computer enthusiasts were excited or awed by the prospects of a transformative technology. 
...although much of the managerial and academic world has become sceptical of exaggerated claims and 
hyper-hype .. .which are part of the official story of computerisation — pushed by the marketing arms of 
computer vendors, futurists like Toiler and Naisbitt, and sympathetically amplified by journalists.”
Likewise, Abrahamson (1991) argues that innovation literature is interspersed with beliefs 
that innovations, and their diffusion, naturally benefit adopters. However, astute marketing 
often leads organisations into deploying fashionable technologies (Buchanan and Boddy 
1983, Ciborra 2000, Swanson and Ramiller 1997) without considering critical issues such as 
technical efficiency, organisational desirability, political and cultural feasibility (Checkland 
1981, Checkland and Scholes 1990). To Abrahamson, fads may lead to the rejection o f useful 
technologies because they discourage their careful and sustained implementation. He says.
“Fads or fashions cause organisations to leap rapidly from one technology to the next, so that no 
technology has enough time to work ... managers jump rapidly from one problem to the next, so that 
technologies do not solve problems because the problems go out of fashion before technologies can solve 
them (Abrahamson 1991).”
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However, Swanson and Ramiller (1997) argue that despite the zest with which the business- 
oriented media proclaims IT advances, experts now greet the declarations with as much doubt 
as affirmation because buzzwords are often “signals o f din and confusion.”
E-Commerce Security
The foregoing debate directly applies to Electronic Commerce' and the fledgling attempts to 
secure it (Josang et a l  2001) because it, too, is shrouded in hype. E-commerce makes it 
possible for parties who are not in direct contact to enter into, undertake and perform entire 
contracts within the bounds of cyberspace. This is irrespective o f whether they had a pre- 
established business relationship or not. This faceless commerce opens up copious business 
opportunities but also comes saddled with risks (Bhimani 1996, El-Ata et a l  2002). Because 
of concerns about confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation and authorisation, e- 
commerce has not taken off as widely as predicted (Levitt 1999, Schneier 2000).
As a result, e-commerce security is widely associated or even synonymous with cryptography 
(Blaze et a l  1996, Diffie and Heilman 1976, Gollmann 2000a, Singh 1999) because it buys 
confidence in an uncertain world (Garfinkel and Spafford 1997). Global political fights over 
export control (Gollmann 2000a) and key escrow (Ganesan 1996, Whitley and Hosein 2001) 
underlined the role of cryptography as a premier control measure for e-commerce and other 
aspects o f modem computing (Wood 1996). The general sentiment is that without 
cryptography e-commerce could never have become mainstream business (Blanchette 2000, 
Clarke 2001). Cryptography is divided into secret key and public key or asymmetric 
cryptography. The next chapter discusses the two types o f cryptography in detail. Of the two 
branches, public key cryptography (Josang et a l  2001) and its technological realisation in the 
electronic world, namely Public Key Infi*astmcture (PKI) (Blanchette 2000), are hot e- 
security topics because o f their ability to enforce real-time contracts between potentially 
distrusting parties across distances.
However, PKI deployments have to date been driven by fads and hype. This is little wonder. 
The digital security sector has traditionally thrived on the pursuit o f technical fixes (Dhillon 
and Backhouse 2000, Hitchings 1995, Smith 1993, Wood 2000) because security is “very, 
very difficult to do (Schwartau 1998).” Due to the prevalence o f the PKI fad Gartner Group,
Electronic Commerce here refers to Internet-based buying and selling of information, products and services.
12
an IT research and consulting firm, developed a “PKI Hype Cycle” to show the stages of PKI 
development. The cycle has five stages as illustrated below.
Visibility We are here
1999 RSA 
Conference
Entrust
IPO
Scotia Bank Deploys B2C PKI 
American Express Releases Blue 
Identrus Formed
Verisign Acquires NSI
Vensign 
IPO Entrust Merges with EnCommerce 
Visa Announces
3-D SSL
1994 RSA Conference 
PGP Introduced
Verisign
formed
PKI Disappears 
into Applications
Industry Policy Authorities Form 
PC Makers add SmartCard Readers
E-Sign Laws Signed
Public Key Encryption Developed
Peak of Inflated 
Expectations
Technology
Trigger
Trough of 
Disillusionment
Slope of 
Enlightenment
Plateau of 
Productivity
Time
Figure 1 -  The G artner PKI Hype Cycle
PKI hype coincides with the “Peak o f inflated expectations.” The phase saw over-enthusiastic 
projections about the technology with conference organisers and magazine publishers the 
main beneficiaries. Therefore, the craze simply replayed the long established ‘year o f the...’ 
syndrome (Ellison and Schneier 2000) in the security sector. To Ellison and Schneier first it 
was “firewalls, then intrusion detection systems, then VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) and 
now certification authorities (CAs) and public key infrastructure (PKI).” The mantra goes, “if  
you buy X, then you will be secure (Ellison and Schneier 2000).” However, there were more 
pilot projects and failures than successes as vendors pushed PKI to its limits leading the press 
to abandon it. The result was the current “trough o f disillusionment.”
This was predictable because, as Abrahamson argues, deploying systems based on fashion 
disadvantages technically efficient technologies because they often need more time to tailor 
to specific organisational needs than what the craze permits. Indeed, Gartner warned that, 
“Infrastructure investments like PKI frequently take time to show benefits (Wheatman and 
Pescatore 2001).” Gartner expected substantial value in two to three years. However, fashion
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is not the only concern about PKI. Claiming that sometimes the importance of cryptography 
to web security is often embellished, Gollmann (2000) warns that uninformed use of the 
technology may cause problems because it was designed for communication not internet 
security. He insists that although,
“Some issues in web security are typical communications security problems, there are also scenarios where 
there are no longer ‘trusting’ parties wishing to communicate securely in a ‘hostile’ environment, but 
‘hostile’ parties needing a ‘trusted’ environment to communicate (Gollmann 2000a).”
Consequently, using cryptography on the mistaken assumption that it enforces the same 
policies and addresses the same threats as in communication security is risky. Thus, PKI is in 
crisis. On the one hand, PKI is clearly vital for secure e-commerce, e-govemment and digital 
democracy. A clamorous example is the UK Inland Revenue system that was “suspended 
when users reported seeing snippets o f other people's information” (BBC 2002, BBC 2002a). 
However, other commentators have doubted the usefulness o f PKI in secure e-commerce. For 
instance, in a sweeping broadside at the technology, Clarke (2001) insists that PKIX has 
been, and will remain a failure because it makes wrong assumptions about organisational 
structures and key usage. We continue this debate in Chapter 2.
We believe PKI is at crossroads because current research almost exclusively considers 
technical features and ignores views like power and politics that are relevant in explaining 
institutionalisation. Our research highlights this oversight and explores the usefulness o f a 
power angle in explaining how a PKI is taken for granted (Kling and lacono 1984). We 
believe useful PKIs must become acceptable in the private cultural and political spaces 
(Silverstone and Haddon 1996) o f the host organisations because new technologies are often 
incompatible with workflows (Ciborra 2000). In sum, we hope the insights from our thesis 
can augment the technical literature and help provide a better PKI institutionalisation picture.
The rest o f the chapter proceeds as follows. The first part summarises our main arguments 
and sets the tone for the dissertation. We introduce the debates here to take the readers, many 
unfamiliar with subject, directly to the subject matter. The approach is useful because it.
“Not only piques their curiosity .. .but also provides them with an orienting glimpse into the storyline that 
will be developed (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1997).”
14
The early depiction of the debates is crucial “in the establishment o f rapport between the 
work and its readers (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1997).” Therefore, we provide a research 
‘sneak preview’ that initiates the storylines that we discuss later in the dissertation. Next, we 
explain the purpose o f the dissertation including the motivation and scope o f the study. The 
research questions follow. Thereafter we justify our research and general approach. We end 
with a summary and the structure o f the dissertation.
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Purpose of the study
In light o f the foregoing remarks, this dissertation investigates the impact of power relations 
in the PKI institutionalisation process. We examine the effect o f the PKI on two organisations 
that are deploying it, exploring its effects on power and responsibility structures. We 
emphasise process here because, as Monteiro and Hepso (1998) contend, institutionalisation 
is but shorthand for an ongoing socio-technical negotiation. Indeed, as other studies (Hanseth 
and Monteiro 1998, Hanseth et a l  1996) indicate, it takes hard work and luck to mobilise 
sufficient support (Monteiro and Hepso 1998) for complex information infrastructures. We 
hoped to assess whether deploying a PKI is a clear-cut process as the technology white 
papers and general management literature claim (Ciborra 2000). However, we find that PKI 
institutionalisation is a long-term process fraught with technical, legal and regulatory 
challenges and a minefield o f political machinations dressed up in cosmetic arguments about 
security and Total Cost o f Ownership reduction (Hoffman 2002, Pratt 2002).
Motivation of research
This research stems from our general interest in large information infrastructures and their 
impacts on managerial and decision-making structures o f global organisations. The sheer 
reach o f these technologies inevitably has security and political implications in pluralistic 
organisations. Since conventional infrastructural research focuses on technological issues, our 
understanding of social and organisational issues is limited. We believe security directors 
should look beyond the current focus on implementing the available technologies to address 
the complex task of incorporating these products into business governance processes. Thus, 
following (Markus and Pfeffer 1983, Silva 1997, Silva and Backhouse 2003), this study 
explores the importance o f power and politics in PKI institutionalisation. First, we 
demonstrate that a PKI becomes ‘part o f the furniture’ (Silva and Backhouse 1997) if it 
positively reinforces power sources and structures o f the host organisation^. Second, because 
specific business divisions or country offices spearhead PKI projects, the infirastructures 
incorporate values, beliefs and agendas that may conflict with the culture o f either the wider 
organisation or substantial constituencies within it (Markus and Pfeffer 1983). Thus, the 
infi-astructure faces challenges because “counterimplementation is most likely to occur when
 ^We use the word to cover both the intra and interorganisational use of PKI.
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outsiders bring in threatening new technologies (Keen 1981).” Public key infrastructures 
perfectly fit the bill because they are panoptic.
But what makes this dissertation unique? First, it focuses on the internal impact of the PKI as 
opposed to the interoperability issues that have dominated research on the technology to date. 
We assess how the PKI is interwoven into political and institutional spaces o f our case 
studies and how it simultaneously becomes the support and physical manifestation o f the 
security objectives and regime. As a result, we shift attention from the current fascination 
with keys to encapsulate a process for the creation o f a functional security infrastructure. 
Second, contrary to views in the besotted trade press (Kling 1990), this dissertation illustrates 
that public key infrastructures are never passive security systems because they skew the 
control o f organisational action in favour o f powerful individuals and groups.
Put another way, the greater security supported by the PKI imposes arduous rigidities on the 
routines o f daily work (Ciborra 2000, Keen 1981) that may either become taken for granted 
or rejected. A useful PKI should ensure an effortless repetition o f security behaviour, which 
over time leads to a security culture (Hitchings 1995). If this behaviour becomes ‘the 
expected way o f doing things’, it initiates the institutionalisation process. Therefore, we 
strongly argue that PKI institutionalisation depends, less on the technical brilliance o f the 
underlying algorithms and key lengths and, more on efforts to blend it with the existing 
power and responsibility arrangements o f the host organisation.
We show that a PKI has better chances o f institutionalisation if  it positively reinforces an 
organisation's (BSI 1999, Finne 1996, Nosworthy 2000, Wood 1997) institutional order by 
building on current structures. We argue that a key reason why about 70% of PKI 
deployments are at pilot stage (Townsend 2001) and others have failed (Clarke 2001) is 
because the native X.509 design attempts to create rival structures and power centres either 
on top o f or in competition with the existing organisational order (Gutmann 2002). The 
problem is that PKIX architectures have sought to superimpose hierarchical and authoritarian 
structures onto organisations that largely have decentralised authority arrangements (Clarke 
2001, Markus 1983). Therefore, many public key infrastructures have faced resistance from 
stakeholders worried about the loss of autonomy and flexibility.
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Apart from issues with the PKIX model, computer security has traditionally been seen as a 
superfluous impediment (Parker 1997, Schwartau 1998) to getting work done. Therefore, an 
institutionalised PKI is beneficial because it becomes invisible, freeing employees from 
decision-making and enables them to dedicate more time to doing innovative activities 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967). Put simply, when a PKI becomes an expected component o f  
organisational life, users no longer regard it as an impediment to work.
Yet despite hackneyed phrases, the current literature has encouraged the view o f PKI as one 
o f those products that could act as a “kind o f magic security dust that they could sprinkle over 
their software and make it secure (Schneier 2000).” The literature offers little advice on how 
to address the sensitive power issues caused by the implementation o f public key 
infrastructures in large organisations. For instance, a PKI enables managers to compel relying 
parties to achieve desired outcomes through its supervision, monitoring and surveillance 
abilities. As such, PKI institutionalisation could encounter political problems. Actually, the 
majority of PKI literature came out at the “peak o f inflated expectations” in the hype cycle.
Our thesis highlights the gaps in the literature and introduces insights from power and politics 
that we believe offer a more comprehensive explanation o f PKI institutionalisation. This is a 
good contribution because, as Pfeffer (1992) argues, although power and influence have 
negative connotations, they are “not the organisation’s last dirty secret, but the secret of 
success for both individuals and their organisations” and their mastery is vital for the success 
of innovation and organisational change (Markus and Pfeffer 1983).
To build our case, we explored the concerns of stakeholders about possible loss o f power, 
forms o f interference and intervention because these fears sow seeds o f resistance against any 
innovations in IS. We also examined the exercise o f power and the imposition o f discipline 
and control over employees faced with new methods o f working because this affects 
organisational politics. The two case studies allowed us to explore these developments at 
different stages in the change life cycle, resulting in good insights into how organisations can 
set firm foundations for PKI acceptance. Institutionalisation is vital because PKI is not only a 
complex, all-pervasive (Adams and Lloyd 1999) and an expensive technology, it can hamper 
organisational flexibility (Barber 2000) and even reduce security (Newman 2001, Schneier 
1999a) if  not properly implemented. Levitt (1999) warns that a PKI “reaches deep into 
enterprise IT infrastructure and must function reliably, or the results could be disastrous.”
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Moreover, as Star and Ruhleder (1994) were to argue, simpler systems are often “picked up 
much more quickly and interfere less with other work habits than those which require 
substantial investment in changing habits and infi-astructure.”
Scope: Boundaries of Thesis
We should mention that although institutionalisation studies can take many perspectives, this 
dissertation does not look at the following areas. First, we do not see PKI as an independent 
actor. Writers like (Ciborra 2000, Hanseth 2000a, Hanseth and Monteiro 1998, Hanseth et a l 
1996, Monteiro and Hepso 1998) have discussed this view o f infrastructure extensively. 
These studies talk about the infrastructure ‘hijacking’ the process o f its institutionalisation 
and hence drifting. As Markus (1983) puts it tongue-in-cheek, this is a case o f a system 
running people rather than people utilising it.
Second, we did not study power relations between stakeholders in the PKI interorganisational 
networks such as Certification Authorities, Registration Authorities, Verification Authorities 
and standards bodies notably the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the PKI Forum. 
In the first place, it was not practical to study all these organisations and be able to finish the 
PhD in good time because they are simply too many. Important too is our realisation, early on 
in the study, that such a line o f investigation would not be feasible for a PhD, because these 
structures are in flux and could have changed beyond recognition by the time we got ready to 
write the dissertation. A common thread of research around these institutions deals with PKI 
interoperability and interoperation from technical and legal angles. PKI interoperability 
refers to the capability, and PKI interoperation refers to the effect, o f logically linking 
multiple PKIs to form a larger PKI supporting a wider community o f users (Baum and Ford 
1998). While these are interesting areas, we believe the interoperability debate grossly 
underestimates the significance o f organisational power plays in the success of, even the most 
well-intentioned and comprehensive, technical standards.
Third, our study o f power relations in PKI institutionalisation does not focus on individual 
attributes. Authors like Agarwal and Prasad (1999) claim, “individuals’ perceptions about 
using an innovation are posited to influence adoption behaviour.” They attribute successful 
computer use to ‘some kind of natural affinity’ (Star and Ruhleder 1996). These authors, for 
instance, explain resistance in terms o f the personality traits of the resistors who are seen as
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‘troublemakers’ (Markus 1983) that resist new IS because o f factors internal to them. The 
approach explains resistance with ideas such as people resist all change, people with 
cognitive styles accept systems, while intuitive thinkers resist them. This view is problematic 
because by claiming ability to catalogue traits (Hofstede 1993) in diverse global 
organisations, it trivialises institutionalisation. Critically, the uncertain benefits o f examining 
personal traits may outweigh the costs of doing so (Markus 1983). At worst, this is a cynical 
attempt to explain away the failures o f system designers.
Lastly, this dissertation excludes detailed mathematical accounts because these have already 
been covered (Menezes et a l 1996, Piper and Murphy 2002, Schneier 1996a). Instead, after 
Star and Ruhleder (1996), we argue that understanding context is critical for successful PKI 
institutionalisation because the technology only becomes an infrastructure for someone, when 
connected to a particular activity in a given cultural context. However, since technology is 
society made durable (Latour 1991) we cover the PKI technical features in detail to 
understand the interests inscribed into the IT artefact (Orlikowski and lacono 2001).
Research questions
This Study has a major research question and several sub-questions.
Major question
What is the role o f power and politics in PKI institutionalisation?
Sub Questions
The sub-questions include:
(a) Does the implementation o f a PKI disturb organisational power balances?
(b) What is the role o f managerial and decision-making structures in the process?
(c) Is security enough reason to institutionalise a PKI in distributed organisations?
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Justification of study
Cryptography is not just critical for internet security (Blanchette 2000). It also underpins 
security in applications that range from automatic teller machines, pay-per-view TV, cellular 
networks, the hapless digital cash and pre-pay utility meters (Anderson and Needham 1995, 
Schneier 1997). Therefore, ensuring PKI institutionalisation is o f paramount importance for 
security in a networked world. Mathematicians, engineers and computer scientists, who 
honed their skills in the above-mentioned applications, currently dominate organisational PKI 
deployments. Thus, it is little wonder that issues surrounding key lengths and management, 
algorithms, ciphers and the design o f dependable systems (Anderson 1994, Anderson 2001) 
still dominate literature in this field. The literature depicts PKI as a detached technical 
artefact that is impervious to the conditions surrounding its development and use (Star and 
Ruhleder 1994). This mindset is problematic in security practice because it wantonly extends 
the idealistic engineering roots of cryptography (Anderson 1994), which assume a logical 
world (Schneier 2000). Actually, the concept o f Satan’s Computer was introduced by 
(Anderson and Needham 1995) and adopted by (Schneier 1999b) to accentuate the difficulty 
o f programming a secure computer as compared to -  a general purpose -  one designed to 
withstand Murphy’s Law  ^ (Anderson 2001). Unlike general-purpose computers, designers of 
secure systems need a detailed understanding o f the potential threats the systems may face in 
use. However, because adversaries and their tools and techniques o f attack constantly evolve,
“Security engineering is different from any other type of engineering. ... security features within 
products, are useful precisely because of what they don't allow to be done. Most engineering involves 
making things work. ... Security engineering involves making sure things don't fail in the presence of an 
intelligent and malicious adversary who forces faults at precisely the worst time and in precisely the worst 
way. (Thus) security engineering involves programming Satan's computer (Schneier 1999b).”
Since much o f this security depends on cryptology and Schneier (1997) argues, “With 
cryptography, what you see isn’t what you get. Subtle flaws can render any security system 
vulnerable to attack” then the engineering logic is not sufficient on its own.
As we discuss elsewhere, X.509, the most widely used certificate standard, was a solution in 
search o f the problem before the Internet. In the same vein, Davis (1996) eloquently explains 
why the very design of public key cryptography (PKC) systems, like PKI, makes unrealistic 
assumptions (Clarke 2001) about the ability and willingness o f users to meticulously validate
Murphy's Law ("If anything can go wrong, it will") was named after US Capt. Edward A. Murphy.
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other people’s public keys and keep their own private keys secure (Schneier 2000). In 
practice, users are either unable or unwilling to manage keys diligently, and the underlying 
technology does not rectify this weakness (Davis 1996). Thus, we believe the success of a 
PKI depends on its association with power structures in the host organisation.
We draw parallels between current PKI research and trends in Electronic Mail (e-mail) 
research. Early e-mail studies focused on the technological constraints o f its design and 
attempted to improve its friendliness and to make “it more accessible, reliable and flexible 
(Romm et a l 1996).” Later research, however, covered non-technical organisational aspects. 
Similarly, this dissertation transcends the PKI research focused on improving reliability and 
flexibility to address the fiddly organisational issues. We believe this is a beneficial research 
direction because since computer scientists, engineers and mathematicians publish most PKI 
literature, non-technical issues like power and politics are not a priority. Yet a vital reason 
why large infirastructural systems, like PKIs, are resisted and subsequently fail is the,
“Fear of undesirable effects on the organisational structure, power distribution or the possibility of 
cultural conflict between the system and the organisation in which it is to be implemented ... Individuals 
are likely to consider systems more or less appropriate if they feel that they might gain or lose power due 
to the implementation of the system (Romm et al. 1996).”
A system stands a risk o f rejection if  powerful actors view its implementation as a threat to 
the current structural characteristics o f the organisation. This is because large information 
infi*astructures affect organisational norms and values through their modification o f the 
techniques of production, discipline and surveillance. Romm et al argue that before 
institutionalisation takes place, management and employees need to understand the political 
aspects o f a technology. Otherwise, success at the early stages can culminate in devastating 
political side effects at the later stages o f implementation. They lament that when power and 
politics are mentioned, many people regard them as detrimental to the institutionalisation of 
an IS and hence suggest their elimination (Pfeffer 1992).
The empirical nature of our research fills a gap in PKIX knowledge because we assess the use 
of the infrastructure in real life settings. This is unlike many o f the critics who, because of 
their own commercial agendas, only give information to promote their wares. An example 
will suffice. Schneier makes a risible point by warning that “with cryptography, what you see 
isn’t what you get” but shortly after he states that his company “Counterpane Systems has the
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expertise you need to make sure your system is as secure as it looks (Schneier 1997).” In 
another paper, he claims Counterpane offers “leading-edge expertise in the fields of intrusion 
detection and prevention (Ellison and Schneier 2000).” We are not picking on Schneier per se 
but only showing that the lack of adherence to PKI standards has forced different vendors 
into “territory grabbing.” We extend this debate in the next chapter.
Since technological innovation is not just a matter o f engineering but IS are social products 
(Silverstone and Haddon 1996), our socio-technical study informed by the Circuits o f Power 
(CoP) framework (Clegg 1989) addresses more issues than purely technical approaches. As a 
renowned computer scientist astonishingly warned, “organisational issues are not just a 
contributory factor in security failure ... They can often be primary causes (Anderson 2001).” 
Our two case studies show that shifting power balances is not only the desired outcome of 
deploying a PKI but power and politics are essentially the means o f facilitating this 
institutionalisation. We use the CoP fi*amework, adapted from social and political science 
theory (Clegg 1989) by Silva (1997), to account for these forces because it shows how power 
circulates through the technological component of information systems as well as norms, 
techniques of production and discipline. Briefly put, the main contribution o f this dissertation 
is to apply conceptions o f power and politics to an empirical analysis o f a hitherto natural 
science dominated area o f information security.
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Chapter summary
The Chapter covers the purpose o f the dissertation, justifies it, and outlines the research 
questions and our contribution to knowledge. We also place this research within the IS and 
information security domains. We analyse these changes through the theoretical lenses 
provided by previous research on institutionalisation notably (Silva 1997, Silva and 
Backhouse 1997) and (Introna 1997) encapsulated in the CoP framework. However, unlike 
(Silva 1997, Silva and Backhouse 2003) our research objective was not to “offer a theoretical 
framework” because the CoP is already available. We set out to extend these works by 
exploring the CoP’s viability as a methodology for large IS empirical studies. We focused on 
how the framework can help identify elements to focus on during empirical work. For 
instance, we found that researchers should cautiously use the native CoP terms such as 
“power and politics” because they are so emotive. The dissertation takes a similar approach.
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Organisation of the Dissertation
The rest o f the dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, we critically review the 
relevant literature on PKI and other themes o f the dissertation namely: infrastructure and 
organisational politics. We broadly argue that PKI is yet to become a pervasive security 
substrate because organisations have been unable to appreciate the capricious interaction 
between its at once restrictive and flexible technical features, organisational structures, goals 
of sponsors and potential user resistance. By focusing on technical aspects, current research 
downplays the role o f context and its attendant political encumbrances in institutionalisation. 
Chapter 3 offers the theoretical foundations o f our thesis with the evaluation o f the debates 
surrounding the concept o f power. We survey the considerable literature on the different 
views of power and their influence on IS research. Thereafter we focus on the Circuits of 
Power framework.
Chapter 4 deals with research design. We discuss the philosophical foundations of our 
methodological approach and place them within the IS research tradition. We also provide the 
rationale for a case study research strategy, the selection o f the two field studies, data sources 
and the role o f the CoP framework as data collection and analytical tool for this research. We 
also give a background to our research decisions. In chapters 5 and 6, we present the findings 
from our two case studies Oilcom and Bankrecht respectively. The chapters include a 
reflection on the political, social and historical background o f the research settings. Since we 
also used the CoP to direct our research (methodology) we present the findings from the two 
cases based on the framework. However, we do not follow the traditional CoP elements but 
the themes we developed during our research to overcome the repetitions in the circuits.
In Chapter 7, we bring together the findings from both case studies and analyse them using 
the CoP framework lenses. We assess whether the CoP framework explains our evidence or if  
it leaves big questions unanswered. We use the answers to these questions to evaluate the 
usefulness o f the CoP in explaining events in the real world. Finally, Chapter 8 summarises 
the dissertation, discusses our contributions to theory, methodology and practice. The chapter 
ends by outlining the limitations o f the research and suggests directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter provides the underlying rationale for our research by discussing the main themes 
namely organisational power and politics, technical security and infrastructure. We justify the 
themes in terms o f current literature and the gaps that exist within it. The focus on the gaps 
gives us the justification from the literature for our study. This gap-driven review has the 
added benefit o f focusing our debate.
The literature we consider is divided into technical and social approaches. Technical security 
covers a range o f sub-disciplines such as computer and network security and specific 
techniques like cryptography, devices and tools. The literature avers that organisations can 
avoid or reduce security threats by using the ‘right’ tools and preventative measures. On the 
contrary, the social side addresses issues o f power and politics and appreciates the role of 
people, policies, procedures and processes in information systems use. We combine both 
approaches because we believe it is vital to understand the effect o f context on security 
products and approaches. Hence, our research transcends the artificial divisions that dominate 
PKI literature and security practice. The chapter is organised as follows. First, we discuss 
power and politics in IS adoption. Next, we survey the technical security literature with a 
focus on cryptography. To assess how a PKI becomes a catalyst for power and politics and 
bridge the artificial gap in the literature, we use the concept of infrastructure as a thread o f  
logic to tie the study together. We conclude that an infrastructure is institutionalised when it 
effortlessly supports and is an integral part of work practices.
IT and quest for control
Transaction cost theorists claim organisations primarily exist as institutional, contractual 
arrangements to govern transactions among individuals faced with complex environments 
(Ciborra 1993). Thus, the key job of managers is to control (Ciborra and Hanseth 2000, 
Markus and Pfeffer 1983) and maintain these contractual arrangements (Ciborra 1993) in a
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milieu o f cooperation and conflict. However, control is elusive because rapid technological 
innovation, changing markets, dynamic regulatory environments and new organisational 
forms (Bj0m-Andersen and Turner 1998, Truex et a l 1999) have conspired to create a 
sweeping wave of change. Stability is reportedly out, change is in (Orlikowski 1996) and 
gurus advise organisations to transform themselves rather than merely execute routines 
(Ciborra 1993). Putting it flamboyantly. Handy avers,
“We are now entering an Age of Unreason, when the future, in so many areas, is there to be shaped, by us 
and for us -  a time when the only prediction that will hold true is that no predictions will hold true; a 
time, therefore, for bold imaginings in private life as well as public, for thinking the unlikely and doing the 
unreasonable (Handy 1990).”
Handy links the discontinuity with a hurried wave of innovation in technology and economics 
notably information technology and biotechnology. Ironically, he also sees the same 
technologies as vital for shaping the “Age of Unreason.” A subtext o f Handy’s work is that, 
“if  management uses the new powerful tools ‘properly’ it will be in control (Ciborra 2000).” 
Indeed, Kling (1980) argues managers chiefly deploy information systems to direct resources 
and control the activities o f subordinates. As such, it has been widely claimed that IS can 
radically increase the control managers (Earl and Feeny 1994) exercise over subordinates by 
providing them with “fine grained, timely and accurate information about the activities within 
their administrative domains (Kling 1980),”
The foregoing remarks support the technological imperative standpoint that sees IT as the 
prime and relatively autonomous driver o f organisational change (Avgerou 2001, Orlikowski 
1996). Information systems reputedly trigger sweeping changes in organisational structures, 
work routines, information flows (Ciborra 1993, Kling and lacono 1984, Orlikowski 1996) 
and enhance performance (Ackoff 1967). However, technological determinism (Knights and 
Murray 1994) ignores the interaction of people with technology in social contexts and instead 
focuses on the capabilities o f IT in representing, manipulating, retrieving and transmitting 
information (Orlikowski and lacono 2001). This rational view of IS also assumes that actors 
have common goals (Ciborra 1993, Keen 1981). However, as Kling (1980) argues, only 
ardent determinists would claim that the effects o f computer use depend exclusively on the 
technical features of the model adopted. For example, after Bums (1969), Knights and 
Murray (1994) argue that career and political objectives of individuals often contradict
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official organisational goals. As such, we embrace the political (Knights and Murray 1994, 
Markus 1983) or strategic rationality (Ciborra 1993) view, which,
“Assumes that different individuals or subgroups ... have different objectives depending upon their 
location in the hierarchy and that, in general, they can be expected to achieve these local goals rather 
than global organisational goals whenever differences exist (Markus 1983).”
To Knights and Murray (1994) this revelation underscores the need for understanding sub- 
imit competition and political dynamics because they illuminate the broader organisational 
struggles and conflicts characterised by individuals jockeying for position.
Power and Politics in information Systems
In view o f the foregoing remarks, IS are vital for the acquisition and exercise o f power 
because they reconfigure the face o f decision-making, organisational performance and 
legitimacy. To Kraemer and Dutton (1982) computing entails power shifts because it 
improves the decision-making effectiveness o f some actors at the expense o f others. The 
frequency and magnitude of power shifts depend on the extent and ways in which different 
actors use computers. Thus, IS are products of conflict, domination, sabotage or compromise 
because real organisations are federations o f groups (Kling and lacono 1984) with 
overlapping but often conflicting interests, objectives and values (Kling 1980).
According to Saunders et a l, the past two decades have seen regular, albeit peripheral, 
coverage of the impact o f power on IT in the management and information systems literature. 
The studies see power as encompassing topics o f politics, authority, influence, participation 
in decision-making, decision rights and centralisation or decentralisation (Saunders et a l 
2000). However, since these views o f power include many levels o f analysis, it is up to the 
readers to discern the element under discussion. For instance, to French and Raven (1959), 
individuals accumulate power from rewards, punishments, legitimacy, expertise and 
reference. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) focus on organisational or intraorganisational bases of 
power like resource provision. As such, Saunders et a l  advise researchers to state their view 
of power and indicate the unit o f analysis because this influences the theoretic outlook.
Markus and Pfeffer (1983) argue that power mainly derives from the ability to influence 
substantive outcomes through impacts on organisational action. However, it can also stem
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from shaping attitudes and beliefs about the legitimacy and rationality o f decisions and 
actions without actually using the control system. They describe this as an organisation’s 
paradigm. It includes values such as language and symbolic content. If an IS openly conflicts 
with the dominant organisational paradigm and culture, more resistance and instances o f  
systems failure (Keil 1995) would be expected (Markus and Pfeffer 1983). This is because 
language and symbols are used politically to mobilise support and quieten opposition (Kling 
and lacono 1984). Thus, regardless of the motive, controlling an information system is 
intensely political as well as technical (Keen 1981, Markus 1983). We agree that,
“Rather than considering politics as an impediment ... we look at it as an important and potentially 
beneficial factor in successful organisational learning. (Indeed) understanding the political implications of 
a new technology may be one of the most im portant lessons an organisation learns during the process 
of institutionalisation (Romm et al. 1996).”
To Dutton and Danziger although research on technology and politics is extensive, a focus on 
factors that shape IT use and effects on the environment unifies the literature. The literature 
has three angles. First, the adoption and use o f technology unfolds through an ongoing socio­
political process in which the environment constrains the artefact (Avgerou 2001, Hanseth 
and Monteiro 1998, Kraemer and Dutton 1982). Second, technology affects its environment 
causing intended and unintended effects (Hanseth and Braa 1998). Third, because a 
technology is an interdependent system of people, equipment and technique, changes in one 
element affects other parts (Angell and Smithson 1991). We explore all three approaches.
Control of information
According to Keen (1981) information is a central political resource because o f the close 
relationship between its ownership and autonomy (Clegg 1989). Similarly, Kraemer and 
Dutton (1982) view information as a political resource within organisations, just as expertise, 
status or position authority. Information systems affect information flows because they can 
modify the speed, direction, content, and its patterns o f circulation. Therefore, an IS becomes 
contentious if  it gives some actors access to more information (Keen 1981, Markus and 
Pfeffer 1983) than their rivals. However,
“Access to information is probably less important as a basis of power than is the ability to control access 
to information or to define what information will be kept and manipulated in what ways. When a 
system centralises control over data, the individual or subunit who gains the control is likely to accept the
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system readily, while those units losing control are likely to resist, even if they receive access to larger 
amount of data in return (Markus 1983).”
Dutton and Danziger (1982) believe that the study o f the politics o f computing should cover 
the relative influence o f various groups over decisions about the use o f computer resources 
and the interests served by the system. While IS generally increase efficiency, the systems 
that affect power balances enable actors to,
“Manage -  control events by getting rapid and correct feedback about operations in progress; Plan -  
anticipate future uncontrollable events by getting analyses of current trends and predictions; Persuade or 
coerce -  control decision situations by getting superior or sensitive information which is perceived as 
compelling (Kraemer and Dutton 1982).”
Keen (1981) argues that when an IS redistributes data this acts as a spur for redesigning the 
organisation, disrupting patterns o f communication and reallocating authority. The impact 
depends on whether the system aims to simply improve operations or significantly change the 
social structure (Markus 1983, Markus and Pfeffer 1983). We are interested in the latter case 
where the new system acts as a vehicle for substantially modifying organisational practices 
and structures. However, using an IS to cause revolutionary change (Hanseth and Braa 1998, 
Markus and Pfeffer 1983) increases the risk for conflict, resistance and system failure 
(Markus 1983, Markus and Pfeffer 1983) because by directly affecting power relations (Keen 
1981) the system creates many losers. Yet PKI causes big changes by underpinning new 
security practices often in conflict with existing power structures.
This study calls for the wider understanding o f the role o f contextual factors (Avgerou 2001, 
Orlikowski 1996) such as power distribution and organisational culture (Markus and Pfeffer 
1983) in PKI institutionalisation. We see parallels between PKI and the acceptance of 
infrastructures intended as coupling devices to coordinate planning and improve management 
control. Infi*astructures have been problematic (Hanseth and Braa 1998) because in a quest to 
make management win, system sponsors largely ignore the concerns o f other agencies about 
the loss o f power, interference and other forms o f intervention. This sows seeds o f resistance 
that may lead to either the overhaul (Markus 1983) or abandonment o f expensively 
assembled information systems (Keil 1995, Markus and Keil 1994).
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IS implementation motives
IS literature has two broad diverse views on the origins of technological solutions. The most 
prevalent view is systems rationalism (Kling 1980) that has functionalist roots (Knights and 
Murray 1994), Its proponents believe that rational considerations solely drive IS deployment. 
Segmented institutionalism counters that organisations may adopt systems for subjective 
reasons such as politics.
Systems rationalism
This perspective o f IS adoption emphasises the positive role that technology plays in 
organisational and social life (Kling 1980). This view is rooted in the functionalist paradigm 
that provides rational explanation to social affairs (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Rationalists 
believe that features of the capitalist world, notably the profit motive and capital 
accumulation, shape innovation processes (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, McLoughlin and 
Harris 1997). Thus, organisations ostensibly adopt IS to increase efficiency (Earl and Feeny 
1994), improve information flows (Ackoff 1967, Zuboff 1988), cut coordination costs 
(Malone et al. 1987) and generally boost competitiveness (Ives and Learmonth 1984, Porter 
and Millar 1985, Venkatraman 1991). These ideas are linked with Frederick W. Taylor’s 
scientific management and the Henry Ford automation vision. Since, Fordist ideas remain 
prevalent in the assumptions o f production engineers, managers, systems analysts and work- 
study experts (McLoughlin and Harris 1997),
“The overarching assumptions underlying systems development has been that problems, such as they exist, 
are technical, not social or organisational, in nature. As a consequence, organisations are treated like 
machines: once the technology is functioning properly, the organisation is presumed to transmit its 
contents unproblematically (Knights and Murray 1994).”
Franz and Robey (1984) agree. They argue that research frequently depicts system 
development activities as rational events, undertaken to improve the effectiveness o f an 
operation. As a result, many commentators (Gottschalk 1999, Hammer 1990, Hammer and 
Champy 1993, Porter and Millar 1985) claim that the only useful IS are those adopted after a 
‘rational’ task-technology fit evaluation (Karahanna et al. 1999, Venkatraman 1991). There is 
also a belief in a marked consensus on the major social goals relating to the usage of 
computer systems (Kling 1980). The reason for IS adoption, so goes the story, is to enable an
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organisation maintain its competitive edge (Ives and Learmonth 1984, Venkatraman 1991) 
and deliver returns to its shareholders. Thus,
“Technology is the instrument of change rather than its product. Because value-consensus underlies the 
functionalist paradigm, in normal circumstances conflict or resistance to the progress of technology does 
not occur. But where there is evidence of political conflict, it is presumed to be pathological or deviant and 
must be purged much like a virus in piece of computer software, lest it contaminates the whole system 
(Knights and Murray 1994).”
However, Taylorism is accused o f an authoritarian bias (Hirschheim and Klein 1994).
Segmented institutionalism
McLoughlin and Harris (1997) see a common feature o f Fordist and post-Fordist models of 
technology as the belief that change is essentially, an “adaptive activity dictated by broader 
economic and technological factors.” However, insisting that value-consensus is a myth in 
social life (Knights and Murray 1994), segmented institutionalists see technology as having 
both ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ consequences on social life (Kling 1980). They observe,
“Participants in organisations adopt computing to enhance their personal status or credibility ... they 
identify as dominant values the sovereignty of individuals and groups over critical aspects of their lives, 
the integrity of individuals, and social equity; economic or organisational efficiency is subservient to 
these values (Kling 1980).”
In reality intergroup conflict is as likely as cooperation because stakeholders have 
overlapping but conflicting interests (Keen 1981, Kling 1980). Therefore, political struggles 
and conflict are common in organisational and social life (Knights and Murray 1994). Kling 
(1980) reveals that actors with a segmented institutionalist approach understand conflicting 
interests and develop plans to work around them. This could involve demanding different and 
potentially incompatible technological platforms or even none at all (Kling 1980). However, 
the outcome o f this jostling for position is that big organisations rarely accept universal 
solutions because the zero-sum nature o f technical artefacts ensures that the inclusion of 
given features leaves out preferences o f other stakeholders.
Indeed, Kling and lacono (1984) argue that information systems do not always enhance 
efficiency as widely claimed but ambitious players use this language as a façade to push the 
system in a direction that consolidates their power and control over organisational action.
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Therefore, IS institutionalisation depends on how well this apparent subjectivity can be 
dressed up into an objective reality seemingly devoid of political calculation.
Problematic nature of technology
Dutton and Danziger (1982) argue that computer systems usually exist at the periphery of 
public attention because most observers do not appreciate their social costs and benefits. 
“And when people do think of computing, it is usually as either a minor convenience or as 
an annoying inconvenience (Dutton and Danziger 1982).” They reveal that a growing body 
o f literature posits that computer systems have major consequences for the sociology and 
politics o f organisations and broader society. In addition, contrary to common logic IT rarely 
contributes to the allocations of resources and control o f diverse activities (Hinds and Kiesler
1999) because o f its contradictory attributes. This is because,
“People who study how technology affects organisational transformation increasingly recognise its dual, 
paradoxical natural. It is both an engine and barrier for change; both customisable and rigid; both inside 
and outside organisational practices. It is product and process. Some authors have analysed this seeming 
paradox as structuration ... technological rigidity gives rise to adaptations, which in tu rn  require 
calibration and standardisation (Star and Ruhleder 1996).”
Kling (1980) argues that managing an IS gets more complicated if  it critically depends on 
people’s skills and cooperation because organisational actors normally have conflicting goals. 
He warns that when there are conflicts over the control o f critical resources, information 
systems may simply be used as “political instruments by the contenders and fought as 
political intrusions.” As such, different groups may see a new IS as a chance to enshrine a 
reporting structure that minimises their accountability but maximises its visibility and control 
over opponents (Kling 1980). Interests groups are vital in the institutionalisation o f IS 
because their rules o f meaning and membership shape the attitudes o f members towards the 
new system (Karahanna et a l  1999). However, the wrangles may be useful. Markus (1983) 
believes disagreements may prevent the implementation o f undesirable IS because some,
“Are dumb ideas. Others threaten the interests of individuals and groups by intruding in on their territory, 
limiting their autonomy, reducing their influence or adding to their workload. While we all may try  to act 
in the ‘corporate’ interest, we often have very different definitions of exactly what that is (Keen 
1981).”
Since IS can affect power relations when utilised in unpoliticised arenas, Kling (1980) warns 
that their consequences are more profound when participants consciously set out to increase
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and exercise their power. Nevertheless, he claims that information systems reinforce the 
structure o f power in organisations more frequently than not because computer-based systems 
are generally expensive to develop and use. He claims it explains why managers and 
accountants (Markus 1983, Markus and Pfeffer 1983) often gain power from IS deployments 
because they authorise the big expenditures and ensure that the systems serve their interests. 
In other words, information systems act as “political, power-reinforcing instruments (Kling
1980, Torvinen and Jalonen 2000)” that increase managerial control interests by fragmenting 
and deskilling jobs (Kling 1990). However, Dutton and Danziger (1982) claim Kling's view 
smacks o f managerial rationalism. In this arrangement, authoritative top managers who use 
extensive, high quality information employ techniques such as cost-benefrt analysis to control 
organisations. It is claimed managers make the major decisions because IS serve wider 
organisational interests. However, Dutton and Danziger insist information systems are highly 
malleable and can serve a variety of interests.
To Kraemer and Dutton (1982) while computers are a malleable technology, they are 
certainly not apolitical (Knights and Murray 1994) because they often serve the interests of 
actors who control the organisation. It was partly the fear that computers would extend the 
lives o f outdated organisational and societal structures (Angell and Smithson 1991, 
Weizenbaum 1984) that inspired business process reengineering proponents to coin pithy 
statements such as ‘don’t automate, obliterate’ (Hammer 1990, Hammer and Champy 1993, 
Venkatraman 1991). Thus, despite all the revolutionary credentials ascribed to computers 
(Zuboff 1988), they are not always tools of reform since systems largely automate or even 
exaggerate existing biases and inequalities o f influence (Kraemer and Dutton 1982).” This is 
due to the complexity o f IS that makes it hard for outsiders to oppose actors using the 
systems to support their own interests and values (Kraemer and Dutton 1982, Markus and 
Bj 0 m-Andersen 1987).
However, the power shifts caused by IS, “tend to be subtle, limited, and complex in their 
patterns (Kraemer and Dutton 1982).” Kling believes it is vital to understand the political 
context and the technical features o f the IS to have a reasonable picture o f their probable uses 
and impacts. Therefore, the political-technical nature o f IS (Karahanna et a l  1999, Keen
1981, Markus 1983) undermines the sufficiency o f formulations that emphasise technical 
features and downplay the organisational political dynamics in which the systems are utilised. 
After all.
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“Computers by themselves ‘do’ nothing to anybody. ... (Since) there is sufficient evidence, that 
computing use is purposive and varies between social settings; little causal power can be attributed to 
conputers themselves. .. .and speaking about the ‘impacts of technology’ often distracts attention from the 
social processes by which they are developed, adopted and used (Kling 1980).”
Even the phrase ‘computer impacts’ is deterministic (Knights and Murray 1994) for it 
attributes power to technology (Hanseth and Braa 1998) yet most social changes linked to IS 
result from managerial action after the implementation o f a system (Kling 1990).
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Technical Security
Technical security relies on an array of techniques and devices to constrain the range of 
activities permissible for organisational members. Therefore, just like rationalistic approaches 
such as scientific management (Taylor 1911) before them, security techniques such as 
cryptography attempt to buy certainty and reduce risks in an uncertain world (Garfinkel and 
Spafford 1997). Cryptography achieves certainty by shaping organisational action through 
limiting the autonomy o f individuals. Thus, to become infrastructural, security technologies 
need to engender a security culture. Success in this quest relies on their acceptance as part of 
the routines, values, practices and policies o f real organisations.
Old techniques, new risks
Austin (2001) argues that information assets such as customer and employee databases 
represent a significant share o f the overall value of modem organisations. In an effort to 
increase market share and profitability, organisations have come under pressure to provide 
their digital assets over the internet (Austin 2001, Klang 2001). However, being a public 
channel, the security o f the internet is inadequate for the needs o f all its users (Bumgarner 
2001, Diffie and Heilman 1976, Schwartau 1998). With more business transactions 
conducted online, digital security has become a prerequisite rather than a speciality for high- 
end users (Fernandes 2001). Yet internet security is a difficult subject because many 
organisations lack a holistic approach to security (Wood 1997, Wood 2000). However, a 
number o f factors are forcing them to take heed (BBC 2002a, Russell and Gangemi Sr 1991). 
For instance, in their recent fight against terrorism, governments demand effective security 
safeguards for critical electronic infrastmcture (Pounder 2002).
Changed Security Paradigm
With its global reach, the internet opens up numerous business opportunities. Indeed, at the 
height of the dotcom boom it was widely predicted that e-commerce would surpass offline 
business (Singh 1999) in a couple of years (Datamonitor 2000, Forrester 2000, Jupiter 2000a, 
Jupiter 2000e). However, the predictions underrated the refractory nature o f the risks 
(Bhimani 1996) associated with e-business referred to as “tmst.” Although the physical world
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grapples with similar issues, the anonymity o f cyberspace exacerbates the risks (Ba 2001, 
Schneier 2000). To Klang (2001) security issues are inherent in the nature o f this medium 
because the whole concept o f the internet relies upon the impossibility o f control (Josang et 
al. 2001). “This design has the effect o f making any attempts o f regulation seem a task 
comparable to Sisyphus'  ^(Klang 2001 329).”
Worse still, the new security paradigm has rewritten assumptions and eroded confidence in 
tried and trusted controls. For instance, computer security has traditionally enforced a fortress 
mentality (Lindup 1996, Shain 1991). Despite the perilous effects o f the mentality in military 
and corporate history (Schwartau 1998), the practice lives on. To Nash et a l  (2001) 
demilitarised zones (DMZs) distinguish resources available to external users (bastion hosts); 
firewalls limit damage by separating the internal network from public ones and authentication 
products restrict access. In addition, intrusion detection systems (battlements) and security- 
hardened operating systems help defend the inner corporate stronghold (Day et a l  1999). 
Inside the fortress is trusted and information resources are availed but anything outside the 
perimeter is assumed non-trusted until proven otherwise (RSA 1999). However, the.
“Security challenges are now significantly different. Networking has moved from its medieval roots to a 
renaissance period. The massive adoption of the Internet as a basis for electronic commerce has moved the 
whole security model from one of a small community huddling within a medieval keep to a walled city 
with an open marketplace. ... Yesterday, security was prim arily about how to limit access. Today, it is 
about how to maximise access -  to the right people (Nash et a l 2001).”
Thus, the fortress mentality impedes the very idea o f an open global e-marketplace. Yet,
“We now face a new security paradigm very different from the old paradigm of communications security. 
Distrusting parties need a trusted environment to conduct a business transaction. ... The adversary is no 
longer an intruder but a fraudulent insider, and the third party  guarantees ra ther than compromises 
security (Gollmann 2000a).”
E-commerce has also changed attitudes and meaning o f key concepts like confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Gollmann (2000a) argues that while intruders will find it harder to 
tamper with orders, the focus o f integrity now shifts to ensuring that customers or merchants 
do not make fraudulent changes (Ba 2001). Parties are less interested in establishing the 
identity of counterpart than in the validity of the transaction.
^ A cruel king of Corinth sentenced by Pluto to forever roll a huge stone up a hill in Hades only to have it roll 
down again on nearing the top.
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To conclude, secure e-commerce requires robust measures against fraud (Gollmann 2000a, 
Schneier 2000, Sherif 2000). To Tan and Thoen (2000) an agent’s trust depends on both their 
confidence in the counterpart and an expectation o f effective anti-fraud controls. The 
distinction is vital in international B2B e-commerce, where partners may not have established 
trading relationships. With a strong control mechanism, trust arises not because a party has 
any specific reason to believe the other’s trustworthiness but because the system stops deceit 
(Blaze et a l  1996, Tan and Thoen 2000). Cryptography engenders this confidence (Wood 
1996) in online interactions.
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Cryptography and Web Security
Web security is a complex topic that covers diverse topics such as computer and network 
seicurity, firewall configuration, authentication services and privacy (Josang et a l  2001). 
Ciryptography is vital for web security because it offers a control mechanism that enables 
pairties to transact even though they do not trust each other (Adams and Lloyd 1999, Ba 
20)01). The benefit is mutual because the internet actually resuscitated cryptography. Whereas 
gO)vemments widely used the technology,
“The phenomenal growth of the Internet — along with its perceived insecurity —  has transformed a 
relatively obscure and esoteric science into a key link to the promises of the New Economy: as the 
current wisdom goes, e-commerce will not flourish until the public gains sufficient confidence that 
electronic transactions are secure. ‘Security’, in this context, is generally equated with the ability to 
exchange information confidentially.., using cryptology-based technologies (Blanchette 2000).”
While most commentators consider cryptography a military technology, civilians (Diffie and 
Heilman 1976, Gardner 1977, Rivest et a l  1978) invented (rather re-invented) nearly all the 
strongest cryptosystems. For instance, cryptography was a hobby for Victorian ‘gentlemen.’ 
Charles Babbage admits, ‘Deciphering, is in my opinion, one o f the most fascinating arts 
...and I fear I have wasted upon it more time than it deserves (Standage 1999).’ 
Cryptography has a military association because nearly all its examples are stories o f armies 
and spies using cryptosystems to shield messages (Cohen 1995, Kahn 1996).
Approaches to cryptography
Chen et a l  (1999) describe encryption as “the transformation o f data into a form that is 
practically close to being impossible to read without certain appropriate knowledge.” 
Encryption maintains privacy because even if  a third party intercepts the data the message 
remains gibberish. The transformation of normal text {plaintext) into gibberish {ciphertext) 
can be performed by either symmetric {secret key) or asymmetric {public key) ciphers 
(Adams and Lloyd 1999, Chen et a l 1999, Schneier 1996a).
Symmetric cryptography
To Singh (1999) under symmetric ciphers, the unscrambling process is simply the opposite o f  
scrambling (Garfinkel and Spafford 1997). Symmetric ciphers rely on the principle that only
39
the sender and recipient have a common key before the transmission of the message (Adams 
and Lloyd 1999, Nash et al. 2001). Symmetric key algorithms are either block or stream 
(Garfinkel and Spafford 1997, Schneier 1996a, Singh 1999). Block algorithms such as DES, 
Blowfish, RC2  ^ and RC5 encrypt data a block at a time. In contrast, stream algorithms, like 
RC4, encrypt data byte by byte. However, symmetric ciphers are problematic in e-commerce 
because they require a secure out-band channel to exchange the key before communication 
occurs. This causes key management issues (Blaze et a l  1996, Price 1999). As a result,
“Cryptography has been a derivative security measure. Once a secure channel exists along which keys can 
be transmitted, the security can be extended to other channels ... The effect has been to limit the use of 
cryptography to communications among people who have made prior preparation for cryptographic 
security. In order to develop large, secure, telecommunications systems, this must be changed. A large 
number of users n results in an even larger number, (n^-n)/2 potential pairs who may wish to communicate 
privately from all others. It is unrealistic ... (Diffie and Heilman 1976).”
Despite key exchange problems, symmetric ciphers are fixtures in modem cryptographic 
systems. This is because they are quicker, offer a large number o f possible keys and are easier 
to implement than public key algorithms. Indeed, “The best symmetric key algorithms offer 
near-perfect secrecy: once data is encrypted with a given key, there is no way to decrypt the 
data without possessing the same key (Garfinkel and Spafford 1997).”
Asymmetric cryptography
Unlike symmetric ciphers that rely on a shared secret, public key cryptography (PKC) uses 
separate keys for encryption (public key) and decryption (private key) (Singh 1999, van 
Krugten and Hoogenboom 2000). PKC features suit e-commerce because its objective is to 
enable real time transactions even between strangers. Indeed, PKC arose out o f a fear by 
Whitfield Diffie that the key distribution problem under symmetric ciphers, that had troubled 
governments and large corporations for ages, would simply prevent the public from taking 
advantage o f cryptography. Singh elegantly summarises the quandary.
“The whole problem of key distribution is a classic catch-22 situation. If two people want to exchange a 
secret message over the phone, the sender must encrypt it. To encrypt the secret message the sender must 
use a key, which is itself a secret, so there is the problem of transm itting the secret key to the receiver 
in order to transmit the secret message (Singh 1999).”
RC stands for Ron’s code. Ronald Rivest developed RC2, RC4, a stream cipher and RC5, a block cipher at 
RSA Security and kept them trade secrets. They were exposed through anonymous postings in Usenet groups in 
1994 (RC4 and RC5) and in 1996 (RC2).
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Diffie and Martin Heilman (1976) introduced the twin concepts o f public cryptosystem and 
public key distribution systems in tbeir seminal paper '"New Directions in Cryptography” 
Declaring that the world was on the threshold o f a cryptography revolution, they underlined 
the “need for new types of cryptographic systems, which minimise the need for secure key 
distribution channels and supply the equivalent o f a written signature,” This heralded an 
approach where parties communicating solely over a public channel with known techniques 
were able to create secure communication channels. This was a momentous discovery as the 
following paragraph reveals.
“Is it possible to devise a cipher that can be rapidly encoded and decoded by computer, can be used 
repeatedly without changing the key and is unbreakable by sophisticated cryptanalysis? The surprising 
answer is yes. The breakthrough is scarcely two years old, yet it bids fair to revolutionise the entire 
field of secret communication. Indeed, it is so revolutionary that all previous ciphers, together with the 
techniques for cracking them, may soon fade into oblivion (Gardner 1977).”
However, recent research has suggested that Diffie and Heilman were not, after all, the first 
people to invent PKC concepts. The accolades should have gone to a trio o f security agents at 
the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Cheltenham, a top-secret British 
establishment (Schneier 2000, Singh 1999). James Ellis, Clifford Cocks and Malcolm J. 
Williamson discovered the same concepts as RSA and Diffie-Hellman but the innovations 
remained secret. By 1969, Ellis was at the same stage as what the Stanford trio o f Diffie, 
Hellmann and Ralph Merkle were to reach in 1975. He later invited Cocks to put his 
principles of “non-secret encryption” principles into practice. The outcome was a system 
similar to RSA asymmetric cipher. Williamson pushed this work forward by discovering the 
Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange scheme at about the same time as the Stanford trio. By 
1975, the agents had discovered all the fundamental aspects o f PKC (Singh 1999).
However, since 1976 few PKC algorithms have proved both secure and practical. Many 
algorithms are impractical because either the key is too large or the ciphertext is much larger 
than the plaintext. For instance, RSA, the best PKC cipher, is about 1000 and 100 times 
slower than DES in hardware and software respectively (Schneier 1996a). Thus, nobody 
directly uses PKC to encrypt messages. Most systems using PGP, PEM and S/MIME employ 
hybrid cryptosystems where a random key ft"om a symmetric algorithm encrypts the message 
and after that, the random key is itself encrypted with the recipient’s public key (Schneier 
1996a, Schneier 2000, Singh 1999).
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The crypto arms race
RSA derives its strength from the difficulty o f factoring large numbers (Schneier 1996a). 
Theoretically, this takes millions of years to accomplish (Gardner 1977) because it involves 
the factorisation of a very large number. Singh (1999) believes that since cryptographers are 
always fearful of somebody breaking their code, they normally choose prime numbers as big 
as 10^ °^ a figure that would take a hundred million PCs to crack. Singh believes that with 
suitably large prime numbers, p  and q, RSA is unbreakable for it is virtually impossible to 
deduce these figures from their product N. Announcing the invention of RSA Gardner 
mockingly writes,
“All over the world, there are clever men and women, some of them geniuses, who have devoted their lives 
to the mastery of modem cryptanalysis. Since World War II, even those government and military ciphers 
that are not one-time pads have become so difficult to break that the talents of these experts have gradually 
become less useful. Now these people are standing on trapdoors that are about to spring open and 
drop them completely from sight (Gardner 1977).”
However, the battle for supremacy between codemakers and codebreakers is far from over 
(Kahn 1996). For instance, Singh warns that quantum computing could render RSA and other 
modem PKC ciphers useless because it simplifies number factoring (Landau 2000, Schneier 
1996). In turn, codemakers are looking to quantum cryptography to stay ahead. Singh claims 
quantum cryptography “is not just effectively unbreakable, it is absolutely unbreakable. 
Quantum theory ... means that it is impossible for Eve to intercept accurately the one-time 
pad key established between Alice and Bob.”
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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
In this Study, we define a PKI as a pervasive security substrate (Adams and Lloyd 1999) that 
facilitates the implementation o f PKC applications. To Hunt (2001) a PKI provides the core 
framework for a wide variety of components, applications, policies and practices to support 
organisational security goals (Baltimore 2000). Likewise, Fernandes (2000) sees a PKI as the 
computer programs and protocols needed to exchange public keys to help associate a 
person’s electronic and physical identities (Baum 1999, NIST 1997).
However, Austin (2000) regards the PKI acronym as a misnomer since its reference to PKC 
conceals the fact that both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography work together in the 
infrastructure to provide overall security (Schneier 2000, Singh 1999, Zimmermann 1998), 
PKI is the most promising technology for facilitating digital security because it provides a 
trusted environment for real time transactions between strangers (Baum 1999, Gollmann 
2000a). Nash et a l  (2001) argue that PKI has caused considerable excitement (Wheatman 
and Pescatore 2001) because o f its immense ability to create and manage a vastly scalable set 
of digital identities. Indeed,
“The main impact o f cryptology might not lie so much in its ability to provide confidentiality to the 
masses, but rather in the way it has come to define authenticity of electronic transactions (identification of 
parties + non-repudiation) and its technological realisation in the electronic world (PKIs) (Blanchette 
2000) .”
Commentators link PKI with the emergence o f internet technologies and e-commerce 
(Radicati 1998) because these innovations exposed glaring gaps in digital security 
mechanisms (Adams 2000, Schneier 2000). Organisations originally adopted PKI with 
applications focused on cost cutting and streamlining business processes and practices (Levitt
1999). The re-engineering hoped to transform social relations, increase employee 
commitment and thus efficiency (McCabe et a l  1998). However, the association with efforts 
to reconfigure power relations inevitably exposed PKI to the tensions touched off by the 
exercises. This is the main theme o f subsequent chapters. PKI later graduated from a 
specialised security component of the restructuring exercise into a core IS component 
(Radicati 1998). In the literature, conventional PKI actually refers to the X.509v3-based 
architecture or PKIX (Clarke 2001).
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PKIX Standards
PKIX standards define the use o f X.509 certificates and the accompanying protocols for 
creating, publishing and fetching certificates as well as the schemes for the generation and 
distribution of key material (Sun 1998). PKIX was initially a single Internet Draft but has 
since been broken into six parts that are themselves split into smaller components (Hughes 
1998b). We briefly highlight these areas.
Part 1 -  Certificate and CRL profile
The section describes the basic certificate fields and the extensions supported for X.509v3 
Public Key Certificates and X.509v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (Hughes 1998b, Xenitellis
2000). The part profiles the format and semantics of certificates and CRLs using Abstract 
Syntax Notation 1 (ASN.l). It also includes the encoding rules for popular cryptographic 
algorithms such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman and Digital Signature Algorithm (Hughes 1998b).
Part 2 -  Operational Controls
This part discusses ways o f accessing certificate and CRL repositories using Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) version 2 (Austin 2001, Hughes 1998b, Xenitellis 2000). 
It permits End Entities (EE) such as machines, users and CAs to retrieve certificates and 
CRLs. It further authorises CAs to populate certificates and CRLs. The document also 
defines how EEs and CAs using FTP and HTTP can obtain certificates and CRLs from 
repositories. The part also covers Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) that enables EEs 
to ascertain the validity o f certificates without needing to read lengthy CRLs (Hughes 1998b).
Part 3 -  Certificate Management Protocols
This document defines the management side of the PKI model by identifying the entities 
involved such as CAs, EEs, Repository and optionally Registration Authorities (RAs). The 
document introduces notions o f Personal Security Environment (PSE) like smart cards and 
Proof o f Possession (POP) o f the private key. POP mandates EEs to show the RA/CA that 
they hold the private key corresponding to the public key for which the certificate is required 
(Austin 2001, Hughes 1998b). It also defines a simple protocol for transporting PKI messages 
between entities (Xenitellis 2000) as illustrated next.
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Figure 2 -  General PKIX model (Hughes 1998b)
Part 4 -  Certificate Policy and CPS Framework
A CPS is a statement of practices that a CA employs in issuing certificates to subscribers 
(AICPA and CICA 2000, Hughes 1998b, Hunt 2001). Subscribers and relying parties depend 
on CPSs to ascertain the trustworthiness of the PKI for transactions and interconnection with 
their own infrastructures (AICPA and CICA 2000, Backhouse 2002). The CPS also covers 
the certificate and CRL profiles used. The document further establishes the relationship 
between certificate policies and CPSs.
Part 5 -  Time Stamp Protocols
To Austin (2001) time stamps provide control and evidentiary standing for transaction audit. 
This document describes a protocol between requesting entities and a Time Stamp Authority 
(TSA). The time stamping services define a trusted third party that creates time stamp tokens 
in order to indicate that a datum existed at a particular point in time (Xenitellis 2000). In e-
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business, time stamps secure data transactions and perform a vital piece o f assurance o f data 
integrity (Nash et al. 2001). Therefore, the time stamp’s data structure must itself be 
cryptographically sound (Adams and Lloyd 1999).
Part 6 -  Notary Protocols
The part defines a notary service between requesting entities and a special type o f Trusted 
Third Party called a Notary Authority (Hughes 1998a, Hughes 1998b). The Authority verifies 
the submitted data for its correctness with a view o f building non-repudiation information and 
creates a Notary Token (Hughes 1998b). Nevertheless, the meaning o f “correctness” depends 
on the type o f data certified (Adams and Lloyd 1999).
The primary reason for defining PKIX profiles is to maximise interoperability between 
different components o f a PKI (Baum and Ford 1998, CygnaCom 1995, Fratto 2000, 
Williams and Zunic 2000). However, since PKIX offers many options, end-users and system 
integrators face the problem of defining a framework that sets a stage for various PKI entities 
to communicate with each other (Hughes 1998b, Hunt 2001).
Digital Certificate
Chokhani and Ford (1999) regard a certificate^ as a means o f binding a public key value to a 
set o f information that identifies an entity such as a person or account associated with a 
corresponding private key. This entity is the subject. The certificate provides assurance that 
the public key belongs to the subscriber (Austin 2001) by binding it to their digital signature 
(Hunt 2001). To Austin (2001) it is vital that a CA signs the certificate because although if  
Bob signed his own certificate it would provide data integrity, Alice has no assurance that the 
public key belongs to him (Baum 1994, Puhakainen 2000). Self-signed certificates also do 
not confirm that Bob actually holds the private key to published public key.
X.509 Recommendation
x.509, the oldest standard certificate form, underpins most digital certificates (Ellison 1997). 
According to Hunt (2001), X.509 provides a useful basis for defining data formats and 
procedures for the distribution of public keys via certificates digitally signed by CAs. It is an
also called public key certificate
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authentication framework designed to support the X.500 directory access standard proposed 
by ISO and ITU (Ellison 1997, Fomé and Castro 1999). While the goal of X.500 was to 
create a global directory of named persons and things, X.509 provides a PKI framework for 
authenticating X.500 services by defining the structure of certificates and any optional 
extensions. X.509 is at version 3 (X.509v3). It supports PKI interoperation and defines 
extensions used to customise the infrastructure to specific business needs (NIST 1997). 
However, the flexibility of the extensions allow too often turns into a hotbed of 
interoperability problems (Baum and Ford 1998, Hunt 2001). The following figure shows the 
common fields of an X.509v3 certificate presented in Internet Explorer version 6.
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Figure 3 -  Fields of an X.509 certificate for Safeweb.com
We explore the X.509 certificate further with a simplified version on the next page.
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Figure 4 -  An illustration of a digital certificate (Austin 2001)
The Subject area shows Bob’s identity and public key. The CA adds information such as the 
issuance date, the validity period, its own identity, among other necessary details. The CA 
hashes the three elements and uses its private key to generate a digital signature, the fourth 
element of the certificate (Chokhani and Ford 1999). This certificate digital signature 
supports data integrity, authenticates the CA, and offers non-repudiation to relying parties 
(Austin 2001, Chokhani and Ford 1999).
X.509 Certificate Versions
The X.509 standard not only defines the information that is included on the certificate it also 
prescribes the order of its presentation (Chadwick 2002, Chokhani and Ford 1999, Gutmann 
1999a, Myers et a l 1999, Puhakainen 2000). The uniformity is both regarded as vital for 
setting the stage for interoperation (Baum and Ford 1998) and a key reason why X.509 based 
infrastructures are regarded as hierarchical and authoritarian (Clarke 2001).
X.509 has gone through numerous revisions to accommodate the changing needs of the 
security community with Version 1 published in 1988 the most generic. Version 2 introduced 
Subject and Issuer identifiers to handle the possibility of reusing subject and/or issuer names 
(Sun 1998). However, because certificate profile documents strongly warn against the reuse 
of names and unique identifiers, X.509v2 certificates are not widely deployed. Hence, the 
most widely used PKIX certificate is X.509v3 issued in 1996. This version supports the
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notion of Extensions, which allows organisations to define additional certificate identifiers as 
illustrated below (Hunt 2001).
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Figure 5 - An illustration of a certificate listing most of the fields in X.509 Version 3
The most common extension is KeyUsage, which can limit key use to specific purposes say 
signing (AICPA and CICA 2000). Another popular extension is AlternativeNames that allows 
other identities such as DNS (Domain Name System) names, Email addresses and IP 
addresses to be associated with a public key. In some cases, an extension can be marked 
critical to inform relying parties that it needs proper checking, enforcement or use. However, 
the extensions are problematic because while,
“X .509v3 certificates . . . .  offer a variety  o f  extensions w hich  can take on a w ide range o f  options. This 
p rovides considerable flexibility , w hich allow s the X .509v3 certificate form at to be used in m any 
applications. U nfortunately, this sam e flexibility  m akes it extremely difficult to produce independent 
implementations that will actually inter operate (H unt 2001).”
Indeed, different vendor interpretations or ‘improvements’ to the X.509v3 format have 
caused untold interoperability problems (Baum and Ford 1998, CygnaCom 1995, Fratto 
2000, Williams and Zunic 2000). We are not discussing interoperation problems in detail 
because they are outside the scope of this dissertation. However, we should state that since 
technical artefacts have a zero-sum character where the inclusion of certain features excludes 
preferences of others, X.509 extensions often fuel organisational power struggles.
A summary of PKI debates
Most commentators (Adams and Lloyd 1999, Austin 2001, Barber 2000, Baum and Ford 
1998, Nash et al. 2001, Ortiz 2000, Rivest et al. 1978, Schneier 1996a, Singh 1999, Zimits 
and Montano 1998, Zimmermann 1998), believe that strong cryptography as personified in 
PKIs is critical for the privacy and security of online transactions. However, recent literature 
has robustly questioned the apparent coronation of PKI as the backbone of e-security. The
49
sentiments are summarised in a maverick question: Do we even need a PKI for e-commerce? 
While the trade press claims,
“PKI is desperately needed for e-commerce to flourish. This statement is patently false. E-commerce is 
already flourishing, and there is no such PKI. Web sites are happy to take your order, whether or not you 
have a certificate. Still, as with many other false statements, there is a related true statement: commercial 
PKI desperately needs ecommerce in order to flourish. In other words, PKI startups need the claim of 
being essential to e-commerce in order to get investors (Elhson and Schneier 2000).”
A major point advanced by critics o f the “PKI for everything” bandwagon (Barber 2000) is 
that, “prior to the internet; public-key cryptography was a solution in search of a problem 
(Blanchette 2000).” Because,
“When the oldest standard certificate form, X.509, was created in the 1980’s it was part of a larger project 
X.500, which was to be a distributed global directory of named persons (and other things). The notion that 
such a directory will come about has persisted and is even present in some plans today. ... What was 
forgotten in those plans was that most companies and agencies consider their employee lists to be 
proprietary...(Thus), the X.500 dream has effectively died but the X.509 certificate has lived on 
(Ellison 1997).”
Similarly, Clarke (2001) describes X.509 as the “the hammer that came to hand when the nail 
was discovered.” The critics have argued that PKI has remained alive despite its failure to 
become a pervasive security infrastructure because of a powerful alliance of forces 
determined not to see it fail. Blanchette (2000) argues,
“Public calls to foster ‘public trust’ in e-commerce highlight how the development of secure transactions 
is, by and large, a symbolic process. W hether solutions are actually secure is not so relevant, in as 
much as secure solutions have to exist. In a way, the incredible success of cryptological technologies can 
be explained not so much by some innate superiority, but by a collective process of willing them into 
existence (Blanchette 2000).”
Klang (2001) agrees. He argues that most e-commerce security efforts still focus on the 
development o f technological mechanisms for secure payment and identification. He 
contends that although stronger encryption does make information safer, on its own it cannot 
create a secure business environment because administrative routines address identity 
concerns better (Ba 2001). Indeed, as Garfinkel and Spafford were to argue.
“If key length were the only factor determining the security of a cipher, everyone interested in exchanging 
secret messages would simply use codes with 128-bit keys, and all cryptanalysts would have to find new 
jobs. Cryptography would be a solved branch of mathematics, like simple addition. What keeps 
cryptography interesting is the fact that most encryption algorithms do not live up to our expectations. 
Key search attacks are seldom required to divulge the contents of an encrypted message. ... messages can 
be deciphered without knowing the key (Garfinkel and Spafford 1997).”
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Another deeply contested issue in the PKI literature concerns Certification Authorities (CAs). 
The concept arose out o f efforts to modify a telephone book to create publicly accessible 
certificate directories (Blanchette 2000, Diffie and Heilman 1976). Clarke argues that PKIX 
has been, and will remain a failure because o f 'Hts inherently hierarchical and authoritarian 
nature, its unreasonable assumptions about the security o f  private keys, a range o f other 
technical and implementation defects (Clarke 2001).” The need for CAs within the PKIX 
model causes most o f these problems. As we see elsewhere, the hierarchical PKIX model 
causes acute political problems in distributed organisations.
To Blanchette the PKI model and the technology itself are still evolving. For instance, he 
wonders whether certificates should bind public keys to identities or roles. Also “despite the 
fact that PKI technology has yet to evolve beyond the poster application, to be tested within 
any kind o f large-scale, intensive setting,” companies are already fighting for the market. 
While Entrust and VeriSign have dominated commercial PKI, Radicati (1998) foresaw the 
arrival o f Microsoft, IBM and Netscape (Austin 2001, Lowe-Norris 2000, Microsoft 2002, 
Microsoft 2002b).
As a conclusion to this review o f power, politics and technical security debates and a prelude 
to the next section, we would like to point out that the institutionalisation o f cryptographic 
systems takes more effort that many people anticipate because o f the “Not Invented Here” 
tag. Cryptology has not only moved from the military to the public sphere (Chen et a l  1999, 
Cohen 1995, Singh 1999), but also firom the exclusive concerns with confidentiality 
(Coppersmith 2000, Ritter 1999, Schneier 1996). Blanchette argues the shift is significant 
enough to warrant the redefinition o f cryptology from a ‘science o f information secrecy’ to a 
‘science o f information integrity’. However, it is difficult to shed the “invader” tag because 
the use of cryptography in global public organisations is worlds away from the intended user 
groups in the scientific, military and diplomatic communities. The transition is hard because.
“Design can be seen as having three interrelated dimensions, each of which is a necessary but insufficient 
precondition for making sense of innovation as a dynamic process. The first dimension, and the most 
obvious, is that of creating the artefact. ... The second dimension is . . .  constructing the user. .. images of 
eventual users are incorporated into the fabric of the object, but at the same time users are designed 
themselves -  as ideal or as necessary to complete both the function and vision embodied in the artefact. 
The third dimension of design involves catching the customer (Silverstone and Haddon 1996).”
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Therefore, appropriating an artefact implies taking it into private cultural spaces and making 
it familiar (Silverstone and Haddon 1996). As we discuss elsewhere, the appropriation of 
PKC systems largely depends on user discipline. However, since users face significant 
barriers in “hooking up” (Star and Ruhleder 1994) and the system lacks a mechanism for 
ensuring its incorporation into actual living and breathing organisational contexts, the results 
have been disappointing. Indeed, Hunt (2001) concludes that although PKI solves many 
security problems, there are still several concerns and risks associated with its use coupled 
with organisational, and management issues for which solutions are still evolving (Clark 
2000, Schultz 2002). However,
“It may well turn out that PKI technology meshes wonderfully well with user expectations, business 
practices and day-to-day usage, and ushers us into being a new golden age of consumerism. Unfortunately, 
the future may not be so rosy... the relationship between the cryptographic key and the individual 
cannot be established mathematically (it is procedural), is highly complex and worse, easily 
compromises the mathematical security of the whole (Blanchette 2000).”
Ross Anderson has catalogued crypto failures (Anderson 1994). He believes that while the 
security discipline has largely sorted out technical issues, “system aspects, where most things 
actually fail, aren’t being worked on anywhere near as much (Heiser 2002).”
Infrastructure: Bridging the social-technical gap
This dissertation uses the concept o f infrastructure to tie together the supposedly disparate 
fields of cryptography, power and politics. We say supposedly, because cryptography is but a 
blatant attempt at maintaining power and political structures by reducing uncertainty in 
organisational interactions. Thus, the separation o f the two fields is artificial because useful 
PKIs rely on the support o f power and political structures to provide a context (Star and 
Ruhleder 1994, Star and Ruhleder 1996) for the performance o f security practices (Anderson 
2001, Camp 1999, Josang et a l  2001).
Rationale for infrastructures
To Ciborra (2000) the role o f infrastructures was originally to standardise systems and 
reconcile centralised IS departments and distributed information resources (Angell and 
Smithson 1991, Williams 1997). This stems, in turn, from the Fordist rationalisation drive, 
which demanded uniform solutions (McLoughlin and Harris 1997, Rolland and Monteiro
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2002). As such, organisations sought IT systems that offered tools for automating work 
activities based on ‘universal’ mathematical principles with applicability across the widest 
array o f firms and occupations (Williams 1997).
Sawyer (2000) argues that the vitality of infrastructures to organisational success is steadily 
increasing (Byrd and Turner 2000) for two reasons. First, infrastructures are embedded in 
work (Star and Bowker 1995). Each infrastructure “is unique since common technical 
components are woven into an organisation’s administrative and social fabric (Sawyer
2000).” Indeed, Star and Bowker (1995) argue that the adoption o f any system 
simultaneously relies on its intellectual value and organisational fit. However, the 
organisational side is decisive. Second, infrastructures are vital in the formulation and 
execution o f strategy (Ives and Learmonth 1984, Porter and Millar 1985, Venkatraman 1991) 
and maintaining organisational flexibility (Clegg and Wilson 1991, Hanseth et a l 1996, 
Nelson and Ghods 1998).
Associating infrastructures with management models transformed them from “a thrown- 
together institutional backbone to a value generating, integrated set o f technologies, 
applications and process (Ciborra and Hanseth 2000).” The ability to maintain control and 
coherence to the different contexts (Rolland and Monteiro 2002) is the key selling point for 
infrastructures. Indeed, Ciborra and Hanseth (2000) assert that most technologies and 
organisational forms aim to advance control over processes in society and nature (Smithson 
1994). Yates (1989) claims that this is paramount because managerial control enables 
organisations to coordinate their operations and achieve desired goals. She contends that 
communication systems exist to coordinate large, multinational firms efficiently.
However, companies rarely follow their blueprints (Meyer and Rowan 1991). Indeed, Sawyer 
(2000) warns that the contribution o f an infrastructure to organisational success is difficult to 
ascertain (Ciborra 2000) for two reasons. First, most organisations have limited 
understanding (Ciborra 2000) o f the effects of infrastructures on work (Star and Bowker 
1995, Williams 1997). This chiefly stems from their context-dependent nature, their 
pervasiveness, and the unpredictable and varied nature of their effects at multiple levels o f 
the organisation. Second, the rate o f change o f the core IT is so rapid that organisations rarely 
get enough time to use any technology properly (Abrahamson 1991, Ciborra 2000). To 
Sawyer (2000) this rapid change ensures that at any given time several parts o f the
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infrastructure are in flux (Truex et al. 1999). Ciborra and Hanseth (2000) also warn that while 
infrastructures help control global phenomena, they are themselves difficult to control. They 
claim infrastructures may curb governance capabilities as much as they enhance them 
because, “infrastructures tend to ‘drift’ i.e. they deviate from their planned purpose for a 
variety o f reasons often outside anyone’s influence.”
What (or when) is an infrastructure?
Adams and Lloyd (1999) argue that a pervasive substrate is a foundation for a large 
environment such as a corporate organisation. As such, they regard an infrastructure as a 
pervasive substrate because it exists such that disparate entities can “tap into it” and use it on 
an as-needed basis (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999). Similarly, Hanseth (2000) sees the 
critical feature o f an infrastructure as its support or enabling fimction. To Sawyer (2000) 
infrastructures constitute hardware and software, administrative roles and rules that support 
that collection, and the informal norms and behaviours that grow around the IT and the rules 
for governing its use. Broadly put,
“An infrastructure can be thought of as a platform for implementation that, without interfering with the 
details, offers the foundation and service needed by the various applications for production, distribution 
and recreation. But an infrastructure can also be a regulating skeleton, providing framework and guidelines 
for activity. The infrastructure provides stability and security rather than liberty of action (Dahlbom 
2000) .”
To Star and Ruhleder (1994, 1996) common infrastructural metaphors are those of substrate 
or something upon which something else ‘runs’ or ‘operates.’ From this view, infrastructures 
are passive physical artefacts (Star and Ruhleder 1994). Talking about the belief that useful 
infrastructures are invisible, Dahlbom (2000) claims,
“Infrastructure .... is subterranean and out of sight, and preferably not only below but also beyond our 
consciousness. When you are reminded of the infrastructure, it tends to make you nervous: there is 
something down there making everyday activities possible, but you do not really know what it is, where it 
is, or how it works, and what will happen, come to think of it, if it breaks down.”
However, Star and Ruhleder (1996) sharply dismiss the ready-to-hand view. They claim that 
such a metaphor is neither useful nor accurate in understanding the relationship between 
work/practice and technology because it fails to capture the ambiguities o f infrastructure 
usage. It could also lead to de facto  standardisation o f a single, powerful group’s agenda 
(Dutton and Danziger 1982, Kling 1980, Kraemer and Dutton 1982, Meyer and Rowan 1991,
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Star and Bowker 1995). Likewise, to Williams (1997) any functioning system has multiple 
meanings o f usage assigned to it because while a large community shares the single object, it 
may appear differently to each group (Hanseth 2000). It is, therefore, impossible to have 
‘universal niches’ because “one person’s standard is in fact another’s chaos.” Therefore, the 
infrastructure becomes transparent or as part of the furniture (Silva and Backhouse 1997) 
when local variations are folded into organisational changes.
After Jewett and Kling (1991), Star and Ruhleder (1996), hold that infrastructure is 
fundamentally a relational concept because no artefact, computer-based or otherwise, is a 
discrete entity, a standalone thing. It becomes infrastructure in relation to organised practices 
or a given cultural context. They further argue that an infrastructure, like other tools, is not 
just a thing with pre-given attributes frozen in time -  but becomes a tool in practice, for 
someone, when connected to some particular activity. Thus, studies o f infrastructure should 
cover “a relationship or an infinite regress o f relationships, never a ‘thing’ -  stripped o f use -  
because infrastructure emerges for people in practice, connected to activities and structures 
(Star and Ruhleder 1994, Star and Ruhleder 1996).” As such, the valid question is when -  not 
what -  is an infrastructure. Dahlbom argues,
“It is irrçortant to see that these systems are not just technical systems, but rather socio-technical. ...Once 
we begin to slide down this slope, we will see more and more examples of things to include in the 
infrastructure. ... All this makes infrastructure a somewhat slippery notion. Perhaps we should only use 
it a relative sense: X is an infrastructure relative to Y, meaning that Y depends for its operation on X, and 
X is somehow more stable and basic than Y (Dahlbom 2000).”
These views stress the heterogeneous nature o f infrastructure as represented by the notion of 
embeddedness and its socio-technical nature due to links with conventions of practice 
(Ciborra 2000, Hanseth 2000). This echoes the sociology o f technology and science works 
that reject a ‘great divide’ between nature and artifice, human and non-human, technology 
and society (Ciborra and Hanseth 2000, Latour 1991, Walsham 1997). Thus, since useful 
PKIs are both catalysts and products o f power, the technology becomes an infrastructure once 
it supports organisational processes.
From infrastructures to institutions
To conclude this Chapter, we link the concepts o f infrastructure and institutionalisation. We 
saw that infrastructures are regulating skeletons, which provide more security and stability
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than liberty o f action (Dahlbom 2000). Actually, Ciborra (2000), after Star and Ruhleder 
(1996), argues that infrastructures are institutions, norms and conventions that provide the 
often-implicit context for the performances of practices. Therefore, we argue that a technical 
artefact connected to an organisational context is an infrastructure. However, infrastructures 
become institutions when they typify specific work practices.
Politics of work practices
Williams (1997) argues that workplace technologies are no longer just an external force 
transforming work but are part o f work and develop in tandem with it. This close relationship 
calls for IT to embed visions o f work transformation (Latour 1991). As such, system 
development needs good techniques for understanding, representing and modelling work 
practices and processes (Bannon 1995) because designers often make wrong assumptions 
about how tasks are performed (Suchman 1995). Unearthing the underlying work practices 
makes it possible to embed the ‘correct’ procedures into the IS and ensure that routines are 
reproduced with economy of effort (Silva and Backhouse 1997). However, this talk discounts 
the contentious nature o f work (Bannon 1995, Suchman 1995). It is difficult to capture the 
practices because,
“Representing work is difficult, messy, complex, and often politically touchy. To capture (or classify) 
is to cut off, simplify, in some direction; work is notoriously slippery and situated. Whose voice, whose 
version will hold? Who benefits from which standards? One person’s infrastructure may be another’s 
barrier (Star and Bowker 1995).”
Apart from the mysterious nature o f work (Suchman 1995), creating useful specifications is 
further complicated by the rapid change in work practices, decision process, roles and 
responsibilities (Handy 1990, Kettinger and Lee 2002, Salmela 1993, Salmela et a l 2000, 
Truex et a l  1999). The problems are more evident with systems designed for environments 
different to the host organisation. For instance, many cryptographic products either started as 
sensitive military applications (Blanchette 2000, Kahn 1996, Piper and Murphy 2002) or 
assumed hierarchical organisational structures. However, different uses demand the re- 
invention o f universal solutions to avoid tensions with local arrangements.
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Institutions and institutionalisation
According to Stinchcombe (1968), “By an ‘institution’ I mean a structure in which powerful 
people are committed to some value or interest. The key to institutionalising a value is to 
concentrate power in the hands o f those who believe in that value.” Jepperson (1991) argues 
that institution and institutionalisation are core concepts in sociology and connotes the 
presence o f authoritative rules or binding organisation. He defines an institution as an 
organised, established procedure represented as the constituent rules o f society. To Zucker 
(1991) the only idea common to all usages of the term ‘institution’ is the establishment of 
relative permanence of a clearly social sort.
Berger and Luckmann (1967) argue that although habitualised actions retain their meaningful 
character for the individual (Suchman 1995), organisations prefer the routinisation o f the 
meanings in the general stock o f knowledge (Rod 2000, Walsham 1993) to support future 
projects. The milieu of stable practices opens a foreground for deliberation and innovation, 
processes that precede institutionalisation for it allows the anticipation o f activity and 
alternatives. Therefore, institutionalisation occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification 
of habitualised actions by other types o f actors. “Put differently, any such typification is an 
institution. .. .The institution posits that actions o f type X will be performed by actors o f type 
X (Berger and Luckmann 1967).”
To Avgerou (2000) organisational IT institutionalisation is a product o f the need to increase 
the efficiency and strength o f the control and coordination mechanisms of the bureaucracy 
(Yates 1989, Zuboff 1988). She claims that the institutional elements of IT include the 
established view on the value of technology and knowledge, a network o f industries 
supporting IT, professional expertise, regulations for development and IT use and 
professional societies. Jepperson (1991) argues that while many scholars regard 
institutionalisation as either equivalent to, or a form of, stability or survival, this identification 
is inaccurate. He claims that institutionalisation is a relative property because we decide 
whether to consider an object to be an institution depending upon analytical context because 
“institution is relative to centrality.” However, institutions.
“By the very fact of their existence, control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of 
conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would 
theoretically be possible. It is important to stress that this controlling character is inherent in
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institutionalisation as such, prior to or apart from any mechanisms of sanctions specifically set up to 
support an institution (Berger and Luckmann 1967).”
Although mechanisms o f control exist in many institutions, their controlling efficacy is only 
o f a supplementary kind because the primary power lies in the mere existence o f the 
institution. “To say that a segment o f human activity has been institutionalised is already to 
say that this segment of human activity has been subsumed under social control.” Institutions 
are powerful in their own right because,
“As historical and objective facilities, confront the individual as undeniable facts. The institutions are 
there, external to him, persistent in their reality, whether he likes it or not. He cannot wish them 
away. They resist attempts to change or evade them. They have coercive power over him, both in 
themselves, by the sheer force of their facility, and through the control mechanisms that are usually 
attached to the most important of them. The objective reality of institutions is not diminished if the 
individual does not understand their purpose or their mode of operation (Berger and Luckmann 1967).”
Jepperson (1991) agrees. He argues that although persons may not comprehend an institution, 
they typically have ready access to some functional or historical account o f why the practice 
exists. He adds that institutions are not just constraint structures because they simultaneously 
empower and control. Like infi*astructures, institutions present a constraint-ffeedom duality 
for they are vehicles for activity within constraints (Jepperson 1991).
Legitimation of institutions
According to Berger and Luckmann (1967), a key feature in sustaining any institution is 
legitimation, which constitutes ways used to ‘explain’ and justify it (Stinchcombe 1968). To 
Stinchcombe legitimacy creates a readiness in other centres o f power to support the actions of 
a person with a certain right. Likewise, Meyer and Rowan (1991) reveal the legitimacy o f  
bureaucratic organisations rests on the norms of rationality.
Berger and Luckmann (1967) claim legitimation is unnecessary in the first institutionalisation 
phase because the institution is self-evident for all concerned. The need for justification arises 
when there is need to transmit the institutional order to either a new generation or a group 
that has no individual recollection o f the institution. “Legitimation not only tells the 
individual why he should perform one action and not the other, it also tells him why things 
are what they are.” That these ideas are strikingly similar to the concept o f legitimation 
introduced in Structuration Theory (Giddens 1984, Jones 1999, Walsham 1993) is no 
accident because the theory traces its origins to Berger and Luckmann’s concept o f the
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mutual constitution o f society and individuals (Jones 1999). Therefore, creating a 
“corresponding canopy o f legitimations” is no admission that the institution is less real but it 
ensures that its relevance is associated with concrete social processes (Berger and Luckmann
1967). Stinchcombe (1968) argues that the best way o f legitimating an institution is making it 
useful. Deviance visits institutions without legitimacy because people generally reject 
routines dictated by others more than ones they personally helped establish.
Roles, responsibility and structures
Jepperson (1991) regards institutions as socially constructed, routine-reproduced, program or 
rule systems. A common way o f ensuring adherence to an institutional order is attaching it to 
roles (Ba 2001, Backhouse and Dhillon 1996). This is a critical area because,
“The origins of roles lie in the same fundamental process of habitualisation and objectivation as the origins 
of institutions. ...All institutionalised conduct involves roles. Thus, roles share in the controlling 
character of institutionalisation. As soon as actors are typified as role performers, their conduct is ipso 
facto susceptible to enforcement. Compliance and non-compliance with socially defined role standards 
cease to be optional, though, of course, the severity of sanctions may vary from case to case (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967).”
Thus, understanding the nature o f roles and responsibilities is vital because they both 
represent and constitute institutions. The scope o f institutionalisation depends on the 
generality o f relevance structures. Organisations that share only a few o f these structures 
normally have a narrow scope for institutionalisation. Indeed, they also incur a risk “that the 
institutional order will be highly fragmented, as certain relevance structures are shared by 
groups within the society but not by the society as a whole (Berger and Luckmann 1967).” In 
conclusion, institutionalisation occurs when,
“The interaction ... becomes predictable. The ‘There he goes again’ becomes a ‘There we go again’. ... 
the institutions are now experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the 
individual as an external and coercive fact... ‘There we go again’ now becomes ‘This is how these things 
are done’. A world so regarded attains a firmness in consciousness; it becomes real in an ever more 
massive way and it can no longer be changed so readily (Berger and Luckmann 1967).”
Zucker (1991) agrees. She argues that for highly institutionalised acts it is sufficient for one 
person simply to tell another that this how things are done (Jepperson 1991). “Each 
individual is motivated to comply because otherwise his actions and those o f others in the 
system cannot be understood (Zucker 1991).”
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Chapter summary
We argued that the main cause o f PKI interoperability problems is the failure to appreciate 
the interaction between its at once restrictive and flexible technical features, organisational 
structures, the goals o f its sponsors and potential user resistance. Drawing on the concepts of 
infrastructure and institution, we submit that PKIs are politically explosive technologies 
because by limiting liberty o f action in favour o f stability and security, in pluralistic 
organisations, they risk backlashes. This should not have been a concern if  public key 
cryptography, the underlying PKI technology, had a centralised mechanism of enforcing the 
user discipline it relies on to work successfully. However, users are either unable or unwilling 
to rigorously validate others’ public keys and securely manage their own private keys. Hence, 
we argue that without the support o f power structures PKI institutionalisation is difficult.
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CHAPTER 3: 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
This chapter extends our coverage o f power and politics in IS management introduced in 
Chapter 2. We started the discussion o f power in Chapter 2 in an effort to introduce the 
deeper theoretical aspects of the research gradually. A considerable body o f literature exists 
on the diverse views o f power and their influence on IS research. We build on these works 
notably (Introna 1997, Silva 1997, Silva and Backhouse 1997, Silva and Backhouse 2003). 
Silva (1997) adapts the Circuits o f Power (Co?) framework for information systems research 
from Clegg (1989). He presents the Co? as a theoretical framework that accounts for power 
and politics in IS institutionalisation. Power being a universally disputed concept, the CoP 
framework is efficacious because it “encompasses different approaches to power that far from 
being contradictory are complementary.”
We begin with a discussion of how to gain, lose and manage with power. While we do not 
fully discuss the structuration framework, we include the insights it provides to the study of 
power. We also left out a detailed description of Actor Network Theory because, since like 
the CoP framework, it originates in the sociology of science, we cover similar concepts. We 
conclude with the key concepts o f our chosen theoretical framework, the Circuits of Power.
Power and Politics
Although political theory is entirely concerned with the conundrum of power (Ransom 1997), 
it remains an elusive (Bachrach and Baratz 1962) and heavily contested concept (Keen 1981, 
Law 1991b, Saunders et a l  2000). To Clegg (1989), the disagreements are so numerous that 
even the best books on the subject cannot transcend the transitory nature of the debates. For 
instance, Lukes characterises power as “ineradicably evaluative and ‘essentially contested’ 
(Lukes 1974).” Power debates have been multidisciplinary because although the concept 
originated in political theory and political philosophy, it later became part of political
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sociology and is now a central concept o f most social and human sciences (Clegg 1989 268, 
Giddens 1984, Ransom 1997, Said 1986). However, because the different disciplines espouse 
contradictory underlying values and beliefs,
“Power has always been one of those words that everybody uses without necessary being able to 
define satisfactorily. It is treated both as a quality or attribute possessed by individuals, groups, or larger 
social structures and as an indicator of an active or interactive process or relation between individual or 
collective actors. Moreover, it also applied to physical phenomena and processes (Wrong 1995).”
Consequently, commentators have warned that no commonly accepted or even preferred 
meaning o f power is feasible if  “people differ on normative issues as they are likely to do 
indefinitely, if  not forever (Wrong 1995).” Thus, Hoy (1986) concedes power has been and 
would probably always be a contested concept. Wrong (1995) argues that unlike inherently 
normative concepts such as ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’, power resembles other fiercely 
contested but not naturally normative and value-laden concepts such as inequality.
Bachrach and Baratz (1975) claim every human institution has a “power structure” that is an 
integral part and the mirror image o f its stratification. However, pluralists reject this view 
stressing that, “Power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, 
provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from 
momentary to semi-permanent.” We follow the lead o f researchers like (Bames 1986, Silva 
1997, Silva and Backhouse 1997, Silva and Backhouse 2003) to underline the difficulty of 
coining an acceptable definition for the concept o f power. We believe that although,
“M atters of precise verbal definition are not of great significance in tbe social sciences; an 
exaggerated importance is often attributed to tbem. ... But surely all they can actually do is inhibit 
specific ways of using particular words, and require the use of other words instead. This, at any rate, is 
why I regard problems of verbal definition ...as small problems, and why I see only very limited 
possibilities of gain from the criticism of definitions (Bames 1986).”
However, since even Bames agrees, “it is necessary to offer some simple image o f the nature 
of power in society, because there is no widely accepted account or image”, we select the 
definition o f the concept provided by Wrong (1995) for this dissertation. Viewing power as a 
human or social phenomenon, he regards it as "'the capacity o f some persons to produce 
intended and foreseen effects on others.^ '"
Ransom (1997) argues that scholars of power need to ask two questions. First, how does it 
function? He sees the ‘how to’ question as key to Foucault’s work (Foucault 1980, Foucault
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1986) because it focuses on power, its sources, strategies and tactics for its use and loss 
(Pfeffer 1992). Traditional political theorists such as Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Rawls and 
Habermas raise the second question about what makes a power structure legitimate (Foucault 
1982). Supporting the relational view of power. Ransom reiterates the definition of power as 
the ability o f individual A to make individual B to do something they would otherwise not 
have done (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, Debnam 1975). However, he cautions against 
Wrong’s claim that power produces foreseen effects on others saying, “It turns out, on closer 
inspection, that this process is anything but straightforward and there are all sorts of strange 
and unexpected ways in which individuals exercise power over others (Ransom 1997).”
Debnam (1975) agrees. He argues that to understand an outcome o f power we must first 
identify two parties to the interaction to ascertain a change o f position by either participant, 
attributable to efforts o f the other. This means understanding the dynamics o f a concretely 
verifiable relationship. However, he warns that while this may be the ideal situation, “one can 
never demonstrate conclusively in the social sciences that any given factor is both necessary 
and sufficient for the production o f any given effect (Debnam 1975).” Debnam also dismisses 
the claim of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) that a researcher can understand power by asking 
‘strategically’ placed individuals for opinion about who is powerful. He believes the 
approach could be misleading because it does not separate hearsay from fact. Indeed, as 
Bames (1986) argues, it is always expedient in explicit discourse for powerful people to 
represent themselves as mere authorities without discretion. This dampens efforts to 
persuade, pressurise or influence their judgement.
Wrong (1995) observes that a key cause o f disagreement in the conventional definition of 
power is the aspect of intentionality (Bachrach and Baratz 1975, Debnam 1975). He 
recognises that many critics believe his definition of power is incomplete because it 
apparently ignores the unintended and unanticipated effects o f decisions and actions o f the 
powerful. He is sympathetic to critics who label his definition as a brazen attempt to 
downplay the role of unintended consequences in assessing the role of power in society. He 
insists, however, that for power to have unintended consequences it must usually first be 
exercised in a social relation in which an actor produces an intended effect. Bachrach and 
Baratz (1975) agree. To them power is operative even when A unconsciously exercises it or 
when he is aware o f exercising it and produces unintended effects.
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Dark side of power
Wrong (1995) contends that the use o f power as a near-synonym of influence, control, rule 
and domination results in its sharing of the many shades of meaning o f these terms. He insists 
that to treat ‘power’ and ‘influence’ as synonyms is to make the exercise o f power equivalent 
to any social effect. He represents the impact o f “unintended influence” and identifies two 
forms o f influence, unintended and intended (power) as illustrated.
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Figure 6 -  Categorisation of power (Wrong 1995).
According to Wrong (1995) a key difference between power and influence is that the former 
continues to possess overtones o f coercion even among writers who do not define it as so 
(Pfeffer 1992). For instance, Weber defines power as achieving ends ‘even against the 
resistance o f others who are participating in the action.’ Thus, Wrong argues that the term 
retains something o f a malign, sinister, even demonic aura. To Debnam (1975a) power attains 
a sinister face when, “the purpose is hidden, not necessarily the action which embodies the 
purpose.” Even the traditional definition o f power implies coercion because A achieves 
outcomes against the wishes o f B (Debnam 1975).
Wrong (1995) argues that the negative connotations are amplified when power is treated as 
the cardinal motive for human striving as in familiar allusion to ‘will to power,’ or ‘lust for 
power.’ Scholars widely associate power with all human relations and social structures 
through the claim that it is the basic object o f human striving (Machiavelli 1997, Nietzsche
1968). Wrong asserts that because unequal distribution of power is prevalent among groups
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and social categories, humans invariably seek to dominate and impose their will on others 
(Debnam 1975a). As laconically put,
“This world is the will to power -  and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power -  
and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1968).”
For instance, Machiavelli’s view of power as a play of strategic forces (Introna 1997) has 
attracted wide criticism for being an unprincipled pursuit o f power bereft o f religious and 
ethical sense (Machiavelli 1997). Advising princes to gain and retain supreme power by 
ruthless and amoral means if  necessary, he states,
“For a man who, in all respects, will carry out only his professions of good, will be apt to be ruined 
amongst so many who are evil. A prince therefore who desires to maintain himself must learn to be not 
always good, but to be so or not as necessity may require. ... For all things considered ... some things 
that seem like virtue will lead you to ruin if you follow them; whilst others, that apparently are vices, will, 
if followed, result in your safety and well-being (Machiavelli 1997).”
However, Wrong argues that Nietzsche and his disciples like Foucault (Foucault 1980, 
Foucault 1986), classified as cynics, define power in a neutral way regarding its malign and 
benign uses. For instance, the original meaning o f the widely derided ‘will to power’ 
characterisation dealt with the force to preserve and enhance the vitality o f an organism and 
its control over the environment (Wrong 1995). Hirschheim and Klein (1994) blame 
distortions about power for creating anxiety and causing people to distort or withhold 
information to protect themselves. However,
“Some doubted that any hidden or obscured phenomenon lurked in the dark, outside of the 
empiricist gaze. If something such as the second face of power could not be seen, they argued, what proof 
could there possibly be that it existed? .. .Either things were real and could be clearly seen or they were not 
real at all, except in what was taken to be a hothouse imagination of left-wing zealots (Clegg 1989).”
Bachrach and Baratz advance the concept o f “Non-decision” making to explain decisions that 
result in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the interests o f the 
decision maker. They claim this explains the consequences o f covert control and mobilisation 
of bias (Debnam 1975). Non-decision presupposes that political consensus commonly arises 
when actors mobilise resources to prevent challenges to their values and interests (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1975). However, Debnam disagrees. He claims that people are largely “apolitical, 
strongly influenced by inertia, habit, unexamined loyalties, personal attachment, emotions.
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transient impulses.” He believes neither frustration nor inequality is automatically the work 
of a hidden hand as implied (Debnam 1975).
Conceptions of Power
To reiterate, power is a disputed concept. Nowhere is the metaphorical rancour more 
clamorous than the internecine split between sociologists and political scientists. 
Sociologically oriented researchers -  elitists -  see power as highly centralised while political 
scientists -  pluralists -  largely regard power as widely diffused (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 
Debnam 1975). Pluralists focus not upon the sources o f power but its existence. Therefore,
“Power to them means ‘participation in decision-making’ and can be analysed only after ‘careful 
examination of a series of concrete decisions.’ ... the pluralist researcher is uninterested in the 
reputedly powerful. His concerns instead are to (a) select for study a number of ‘key’ as opposed to 
‘routine’ political decisions, (b) identify the people who took an active part in the decision making process, 
(c) obtain a full account of their actual behaviour and (d) determine and analyse the specific outcome of 
the conflict (Bachrach and Baratz 1962).”
This is the exact opposite o f what elitists do (Introna 1997). While praising the approach over 
the elitists, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) point out two basic flaws in the pluralist perspective. 
First, pluralists ignore the fact that the exercise o f power may be, and is often, confined to 
relatively ‘safe’ issues. Second, the model provides no ‘objective’ criteria for distinguishing 
between ‘important’ and ‘unimportant’ issues in the political arena. Undeniably power is not 
only exercised when A participates in decisions that affect B but also, “To the extent that A 
succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore 
any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A ’s set o f preferences 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962).”
Bachrach and Baratz, state, “All forms o f political organisation have a bias in favour o f the 
exploitation o f some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organisation is 
the mobilisation o f bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised 
out.” They attack pluralists for assuming “erroneously” that only concrete decisions reflect 
power because this ignores the fact that some groups prevent contests from arising in the first 
place. Thus, they assert, “there are two faces o f power, neither o f which sociologists see and 
only one o f which political scientists see.” Debnam (1975) sharply disagrees. He claims that 
Bachrach and Baratz’s research strategy offers no means o f gauging the import of 
mobilisation o f bias. He insists research should neither be started from the premise o f the
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sociologist who ask, “Who rules?” nor from pluralism where the query is, “Does anyone have 
power?” but by investigating the particular “mobilisation of bias” in the institution under 
scrutiny (Debnam 1975).
Bames (1986) also accuses sociologists o f insistently proceeding as positivists instead of 
realists in their treatment o f power. Clegg (1989) concurs. He argues that early writers on 
power saw it in a mechanical, modernist spirit under which it “was to be conceived in 
positivist terms as something directly observable and measurable.” The metaphor is rooted in 
classical political theory associated with Thomas Hobbes. Power is, “A locus o f will, as a 
supreme agency to which other wills will bend, as prohibitory; the classic conception of 
power as zero-sum; in short, power as a negation o f the power o f others.” The model includes 
a centrally located sovereign to which all activities o f power are traceable (Introna 1997, 
Ransom 1997). Because Hobbes was interested in understanding power and ways of using it 
to right, the sovereign is accountable for its effects (Introna 1997, Ransom 1997).
What sort of capacity is power?
Although power is often thought o f as the capacity to enforce one’s will (Bames 1986, 
Ransom 1997), to get things done (Pfeffer 1992), the literature is largely silent about the 
characteristics o f this capacity. To Debnam (1975a) the frequent use of the term power 
denotes a facility, which is neither authoritative nor coercive. Likewise, Clegg (1989) sees 
power as a ‘capacity’ premised on resource control. Bames (1986) calls for an explanation of 
how an agent or role with power differs from one lacking it. He argues that although,
“There is a great deal on how to define power, how to detect its presence, how to measure it through 
empirical indicators and visible correlates, how to identify its material effects; but there is next to 
nothing upon what power is ‘in itself as it were (Bames 1986).”
He believes that to explain away this gap in knowledge, authors routinely link power with 
authority. For instance, Zuboff (1988) claims authority is the spiritual dimension of power 
because agencies need a degree of shared faith in the values that determine rank. To Weber 
(1964) authority means the probability o f power targets obeying a specific command. 
Identifying the types as legal^, traditional^ and charismatic^, he claims that stable power
 ^Legal authority rests on enactment with its purest type represented by bureaucracy.
® Traditional authority depends on the belief in the sacredness of the social order and its prerogatives, as they 
have existed for a long time. The purest form is the patriarchal authority.
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structures rely on the belief that they are ‘legitimate’ by right (Weber 1964). To Debnam 
(1975a) the difference between authority and coercion describes the limits o f legitimate and 
illegitimate action. However, Bames (1986) sees total disarray in attempts to establish 
whether power or authority is superior. He avers that while in the sociological tradition the 
received view is that authority is power plus consent, legitimacy or institutionalisation, there 
is controversy about what to add to transform power into authority. We continue this debate 
under the “power discretion” notion of power.
Law’s notions of power
Power is such an omnipresent facet o f social life that even a failure to refer to it “points to 
'’silences in the text' that are held to reveal a presence confirmed by its very absence (Wrong 
1995).” Cataloguing the experience o f sociology. Law (1991b) rages that because power is, 
“Used, re-used, and endlessly abused, it is unsurprising that they are many who believe that it 
should be dropped altogether from the vocabulary of the discipline.” To Gallon (1986) this is 
little wonder because sociologists rarely, if  at all, agree about anything. Likewise, Hoy (1986) 
suggests that since, “social philosophers may be fated to perpetual quarrelling, social 
scientists should be able to either define univocally central theoretical concepts like power or 
dismiss such concepts if they continue to elude quantifiable refinement.” He stresses that a 
decision needs to be taken because if the concept o f power is not understood, we risk failing 
to grasp the character o f society as well (Hoy 1986).
Against this background. Law (1991b) believes he can extricate a useful notion of power 
from the “shipwreck o f sociology”. He suggests four themes in the sociology o f power: 
‘Power to’, ‘power over’, ‘power storage’ and ‘power discretion.’ Law argues that ‘power to’ 
and ‘power over’ can under specific circumstances be stored and used in a discretionary and 
calculative manner. Each power form is relational because its deployment affects the 
environment and causes change (Wrong 1995). Although he dodges the question o f how 
these relations are stabilised. Law asserts that the power networks are never purely social 
because they are a product o f a fabric that integrates social relations and technical, 
architectural, textual and natural non-human actors (Latour 1991). Thus, he writes.
 ^Based on the affectual and personal devotion of the follower to the lord and his gifts of grace (charisma). The 
unheard of and the emotional rapture from it are sources of personal devotion (Weber 1964).
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“To understand the social and, more particularly, to understand what it is that stabilises social relations to 
generate power effects we have, I suggest, to make sense of the way in which the ‘social’ interacts with 
and is constituted by these other materials. And, in particular, we have to explore the way in which 
discursive ordering strategies (in part) shape, and are embodied in a range of different materials (Law 
1991b).”
This view is relevant to us because even the reference to information systems as social 
systems (Angell and Smithson 1991) implies a heterogeneous sociotechnical network (Law 
1991b) under which power relations are rooted (Foucault 1982). Eschewing what he calls 
sociologism and technologism, Latour (1991) claims we never face objects or social relations, 
but chains, which are associations of humans and non-human agents. “No one has ever seen a 
social relation by itself ... nor a technical relation.” Hence, understanding the material 
heterogeneity o f arrangements is critical (Law 1991b, Star 1991) because, “whenever we 
discover a stable social relation, it is the introduction o f some non-humans that accounts for 
this relative durability (Latour 1991).”
Power to
This notion represents the productive and enabling character o f power. Several authors have 
commented about this form of power (Bames 1986, Bames 1988, Foucault 1982, Wrong 
1995). For instance, Bames (1986) argues that this power is the capacity to enforce one’s will 
even against opposition. Likewise, Giddens’ definition o f power as the capacity to achieve 
outcomes also supports this notion. He identifies a two-way relationship between power and 
human agency because without power there is no agency (Giddens 1984). Using the terms 
agency and actor interchangeably. Law seeks to bridge the legendary agency/stmcture 
dualism by presenting an actor as a set o f relations. A key difference between Law and 
Giddens is that to the former, “Agents are not co-terminous with people” because other 
entities can too be agents (Clegg 1989). Bames (1986) appreciates the unequal distribution of 
this added capacity to perform in society. However, he sees this power as a non zero-sum 
social property (Law 1991b).
Wrong (1995) argues that most o f the confusion surrounding the concept o f power has been 
caused by the conflation or at least a slurring o f the difference between “power to,” the more 
general category, and “power over.” He defines ‘power to’ as the capacity o f individuals to 
satisfy their wants. He argues that this distinction remains cmcial because conflation o f the 
two senses o f power is the source o f many ambiguities, conceptual and rhetorical, that cling
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to the power concept (Wrong 1995). In common with Bames, he regards power to as 
“obviously relational” which implies that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Law 
1991b). Wrong adds that power as the capacity to produce effects may be imputed to the 
agency as a dispositional property even when the capacity is not manifest in action. To Law’s 
surprise Foucault too espouses this concept of power as an enabling phenomenon and 
eschews the zero-sum conception.
Power over
This has traditionally been the most dominant theme o f power among social theorists. For 
instance, Foucault (1982) claims, “let us not deceive ourselves; if  we speak o f the structures 
or the mechanisms o f power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise 
power over others.” According to Law (1991b), most of these theorists adopt, whether 
expressly or not, a zero-sum view o f power, which implies a relative empowerment, and 
disempowerment o f agencies in a relational field (Clegg 1989). Lukes (1974) is a key 
advocate o f this notion. He asserts that, “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a 
manner contrary to B ’s interests,” He raps proponents o f the ‘power to’ notion arguing,
“They focus on the locution ‘power to’, ignoring ‘power over’. Thus power indicates a ‘capacity’, a 
‘facility’, an ‘ability’, not a relationship. Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power -  the fact that it is 
exercised over people -  disappears altogether from view (Lukes 1974). ”
Law sympathises with Lukes’ claim that many theorists, notably P a r s o n s i n  their desire to 
understand the social system fail to see that such a system may be a product o f conflict 
between parties with different interests and degrees of power. Lukes (1974) labels the generic 
concept o f power as ‘power over’ and influence as ‘power to’. He subsequently focuses on 
the former claiming this is to maintain focus on the relational and contested character of  
power relations. However, Law (1991b) rejects Lukes’ assertion that the central definition of  
power relates to ‘power over’. He depicts it as an example of the “insularity o f social theory 
and its ignorance to both natural scientific thought and dictionary definitions (Law 1991b).” 
Like Bames (1986, 1988), he sees no reason why concern with ‘power to’ should 
automatically eliminate interest in ‘power over’ because relations and capacities are 
indissolubly linked.
To Lukes, Parsons seeks to “treat power as a specific mechanism operating to bring about changes in the 
action of other units, individuals or collective, in the process of social interaction.’’ However, he wonders what 
is specific about this mechanism to distinguish it as ‘power’.
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Power storage
According to Law (1991b), the conjoined character o f ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ raises a 
further question o f whether or not agents are able to store up ‘power to’ or ‘power over.’ For 
instance, he wonders what it means when Lukes says some agents are more powerful than 
others. In attacking power reductionism, which treats everything as an expression of power 
and describes phenomenon as a social relation in which some persons possess and exercise 
power over others. Wrong (1995) provides a good definition for power storage. This notion 
of power is associated with social stratification where people have access to unequal power, 
income and other resources. The beneficiaries o f this unequal distribution or “haves” then 
attain and maintain their favoured position by means of the power they exercise over the 
underprivileged “have-nots.” Thus, the notion o f power storage relies on the inseverable 
nature o f power relations and capacities.
Law exemplifies power storage through a case study o f a formal organisation. He argues that 
managers assume that they have a ‘store’ o f power to act. This normally takes the form of 
money because its liquidity enables ‘powers’ conveniently to convert it into a variety of 
actions, which are also accumulated, deployed and further converted. “Money is thus a 
relationally derived store o f power to act and (accordingly) power over certain others.” 
However, Law cautions that money is not the only store o f the capacity to act because 
achieving outcomes o f power involves a heterogeneous network of social-technical elements. 
After Giddens (1984), Wrong claims we should regard power itself as a resource. He argues 
this is because power results from the mobilisation of resources such as wealth, knowledge 
and skills to produce effects. This view supports Foucault’s claim that power is an 
achievement and is not normally stored (Law 1991b). He argues,
“Power is exercised ra ther than possessed; it is not a ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the
dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions -  an effect that is manifested and sometimes
extended by the position of those who are dominated (Foucault 1979).”
However, Law (1991b) finds Foucault too restrictive because he presents an either-or 
situation. From the advice, we either have a unity o f domination or conflicting strategies o f 
power. Law claims society routinely assumes that both ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ can 
indeed be stored. However, the methods o f storage are never fail-safe. Law gets support from
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the concept of ‘structural power’. It deals with a “set o f (prior) reproduced asymmetric social 
relations between groups based on the possession of, and restriction o f access to, certain 
resources (Layder 1996).” The prior arrangements constrain the exercise o f power by both 
individuals and collectivities within and outside the structure. In sum. Law submits that 
‘power to’ and ‘power over’ may be stored on condition we remember they, “are also an 
effect, a product of a set o f more or less precariously structured relations.”
Power discretion
Law terms this notion as the ‘power not to’ act or power/discretion. He argues that once 
power is ‘stored’, this notion explains when to exercise this capacity over other actors. The 
inference is that an agent can switch potential ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ on and off. Thus, 
they have discretion. Bames (1986, 1988) provides the link between power and discretion by 
arguing that ‘real’ power not only has capacity for action but also discretion in its use. He 
insists,
“Authority should be thought of as power minus, that to possess power is more expedient and 
advantageous than to possess authority ... power directs a routine with discretion, an authority directs it 
without discretion. ...But they do in response to external indications; the basic pattern of their actions is 
entirely the product of external constraint. Authority then, is power minus discretion (Bames 1986).”
Thus, maximising power is about retaining as much discretion over strategic routines as 
possible. “The problem o f the power holder in this context is to create passive agents and 
prevent their metamorphosis into active agents (Bames 1986).” Law (1991b) hails the 
distinction between powers and authorities because it fits with routine distinctions between 
representatives and delegates, or policy makers and mere functionaries. However, Law is 
uncomfortable with the authority and power dichotomy especially what it means to have 
discretion. He regards the solution offered by Bames as simplificatory because authorities are 
not always ‘mere relays’ and powers calculative mobilisers o f routines, due to overlaps. He 
believes we should treat the distinction as a continuum of (relational) powers and authorities. 
Most would lie “between the two, borrowing and so embodying more or less explicit 
strategies o f calculation (Law 1991b).”
Consequently, unlike authors who restrict themselves to one view o f power (Lukes 1974, 
Wrong 1995), the four notions give a more comprehensive picture o f how relations are 
stabilised for long enough to generate the effects and conditions o f power (Law 1991b). As
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Law observes, we need to understand ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, their storage and 
deployment while appreciating they are precarious relational and transformational effects 
(Clegg 1989). Law believes the character o f ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ is a function of a 
socio-technical network o f relations in which an actor is implicated, explained, “Perhaps (by) 
the ‘circuits o f power’ to use Stewart Clegg’s felicitous phrase.” We discuss the CoP next.
The Circuits of Power framework
Stewart R. Clegg (1989) concedes power is the most contested of concepts. As such, there is 
no single all-embracing concept of power per se (Hoy 1986, Wrong 1995). He identifies at 
least three groupings clustered around loci o f dispositional, agency and facilitative concepts 
of power. In the dispositional conception advanced by Wrong, power is equated to a set of 
capacities (Law 1991b). The facilitative conception o f Parsons sees power in terms o f its 
ability to achieve goals. This was an effort to stress the positive aspects o f power to mitigate 
its dark side (Pfeffer 1992, Wrong 1995). However, Clegg claims, “None o f these 
conceptions easily fitted into a narrative structure constructed around a single, essentially 
contested conception o f power.”
Therefore, Clegg introduces the Circuits o f Power (CoP) as a tool to unravel and make sense 
of this dynamic by providing a central tradition of power that incorporates different debates 
and explains well-grounded alternative conceptions. Clegg argues,
“Irrespective of mode of analysis, an adequate framework of power should enable us to sketch a 
plausible narrative, where plausibility is not brought into question by recourse to devices such as 
analytical prime movers, or hidden and inexplicable mechanisms of thought control.”
The CoP framework draws on advances in the sociology o f science (Callon 1986, Latour 
1991) and the sociology o f organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Jepperson 1991, 
Meyer and Rowan 1991). According to Introna (1997), the framework provides specific 
language for visualising and thinking through the material nature o f power in everyday 
organisational relations. Appropriate language is critical because, as Silva (Silva 1997, Silva 
and Backhouse 1997) argues, answering obstinate questions about what power is and how to 
study it in information systems needs a theory o f power. Thus, the framework is an apt choice 
because o f its origins in political and organisational theories.
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The framework explains how organisations achieve specific outcomes and more critically 
how these outcomes are stabilised for long enough to generate effects and hence the 
conditions o f power (Law 1991b). The crux o f Clegg’s argument outlined in his book 
Frameworks o f Power (1989) is that to achieve outcomes o f power agencies need to make 
alliances, control resources and translate rules that govern meaning and membership in 
organisations (Clegg 1989).
As stated previously, we build on the works o f other IS researchers who have used this 
framework in our discipline. However, there are two differences between those studies and 
our dissertation. First, with the exception of sections o f (Silva 1997), these works rely on 
secondary data from the London Ambulance Service information systems failure (Introna 
1997, Silva and Backhouse 1997) to test the framework. In contrast, we present a more 
detailed appraisal o f framework’s utility in explaining the relationship between power and 
institutionalisation. The framework guides our interview design, data collection and analysis. 
Second, the previous studies cover relatively conventional IS aimed at internal efficiency. 
Although these systems also attempted to change work habits, a PKI is both more pervasive 
internally and opens up the organisation to the unpredictable outside world. Apart from their 
scope, PKIs are difficult to stabilise because they focus on security - a “moving target.”
Next, we present a substantive discussion o f the CoP Framework. We start by outlining 
Clegg’s notion o f power and the evolution o f the framework. Following that section is 
coverage o f the main CoP elements. The discussion is vital because we not only drew on the 
framework for theoretical concepts as ways o f viewing elements in the real world but it also 
showed us the elements to trace in empirical work (Walsham 1997).
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Clegg’s Notion of Power
Clegg believes the terminology o f power originates from Weber’s (1978) discussions o f how 
his three pure types of legitimate authority -  rational, traditional and charismatic -  differed 
from other forms o f domination^ ^  (Herrschaft), and subsequently how domination varies 
from other forms of power (Macht) (Weber 1964). He argues that domination becomes 
authority when institutionalised through the circuit o f dispositional power as a substantive 
modality o f rule such as legal rationality.
Clegg agrees that the key elements o f power systems are agencies and events that interest 
them. However, he rejects explanations focusing on dominant ideologies, real interests or 
three dimensions (Lukes 1974) widely associated with Marxist authors. These authors place 
the problems o f conflict and change at the forefront o f power analysis (Burrell and Morgan 
1979). In IS Marxist authors believe that information systems always aim to deskill workers 
and increase monitoring (Knights and Murray 1994) for the benefit o f the dominant 
managerial interests (Markus 1983, Markus and Pfeffer 1983). Clegg argues that 
understanding interests should not focus on the “individual actor’s reason to act” because 
agencies may represent other interests because o f a process o f ‘translation’ (Callon 1986). 
Thus, “reference to interests in this schema is not to be taken as referring either to individual 
agent’s ‘reasons’ or to their unknovm but ‘real’ interests (Clegg 1989).”
Clegg also compares the sovereign view o f power in what he calls the ‘fiction’ o f Leviathan 
(Hobbes 1968) to Machiavelli’s imprecise, contingent and strategic vision. The strategic 
perception is associated with post-structuralism (Nietzsche 1968, Wrong 1995), which stands 
against the notion o f sovereign power traceable to a central source (Introna 1997, Ransom 
1997). Like Machiavelli, Foucault focuses on how power achieves strategic effects through 
its disciplinary character (Foucault 1979, Introna 1997, Ransom 1997). However, Foucault 
claims, “it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme,” o f his research 
(Foucault 1982).
Introna (1997) argues that while Hobbes focuses on what power is or should be, Machiavelli 
writes about what power does. Likewise, Clegg contends that the Machiavelli project
' * Domination is the likelihood that a given group will obey a command with a specific content.
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represents a “full blown, if  somewhat marginalised, way of seeing power.” Machiavelli sees 
power as significant in the way it manifests itself in shaping and reshaping relations in 
everyday practice -  power as strategic force relations (Introna 1997, Machiavelli 1997). His 
disciples de-emphasise the total score and focus on the more contingent and local 
interpretation. They share “an analytical focus on and fascination for shifting, unstable 
alliances, a concern for military strategy and a disinclination to believe in any single, 
originating and decisive centre o f power (Clegg 1989).” Clegg believes Machiavellian 
insights are more relevant in postmodern times compared to the victorious project of Hobbes 
spurred by “that mythical, heroic, modernist law bringer.”
The Circuits of Power
The firamework considers power to be circulating through the episodic, social integration and 
system integration circuits o f power. Clegg christened the fi*amework a ‘Circuits’ of Power to 
indicate the relational nature o f power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, Debnam 1975, Wrong 
1995) that implies at least two agencies. It also shows that power should not only be seen as a 
‘thing’ that can be owned (Foucault 1979). Instead, he regards power as a phenomenon 
whose outcomes keep circulating in organisations through norms, rules and values (social 
integration) and their relationships to techniques o f discipline, surveillance and supervision 
(system integration). He contends that,
“In the circuits framework, power is multifarious: it is episodic power; it is also the circuit of power 
through rules and domination, as well as the overall empirical articulation which configures the theoretical 
circuits in any application of the model.”
Why does Clegg insist on three circuits? He believes that to sketch a plausible narrative, a 
satisfactory framework should cover the diverse conceptions o f power as represented in the 
three circuits. The episodic circuit is vital because it illuminates how agents struggle to 
achieve their desired outcomes. However, to produce intended and foreseen effects on others, 
agents depend on rules and pre-configured standing conditions or capacities explained under 
social and system integration circuits. Therefore, the three circuits give a full picture o f how 
agencies exercise power over others and how to embed these outcomes into the fabric of 
actual breathing organisations.
Focii* l a w  of Circuit Typo of Powot Cfreulto of Powor
Episode
Power
RelaGeos
Rules of 
Practice
Domination
Agency
Social
Integration
System
Integration
Causal
DIspodtiorW
Facâilaltve
wpfoduce/rranstom
tac&it^ te/tesyia
empowef/dsempowof
Rules fixing rdations of 
mmmingand membership
Outcomes
innovafionln 
techf^ques ol discipline 
and production
Means
Standng conditions
Control
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The circuits diagram is composed o f nodes and subways. The nodes represent the main 
elements o f each circuit while the pathways stand for ‘fields o f force’ embodied in the 
organisation. Although Clegg views the terms ‘field o f force’ and the ‘actor network^ 
perspective in Actor Network Theory (Walsham 1997) as similar, he opts for the former. He 
argues this is because apart fi-om the human subject, agency may be vested in,
“Non-human entities as diverse as machines, germs, animals and natural disasters. ...Organisations may 
constitute a form of collective agency and there is no reason to make this a second-rate form of agency 
compared to that of the problematic human subject. Where organisation achieves agency it is an 
accomplishment, just as it is for the individual but more so, because it involves the stabilisation of power 
relations across an organisational field of action, and thus between many subjectivities, rather than simply 
within one embodied locus of subjectivities (Clegg 1989).”
The organisational field o f action is analogous to the Foucauldian field o f force concept. 
Referring to agency instead o f actors, Clegg argues, “Such fields exist only to the extent that 
they are an achievement o f episodic power in the institutional field, stabilising relations of 
power between organisational agencies A, B . .. N.” He rejects accusations that the CoP is too 
complex by borrowing the law o f ‘requisite variety’ to claim, “The complexity o f the 
phenomenon is mirrored in its representation.” Let us now discuss the main CoP elements.
Episodic Circuit
This is the most obvious circuit because the exercise o f power under it ideally produces 
tangible and foreseen effects on others. Agents manifest episodic power by mobilising 
resources and alliances to produce intended outcomes. The circuit represents power and 
resistance because politics includes both a struggle for power and attempts to limit, resist and 
escape fi*om its exercise (Clegg 1989). Lukes (1974) also sees social systems as products of 
conflict between parties with different interests and degrees o f power (Ransom 1997).
Law (1991) links episodic power with ‘power over.’ It is relational power (Lukes 1974), 
which “trades off some extant ‘fixing’ of facilitative and dispositional power (Clegg 1989).” 
By including standing conditions and showing that episodic power relies on other circuits, 
Clegg claims to have solved the structure-power quandary without using the duality o f
He defines an ‘Actor Network’ as an interrelated set of entities successfully translated by an actor.
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structureconcept (Giddens 1984) or focus on real interests (Lukes 1974). Critics have 
accused Giddens of conflation (Barley and Tolbert 1997) and ignoring enduring relations 
(Introna 1997) for claiming that institutions only exist as memory traces and are only 
instantiated when drawn on social in action. Therefore, episodic power relies on the 
capacities of agents grounded in resource control to achieve outcomes. Agencies activate 
resources in power struggles hence those with more resources have a stronger power base.
The episodic circuit is both coherent and important in its own right because power can either 
flow within it alone or encompass the other circuits. However, power restricted to this circuit 
automatically reproduces existing configurations o f rules and domination. Since, it neither 
tests the social integration nor system integration circuit it cannot innovate. Consequently, 
outcomes o f economy power are rarely enduring because by failing to reshape rules of 
practice there is no power storage to maintain these effects. To understand how the episodic 
circuit stabilises social relations to generate power effects, we assess its constituent features.
Social Relations and Agency
To Clegg it is difficult to have a complete view o f power unless we identify both agents and 
their associated social relations. The relations are significant because their long-term stability 
is pivotal to the generation o f power effects. In the framework, social relations constitute the 
identity o f agencies that are the collective loci o f decision-making and action. To understand 
the relations, we need to analyse the political landscape to ascertain the political subdivisions 
that characterise an organisation (Pfeffer 1992). This reveals the conditions that pré­
configuré^"  ^power relations and hence explains what constitutes effective agency, especially 
the organisational type. The analysis covers the wider relational field o f force for power 
configuration in which social relations constitute agency. Social relations also give insights 
into reification -  the greatest achievement o f power. Reification is associated with power 
storage (Law 1991b) and occurs.
“W hen power is regarded as thing-like, as something solid, real and material, as something an agent 
has, then it represents power in its most pervasive and concrete mode. It is securely fixed in its 
representations (Clegg 1989).”
Giddens argues that the basic domain of social science study is neither the experience of the individual actor 
nor the existence of any form of social totality, but social practices ordered across time and space.
A major criticism of the structuration framework is that it fails to appreciate that prior inequalities of power 
derive from the reproduced relations of domination and subordination of the groups to which specific 
individuals belong or represent (Layder 1996).
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Reification is close to power storage because to store power or have discretion over its 
development is to enjoy or suffer from the effects o f a stable network. The reification of  
relational conditions occurs through the fixing o f their obligatory passage points. However, 
control is precarious because, “It will be open to erosion and undercutting by the active, 
embodied agency o f those people who are its object (Clegg 1989).” Put differently, “those 
who command and those who obey are locked in a mutual dependency that is infused with 
shared meaning. Command is ever vulnerable to the vagaries o f changing values, conflicting 
experiences, and diverse interests (Zuboff 1988).”
Resistance: Control/contest
In practice, reified power rarely, if  ever, occurs entirely without resistance. Thus, contrary to 
common assumptions, power is seldom the complete reification. Although all forms of 
agency -  human and organisational -  are an “achievement o f control produced by discipline” 
it is difficult to get obedience and compliance (Foucault 1979, Ransom 1997). Clegg argues 
that by definition, wholly effective discipline admits no breach, no ‘disobedience’ and total 
rule-boundedness. Since Machiavelli observes that organisations are, “locales in which 
negotiation, contestation and struggle between organisationally divided and linked agencies is 
a routine occurrence (Clegg 1989),” resistance goes together with the exercise o f power.
Episodic power causes resistance because o f the power/knowledge nature o f agency 
(Foucault 1980). Clegg claims that power and resistance are inseparable because some 
conceptions o f resistance are over-extensions o f a sweeping concept o f power itself. Indeed, 
resistance indicates power exercise. Thus, an analysis o f episodic power should appreciate 
that relationships between agencies are unequal because o f the identities conferred by social 
relations and access to resources (Law 1991b, Layder 1996, Wrong 1995).
Success in mobilising resources depends on the ability o f agents to interpret standing 
conditions and use the available means. Clegg argues that agencies operate in a highly 
complex arena o f standing conditions because they not only coexist with others with 
conflicting interests but they also attempt to exercise ‘power over’ each other. Hence, we 
should do the following to study the standing conditions o f episodic power. First, we need to 
identify the agencies trying to exercise ‘power over’ others. Second, establish the scope o f the
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action o f the involved agencies. Third, identify the means available to each agent to activate 
their desired resources. Lastly, researchers should characterise the resources that underpin the 
capabilities o f each agency. Clegg believes he enriches the usual view o f episodic power by 
showing standing conditions as essential for achieving varied outcomes.
Outcomes
Within the episodic circuit, the Outcomes quadrant reflects the objectives and intentions of 
agents as enshrined in dominant discourses. Researchers assess outcomes by exploring 
intentional actions undertaken by agencies and their interpretation o f others’ actions. Clegg 
distances himself from Lukes (1974) definition o f power, which assigns putative interests to 
agents. He argues that intention is not synonymous with something interior to private mental 
states o f persons or even equivalent to what people claim comprises their private mental 
states. Clegg focuses on the intentional actions and interests o f agencies to ascertain whether 
they have been realised or not.
However, he warns we cannot simply assume power as the realisation of outcomes from 
capacities. Indeed, in many social relations an agent’s power is less than the capacities they 
mobilise to achieve a specific outcome. Clegg believes this is because ‘social games’ rarely 
correspond to the idealised conditions of pure games that have clear rules o f engagement. 
These rules are, “more fragile, ambiguous, unclear, dependent upon interpretation, and 
subject either to reproduction or transformation depending on the outcome o f struggles to 
keep them the same or to change them this way or that.” Powerful actors both have greater 
scope in their permissible actions and authoritatively reinterpret what the rules mean because,
“The concept of rules also relates to that of intention. ...In regarding a behaviour as a specific type of 
social action, which can be said to have been intended to be such and such an action, we ... make reference 
to our interpretations of social actions by reference to social rules (Clegg 1989).”
The interaction between capacities and resistance and in the ‘social games’ ensures that 
agencies seldom achieve all their intended outcomes. Thus, to achieve outcomes o f power 
agencies have to overcome resistance posed by the causal powers o f competitors.
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Aggregate effect of episodic circuit
While episodic instances o f agency power are the most apparent, Clegg (1989) warns that an 
exclusive concern with this circuit fails to address the phenomena adequately (Law 1991b). 
This is because the episodic circuit cannot stabilise social relations on its own. As such, 
episodic power needs to move through the other two circuits to allow the translation, fixing 
and either reproduction or transformation of rules, relations and resources. Thus, these 
circuits provide the field o f force for the articulation o f episodic agency conceptions of 
power. Indeed, in the long term agencies seek power to reproduce the ‘substantively rational’ 
conditions that enable the strategies espoused in the episodic circuit to make contextual good 
sense. These conditions provide a foundation for institutionalisation because they make 
routinised actions retain their meaningful character (Suchman 1995) in the general stock of 
knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1967).
Obligatory Passage Points (GPP)
The concept o f Obligatory Passage Points is central to the circuits o f power analysis. To 
Introna (1997), GPP is a rhetorical device that presents the solution to a problem in terms of 
the resources of the agent proposing it. The premise is that since innovations disturb the 
social integration circuit by introducing new meanings, their survival hinges on attaining 
stability, “in rules o f practice as an obligatory passage point through which an agency’s 
reproduction must pass (Clegg 1989).” OPPs enrol interests o f different agencies into stable 
representations to form an organisational field. In turn, the field allows the creation of 
alliances necessary for achieving outcomes o f power.
The GPP concept has roots in the sociology o f translation (Callon 1986, Latour 1991) and 
Actor Network Theory (ANT). Callon introduces the sociology o f translation or enrolment to 
explain the role played by science and technology in structuring power relationships (Callon 
1986). He defines translation as the mechanism by which the social and natural worlds 
progressively take form resulting in certain entities controlling others. Like Foucault, Callon 
is a disciple o f Machiavelli. He offers three methodological principles for the sociology 
translation namely agnosticism, generalised symmetry and free association. Agnosticism 
dictates impartiality when faced with actors engaged in controversy. Gbservers should both 
be impartial towards the scientific and technological arguments used by the protagonists and 
avoid censoring actors as they speak about themselves and the social environment.
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Generalised symmetry demands both a commitment to explaining conflicting viewpoints in 
the same terms and that the observer uses a “single repertoire” after the description. Lastly, 
free association requires the observer to abandon all a priori distinctions between natural and 
social events. “These divisions are considered to be conflictual, for they are the result o f 
analysis rather than its points of departure (Callon 1986).”
The principles attempt to provide a broad view o f power because, “understanding o f what 
sociologists generally call power relationships means describing the way in which actors are 
defined, associated and simultaneously obliged to remain faithful to their alliances (Callon 
1986, Latour 1991).” Callon (1986) explains that for actors to impose their definition o f the 
situation on others, they must go through four ‘moments’ o f translation. These are 
problematisation, intéressement, enrolment and mobilisation.
Problematisation is the ‘moment’ where the actor attempting to become a spokesperson 
defines the nature o f the problem to others and suggests ways o f resolving it. However, the 
actor presents the solution in terms o f their resources, inevitably establishing themselves as 
an obligatory passage point in the network o f relationships they are building. The actors 
attempt to become an indispensable part o f the network o f alliances or associations between 
entities they helped define and create.
Intéressement encompasses actions by which an entity attempts to impose and stabilise the 
identity of the other actors defined through problematisation. This ‘moment’ is “founded on a 
certain interpretation o f what the yet to be enrolled actors are and want as well as what 
entities these actors are associated with. The devices o f intéressement create a favourable 
balance o f power (Callon 1986).” Intéressement serves to impede rival alliances or 
interferences that might question the legitimacy o f the proposed OPP and attempts to get 
members to confirm the selected passage. The success o f this ‘moment’ confirms the validity 
o f problematisation.
Enrolment is a critical stage because it consummates alliances. For as Callon argues, no 
matter how convincing the argument, there is no guarantee o f success until we reach a stage 
where interrelated roles are defined and attributed to actors who hopefully accept them. This 
is the stage where the “multilateral negotiations, trials o f strength and tricks that accompany
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intéressement” succeed or fail. Ideally, actors consolidate alliances through bargaining and 
mutual concessions.
Mobilisation is the final ‘moment’. It deals with ways o f determining the legitimacy o f the 
spokesperson. Success at this stage depends on answering the prime question o f who speaks 
or represents whom. The spokesperson is like a macro-actor who successfully translates 
other actors’ wishes into a single will for which they speak (Callon and Latour 1981). 
Enrolment creates a single voice which is “extremely powerful because o f the forces on 
which it relies.” Therefore, translation explains how a few represent many silent actors o f the 
social and natural worlds that they have mobilised because to translate is to,
“Express in one’s own language what others say and want, why they act in the way they do and how 
they associate with each other: it is to establish oneself as a spokesman. At the end of the process, if it is 
successful, only voices speaking in unison will be heard (Callon 1986).”
The notion o f translation emphasises the continuity o f displacements and transformations at 
each stage in terms o f goals, interests, devices and human actors. When it occurs, power is 
exercised because some displacements play a more strategic role than others do.
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The Circuit of Sociai integration
Clegg conceives o f social integration or dispositional power in terms of the relation between 
the rules governing meaning and membership. To Wrong (1995) dispositional power is the 
capacity o f agencies to produce intended and foreseen effects on others even though they may 
not manifest this potential in action. According to Introna (1997), the analysis o f this circuit 
identifies both legitimate and illegitimate power. Introna believes that the recognition of 
illegitimate power is fundamental in a complete political appraisal because a key reason for 
IS failure is the, “lack o f fit between the meanings arising from the information system, and 
the prevailing organisational rules and norms.”
We saw elsewhere that ‘power over’ trades off some extant ‘fixing’ o f facilitative and 
dispositional power. To Clegg indexicality is the reason why a change in rules governing 
meaning is always contentious. Indexicality implies that the meaning o f speech and language 
depends on the specific features of the context o f their use such as personal, temporal or 
location. Thus, attempts to deploy new material conditions such as technology, techniques 
and methods o f production, run into trouble if  they demand significant changes to the rules 
governing meaning and membership.
Introna (1997) argues the acceptance of new material conditions largely depends on their 
integration with the institutionalised organisational order as encapsulated by norms, beliefs 
and values. He warns that where there is a lack o f fit, material conditions may engender 
social relationships and practices that can threaten the organisation’s very existence. Clegg 
(1989) observes that issues o f social integration, achieved through fixing rules governing 
relations o f meaning and membership, become important within both organisations and 
organisation fields as they age. This is because while all norms are temporal, older 
organisations experience greater structural inertia that slows innovation down. Older 
organisations are slow innovators because their membership and meaning characteristics like 
personnel, formal structure, culture and goals tend towards homology. Inertia is remarkably 
destructive where information is not merely an intellectual commodity but a political 
resource, whose redistribution through a new IS, affects the interests o f particular groups
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(Keen 1981). Organisational outflanking^^ thwarts radical social change because the absence 
of collective organisation to do otherwise premises compliance.
Silva (1997) warns that because o f the structural nature o f dispositional power, elements o f  
the circuit are probably the most elusive in research. Unlike episodic power, especially when 
seen through positivist eyes (Hofstede 1993) as something directly observable and 
measurable (Barnes 1986, Clegg 1989), dispositional power is embedded in social practices, 
rules and norms making it less obvious. Therefore, researchers must rely on their 
understanding o f the organisational context built through data collection to discern the 
elements. Since Clegg identifies organisational age as a factor in institutionalisation, it is vital 
to reconstruct the history of the case studies to understand how members value innovations.
Exogenous Contingencies
In the CoP framework the arrow between the ‘exogenous environmental contingencies’ 
quadrant and the rules o f meaning and membership highlights the link between institutional 
isomorphism and the social integration circuit (Silva 1997). Exogenous contingencies 
represent coercive pressures from agencies with authority in an organisational field that 
transform or reinforce the rules o f meaning and membership. The CoP draws on concepts of 
institutional isomorphism to explain how organisations adopt innovations and how the 
innovations become stable in organisational fields (Meyer and Rowan 1991). To DiMaggio 
and Powell (1991) an organisational field  represents those organisations that in aggregate 
constitute a recognised area o f institutional life. These include key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies and competitors.
Isomorphism explains a constraining process that forces one unit to resemble others faced 
with similar environmental conditions. Isomorphism is both competitive and institutional 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Competitive isomorphism is the purer type and assumes a 
system rationality emphasising competition, niche change, and fitness measures in 
competitive markets. Institutional isomorphism considers other firms because organisations 
compete not just for resources and customers but also political power and legitimacy. 
Institutional isomorphism can be coercive, mimetic or normative.
Under “organisational outflanking” resistance may “consolidate itself as a new power and thus constitute a 
new fixity in the representation of power, with a relational field of force altogether.”
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The coercive isomorphism emanates from political influence and the problem of legitimacy 
where centrally configured agencies use existing configurations of episodic power to demand 
specific actions from dependent relations in the network. These pressures could be forceful, 
persuasive or “invitations to join in collusion.” Mimetic processes rely on the power of  
uncertainty to create imitation. Organisations may model themselves on others when 
knowledge of technologies is low, goals are ambiguous or when the environment creates 
symbolic uncertainty. The dominance of the technically inferior QWERTY over Dvorak 
keyboards shows the power of uncertainty (Rogers 1983). The normative type stems from 
professionalisation or a collective struggle by members o f an occupation to define conditions 
and methods o f their work. The goal is to create a cognitive base and legitimation for 
autonomy. Overall, isomorphism leads to homogenisation even o f new entrants once the 
organisational field is established (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
However, to Clegg institutional theory is not concerned with the nature or source of 
innovation itself. The institutional perspective focuses on the ‘politics’ and ‘ceremony’, 
which the CoP framework represents as rules o f practice. Social change is the interest o f the 
circuit o f facilitative power through system integration.
87
The Circuit of System integration
This circuit deals with ‘material conditions’ o f techniques o f production and discipline. After 
Lockwood (1964), Clegg states that material conditions include the technological means o f  
control over the physical and social environment and the skills associated with these means. 
The circuit deals with facilitative power because material conditions o f production either 
empower or disempower agencies in their productive activities. Facilitative power is 
associated with the ability to produce and achieve collective objectives as we saw under the 
‘power to’ notion. Because some agencies have capacity to define collective objectives, this 
circuit explains why organisational members work together and extends the notion of power 
beyond concern with conflict. Thus, systemic integration deals with the coordination o f  
working practices. Both discipline and production are in this circuit to amplify the productive 
angle o f power since A draws on these mechanisms and techniques to ensure B's compliance.
System integration concerns the CoP through techniques of domination because the 
facilitative conception o f power sees the episodic exercise o f power as always beginning 
from conditions. Although this frequently occurs through a ‘zero-sum conflict’, Clegg 
believes it is not automatic because in a relational field the empowerment o f relatively more 
powerful and weaker agencies may simultaneously occur. Having discipline and production 
in one circuit also recognises that methods o f production entail methods o f discipline 
(Foucault 1979, Ransom 1997). Discipline normally attempts to achieve the subordination o f  
individual agencies to collective objectives. Disciplinary practices rely on the surveillance of 
organisational members through the collection, recording and comparison o f data about their 
activities (Keen 1981, Markus and Pfeffer 1983). To Clegg these ‘disciplinary practices’ are 
micro-techniques o f power meant to inscribe and normalise not only individuals but also 
collective, organised bodies because,
“Surveillance, whether personal, technical, bureaucratic or legal, is the (central power) issue. Its types may 
range through forms of, for instance, supervision, routinisation, formalisation, mechanisation and 
legislation, which seek to effect increasing control of employees’ behaviour, dispositions and embodiment, 
precisely because they are organisation members (Clegg 1989).”
Apart from direct control, surveillance can take forms like cultural practices of moral 
endorsement, enablement and suasion to more formalised technical knowledge. Clegg’s 
notion o f discipline encompasses Foucault’s ideas o f hierarchical observations, normalising
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judgements and examinations and views focusing on rationalised obedience in form of 
authority (Weber 1964).
Therefore, system integration is vital circuit because it is a source o f resources for power, 
subject to competitive pressure. Competition depends on passage ways made obligatory by 
the fixing o f rules o f practice at the facilitative core o f power. The circuit focuses on the 
empowerment and disempowerment o f the capacities of agencies, whose strategic value relies 
on changes in techniques o f production and discipline. However, to Clegg the process is 
double-edged. Although it is oriented towards environmental resources, their retention relies 
on stabilisation in rules o f practice as an obligatory passage point through which an agent’s 
reproduction must pass in the social integration circuit. By affecting the capacities o f 
agencies, system integration introduces potent uncertainty and dynamism in power relations 
via innovation in techniques o f production and discipline. This presents opportunities for 
challenging established episodic power configurations because it generates competitive 
pressures through new techniques and forms o f discipline. After Lockwood (1964), Clegg 
writes transformation,
‘Of an existing configuration of power .. .will .., arise “from a ‘lack of fît” between its core institutional 
order and its material substructure”, and “will be characterised by a typical form of ‘strain’ arising from 
the functional incompatibility between its institutional order and material base”.’
Contrary to Marxist and functionalist perspectives, these processes are not automatic. The 
outcome depends on whether agencies can take control o f the ‘nodal’ or OPPs enabled by the 
system and social integration circuits or not. The agencies need to establish networks and 
alliances o f control to use the techniques o f production and discipline as pathways for 
ushering in new standing conditions. Eventually the agencies need to translate the new rules 
and norms implied by an information system into discourses that other agencies can 
understand and accept as ready-to-hand (Introna 1997).
Like social integration, changes in the system integration circuit are either endogenous or 
exogenous. The former are a result o f episodic power outcomes that may enhance innovation 
in techniques o f production and discipline. However, exogenous changes result from 
environmental contingencies, which may intermpt the fields o f force in the system integration 
circuit. Clegg cautions that whereas circuits as terms are ‘integrative’ they can as well be
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disintegrative particularly where exogenous sources o f change are involved. The receptivity 
of exogenous factors relies on OPPs and rule fixing.
Chapter summary
Scholars agree that power is probably the most fiercely contested concept. Some have 
suggested that since there is bound to be perpetual disagreement, social science should simply 
discard the elusive concept. The discord has roots in the different worldviews pursued by 
scholars o f power. For instance, while positivists regard power as directly observable and 
measurable other scholars simply regard it is as property o f relations.
Wary o f calls for the banishment o f the power concept, we followed the lead o f other IS 
researchers and adopted the Circuits of Power framework because it provides a central 
tradition o f power that incorporates different debates and offers well-grounded alternative 
conceptions. The framework does not advocate a single sovereign power conception but 
distinct circuits. Each circuit relies on effective organisation whose form is subject to 
pressures o f reproduction and transformation in each o f the circuits o f social and system 
integration. Whether system disintegration or contradiction leads to transformation and new 
rules depends on the network o f power and passage points achieved through episodic power’s 
configuration o f the organisational field at the social organisation level.
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CHAPTER 4: 
RESEARCH DESIGN
Introduction
This Chapter discusses the philosophical underpinning of our methodological approach and 
places our work within the wider IS research traditions. We highlight the theoretical concepts 
upon which our research is based because behind every method lies a belief about the nature 
o f the world and knowledge (Mingers 2001). We cannot overstate the value o f providing the 
supporting theory o f reality for such a contested concept like power. As discussed previously, 
we adopted the Circuits o f Power (CoP) framework because it provides a central tradition of  
power that incorporates different debates and alternative conceptions.
The chapter is organised as follows. First, we present the philosophical underpinnings of  
information systems research covering the positivist, interpretive, and critical stances. We 
focus on the interpretivist approach because it best grasps the elusive and contested essence 
o f power and politics. The next section examines the case study research strategy. We 
thereafter reflect on our rationale for selecting the two field studies, the data sources and the 
role o f the CoP framework as data collection and analytical tool for this research.
Philosophical assumptions
Zuboff (1988) argues that behind every method lies a belief about the nature o f the world and 
knowledge (Mingers 2001) because researchers pursue different worldviews (Creswell 1994), 
She believes researchers should state their theory o f reality and how that reality surrenders 
itself to knowledge seeking efforts (Zuboff 1988). To Creswell (1994) the assumptions cover 
the nature o f reality (ontological); relationship between the researcher and subject 
(epistemological); role o f values (axiological); the language o f research (rhetorical) and the 
process o f research (methodological) (Burrell and Morgan 1979). The assumptions jointly 
form a paradigm because they are constructs o f thought about the social world (Creswell 
1994, Mingers 2001). We focus on epistemological assumptions because this chapter 
discusses our research decisions.
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Epistemology
Epistemology deals with assumptions about the grounds o f knowledge. It focuses on ways o f  
understanding the world and communicating this as knowledge to other human beings 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979). Epistemology defines obtainable forms o f knowledge and ways 
of ensuring that it is ‘true’ or appropriate evidence and its character. Knowledge could be real 
and transmittable in a tangible form. Alternatively, it could be o f “a softer, more subjective, 
spiritual or even transcendental kind, based on experience and insight o f a unique and 
essentially personal nature (Burrell and Morgan 1979).” The assumptions enable researchers 
to ascertain what constitutes good evidence and ways o f gathering it properly. However, to 
Zuboff, epistemological basics are subject to debate but not to ultimate proof. She adds,
“Each epistemology inches a set of methods uniquely suited to it, and these methods will render the 
qualities of data that reflect a researcher’s assessment of what is vital. I believe that researchers ought to 
indicate something about their beliefs, so that readers can have access to the intellectual choices that 
are embedded in the research effort (Zuboff 1988).”
Likewise, Burrell and Morgan (1979) believe the failure to broach underlying viewpoints 
about the social world often sows doubts about the credibility o f research findings. The 
widely used classification o f IS research epistemologies into positivist, interpretive, and 
critical stances (Klein and Myers 1999, Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991) follow the work of 
Wai Fong Cbua in the Accounting discipline. She argues that Accounting research 
traditionally emphasised, “physical realism, bypotbetico-deductivism, the natural tendency 
toward social order, and a ‘value-free’ position in terms of the relationship between theory 
and practice.” Highlighting the severe limitations o f this mainstream theory, she calls for the 
appreciation o f the role and meaning of accounting data in action (Cbua 1986). Next, we 
discuss the underlying beliefs o f the three approaches.
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Positivism
Positivists believe that “objective” data can be collected from “out there” independent o f  
researcher preconceptions and can be used to test prior hypothesis or theories (Creswell 
1994, Klein and Myers 1999, Walsham 1995a). From this view, the world is 
characterised by order rather than discord. The “social structures o f reality are ‘found’, 
‘observed’ or ‘modelled’ rather than ‘interpreted’ or ‘re-created’ (Torvinen and Jalonen 
2000).” Positivism views the social world as a hard, external and an objective reality. 
Hence, researchers analyse the relationships and regularities between various elements.
Lee (1991) associates positivist research with inferential statistics, hypothesis testing, 
mathematical analysis and experimental and quasi-experimental design. To Orlikowski 
and Baroudi (1991) the paradigm is part o f the scientific or empirical-analytical tradition 
characterised by formal propositions, quantifiable measure of variables, hypothesis 
testing and drawing o f inferences about a phenomenon from the sample to a stated 
population (Galliers 1991). Positivism is also deterministic. Individuals respond in a 
mechanistic fashion to situations they encounter in the external world (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979). Thus, individuals and their experiences are “products o f the environment; 
one in which humans are conditioned by their external circumstances.” After Bleicher 
(1982), Galliers (1991) argues that positivists insist,
“The enq)irical-analytical method is the only valid approach to improve human knowledge. What can’t 
be investigated using this approach can’t be investigated at all scientifically. Such research must be banned 
from the domain of science as ‘unresearchable.’
Methodologically, the focus is on the concepts themselves, their measurement and the 
identification o f underlying themes (Burrell and Morgan 1979, Walsham 1993). 
Creswell (1994) links the positivist paradigm to quantitative studies that statistically test 
theory to determine whether predictive generalisations hold true.
An extensive study of IS literature by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) revealed that although 
there was no theoretical or topic congruence among researchers, positivism was the most 
dominant philosophical worldview (Galliers and Land 1987, Lee 1991). To Walsham (1995a) 
positivism has the status o f tacit knowledge in mainstream IS literature because it needs less
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or no argument to support it. When effort is concentrated in a limited area o f theoretical 
assumptions, it generates orthodoxy so dominant that,
“Its adherents often take it for granted as right and self-evident. Rival perspectives within the same 
paradigm or outside its bounds appear as satellites defining alternative points of view. Their impact upon 
the orthodoxy, however, is rarely very significant. They are seldom strong enough to establish themselves 
as anything more than a somewhat deviant set of approaches. As a result, the possibilities which they 
offer are rarely explored, let alone understood (Burrell and Morgan 1979),”
The authors claim they developed their feted “Four Sociological Paradigms” out o f concern, 
“about academic sectarianism reflected at various times in open hostility, ostrich-like 
indifference and generally poor quality dialogue and debate between essentially related 
schools o f thought.” Our research follows the interpretive tradition.
Interpretivism
The growing criticism of positivism and the quest for alternative epistemological and 
methodological foundations has increased the appeal o f interpretive research (Bryman 1988). 
Indeed, the claim of interpretivism as a valid approach o f inquiry has penetrated mainstream 
IS to an extent that it is taken seriously, at least in methodology research literature (Walsham 
1995a). Lee (1991) believes the interpretive approach has gained attention as an alternative to 
positivist research because natural science does not effectively handle social reality. 
However, hurdles remain because, “It is safer for authors to stick to positivist orthodoxy 
(Walsham 1995a).”
Lee (1991) associates interpretivism with procedures such as ethnography, hermeneutics, 
phenomenology and case studies. Interpretivism is linked with voluntarism because it,
“Attributes to human beings a much more creative role: with a perspective where ‘free will’ occupies the 
centre of the stage; where man is regarded as the creator of his environment, the controller as opposed 
to the controlled, the master rather than the marionette (Burrell and Morgan 1979),”
Voluntarism prizes the subjective experience of individuals in creating, modifying and 
interpreting their social world. Therefore, interpretivism assumes that people create and 
associate their own subjective and intersubjective meanings as they interact with the world 
around them (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Lee (1991) insists the adjective ‘subjective’ is 
not a synonym for ‘biased’, ‘opinionated’ or ‘untestable’ but refers to the meaning held by 
the observed human subject. To Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) interpretive studies reject the
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notion o f “objective” or “factual” actual accounts of events and situations and instead seek 
relativistic, albeit shared, understanding o f phenomena (Burrell and Morgan 1979). As such, 
multiple realities exist in any given situation because the researcher, the subject and study 
readers have different views (Creswell 1994, Mumford 1985, Walsham 1995a). 
Interpretivists focus on the complexity of human sense making as the situation emerges and 
attempt to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them (Giddens 
1984, Jones 1999, Walsham 1993). In general,
“Interpretivists argue that organisations are not static and that the relationships between people, 
organisations and technology are not fixed but constantly changing. As a consequence, interpretive 
research seeks to understand a moving target (Klein and Myers 1999).”
To Walsham (1995a) value-free data is unobtainable in interpretive studies because inquirers 
use their own notions to guide the study (Mingers 2001). Hence, there is no objective reality 
to discover and replicate because theories of reality are just ways o f making sense o f the 
world (Walsham 1993, Zuboff 1988). To Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) interpretivism does 
not seek generalisations about a population but attempts to understand the deeper structure of 
a phenomenon with the belief that this can inform other settings (Kettinger and Lee 2002, 
Markus 1983). Thus, interpretive research takes,
“A nondeterministic perspective where the intent of the research was to increase the understanding of the 
phenomena within cultural and contextual situations; where the phenomenon of interest was examined in 
its natural settings and from the perspective of the participants and where researchers did not impose their 
outsiders’ a priori understanding of the situation (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991).”
Therefore, the researcher is able to represent ‘reality’ from the voices and interpretations of 
the informants (Creswell 1994, Galliers 1991). Klein and Myers (1999) believe interpretive 
research can produce deep insights into IS phenomena because it focuses on human thought 
and action in organisational settings. To Galliers (1991) this follows an in-depth self­
validating process, in which the continual questioning o f the presuppositions leads to a better 
understanding o f the phenomena under study.
Qualitative methods
Klein and Myers (1999) argue that while interpretive research does “not subscribe to the idea 
that a pre-determined set o f criteria can be applied in a mechanistic way, it does not follow
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that there are no standards at all” to judge it (Buchanan et a l  1988). The paradigm is often 
associated with qualitative studies or,
“An inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem based on building a complex, holistic
picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a natural setting
(Creswell 1994),”
The rising interest in qualitative research is a product o f dissatisfaction with quantitative 
techniques. To Benbasat et al, (1987) the concern stems fi*om the complexity o f multivariate 
research methods, the distribution restrictions, large sample sizes and the sheer difficulty o f  
understanding the results. Franz and Robey (1984) state that because rational and non- 
rational or political myths coexist and complement each other during IS implementation, 
qualitative research best captures the two sets o f stories.
Silverman (1998) believes the major attraction o f qualitative research is its ability to reveal 
how humans interact. Qualitative research has the “ability to focus on actual practice in situ, 
looking at how organisations are routinely enacted (Silverman 1998).” However, Silverman 
rejects the “fashionable identification of qualitative method with an analysis o f how people 
‘see things’, preferring to focus instead on how people ‘do things’ (Bryman 1988).” He 
insists researchers should question the belief that the qualitative approach is only 
‘exploratory’ or ‘anecdotal’. He believes case study methods can examine large datasets with 
standard issues of ‘reliability’ addressed through systematic transcription o f data.
However, to Klein and Myers (1999) the word interpretive is not always a synonym for 
qualitative because, depending upon on the underlying philosophical assumptions o f the 
researcher, qualitative research may or may not be interpretive. Similarly, Walsham (1995a) 
argues that the interpretivist school is not homogeneous in its knowledge claims. Carroll and 
Swatman (2000) agree. They argue that qualitative research covers a plurality o f research 
paradigms - positivist, interpretive and critical - with which there are many research methods 
-  case studies, field studies, ethnography and action research -  processes and techniques. 
They stress that while there is no agreed doctrine underlying all qualitative social research 
(Markus and Lee 1999, Silverman 1998), it is generally the collection o f data in the form of 
words and images, which is analysed by methods that do not include statistics or 
quantification (Carroll and Swatman 2000).
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Markus and Lee (1999) also argue that what researchers often refer to, as qualitative or 
interpretive research is not one method, but many methods, each with its own appropriate and 
different criteria o f evaluation. Consequently, they coin the term “intensive research” to 
describe qualitative research to signal the variety o f methods in this field (Markus and Lee 
1999). Since, interpretivism is not a dominant approach in IS research (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi 1991, Walsham 1995a), the tendency to lump dissimilar methods into a collective 
term tempts journal editors, reviewers and readers to apply a single criteria inappropriately to 
all studies under the label. However, the lack o f understanding is mutual because,
“While intensive researchers have been, unfortunately, habituated to the application of inappropriate 
criteria to intensive research by some colleagues who specialise in quantitative methods (a practice that, 
fortunately, has been lessening recently), we have been shocked and dismayed by a similar lack of 
‘professional courtesy’ by intensive research specialists (Markus and Lee 1999).”
However, Carroll and Swatman (2000) warn that this array o f research approaches poses 
theoretical and practical problems for researchers. A cardinal theoretical concern is the 
difficulty o f assuring the quality of qualitative IS research. Even the choice o f the ‘best’ 
paradigm and method does not guarantee good qualitative research because success largely 
hinges on the experience and sensitivity o f the researcher. For instance, Silverman (1998) 
reveals that while many qualitative researchers see their aim as being able to ‘see through the 
eyes’ o f subjects, others would see this aim as ‘subjectivist’ and even ‘journalistic.’ The 
scientific school also dismisses claims that open-ended, qualitative interviews give direct 
access to ‘experience’ insisting that common-sense reasoning influences what this means 
(Galliers 1991, Silverman 1998).
Critical perspective
According to Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), this stance questions the status quo through the 
exposure o f deep-seated, structural contradictions within social systems. The purpose o f this 
critique is to identify and fight restrictive social conditions. Likewise, Klein and Myers 
(1999) argue that research takes a critical stance if  it brings to light restrictive and alienating 
conditions. To Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) these are taken-for-granted assumptions about 
organisations and information systems. The goal o f the research is to provide a dialectical 
analysis that reveals the historical, ideological, and contradictory nature o f existing social 
structures (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991).
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Klein and Myers (1999) regard critical research as emancipatory because it attempts to 
eliminate the causes o f unwarranted alienation and domination and hence enhance the 
opportunities for realising human potential. Critical theorists assume that agencies can 
consciously act to change their social and economic conditions. However, the theorists 
“recognise that human ability to improve their conditions is constrained by various forms 
of social, cultural and political domination as well as natural laws and resource 
limitations (Klein and Myers 1999).”
Plurality of perspectives
From the ontological assumption o f multiple interpretations for any social phenomena 
(Creswell 1994, Galliers 1991, Walsham 1995a), interpretivists believe that the positivist 
claim of being the only valid approach for improving human knowledge is injudicious. 
Interpretivists argue that in its broadest definition information systems is essentially a 
pluralistic field that draws on and provides a nexus for many diverse research fields and 
disciplines (Dahlbom 1997, Mingers 2001). Interpretivists have also challenged basic aspects 
o f positivism. For instance, Silverman criticises the ‘objectivity’ claims o f surveys and other 
quantitative research methods. He insists that while ‘properly’ designed questionnaires 
appear to deliver valid and reliable quantifiable information,
“Respondents’ answers to survey questions are inevitably abstracted from the day-to-day business of 
actually operating the system. Thus, there may be a world of difference between the contingencies of 
working with a given piece of IT and responding to a questionnaire about one’s ‘attitudes’ towards the 
system (Silverman 1998).”
Silverman claims surveys depend upon a ‘positivistic’ model, which assumes that ‘tools are 
discrete entities’ (King 1996). However, since artefacts only become tools in practice (Star 
and Ruhleder 1996) this view is problematic. Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) add that if  we 
agree that IS are complex (Kling and Dutton 1982, Newell et a l 2000, Rolland and Monteiro 
2002, Star and Ruhleder 1994), then multiple perspectives allow the exploration o f the 
phenomena fi*om diverse angles. For instance, while qualitative methods describe well the 
socially constructed world (Walsham 1993, Walsham 1995a), quantitative research has better 
tools for defining, counting and analysing variables (Creswell 1994). Hence, a plurality of  
views should enrich IS research (DeSanctis 1993, Markus and Lee 1999, Mingers 2001).
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Markus and Lee (1991) call for the clarification o f evaluation criteria for intensive methods to 
improve acceptance and appreciation of diversity within the community and across the 
intensive/quantitative divide (Walsham 1995a). Since the polarities between qualitative and 
quantitative research largely serve didactic purposes,
“It is inaccurate to assume that quantitative and qualitative research are polar opposites. ...For, of course, 
there are no principled grounds to be either qualitative or quantitative in approach. It all depends upon 
what you are trying to do. ...Indeed, often one will want to combine both approaches ...just as 
quantitative researchers would resist the charge that they are all ‘positivists’ ... there is no agreed doctrine 
underlying all qualitative social research (Silverman 1998).”
Burrell and Morgan (1979) claim, “To understand a new paradigm one has to explore it firom 
the inside, in terms o f its own distinctive problematic.” Lee (1991) also dismisses the belief 
that the approaches are opposed and irreconcilable. He offers a framework to show that the 
approaches can be mutually supportive rather than exclusive. However, Walsham (1995a) 
warns that interpretivists would strongly oppose Lee’s views because they confuse and 
conflate contradictory epistemological positions. In conclusion, Markus and Lee (1999) call 
an end to these “paradigm wars” arguing that methodologies in themselves, like algebraic 
symbols, are formalisms, devoid o f empirical content.
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Information Security phiiosophical roots
Galliers (1991) writes that after positivistic claims that if  a phenomena cannot be investigated 
by empirical-analytical methods it can never be studied scientifically, a number of IS 
researchers have been led into ‘illogical’ conclusions that,
“1. Every real phenomenon can be measured
2. If it can’t be measured, it’s not real
3. If it can be measured, it is real.”
Galliers and Land (1987) also express concern about the primacy within IS o f traditional, 
empirical research more suited to the natural sciences to a near exclusion o f different research 
perspectives that nevertheless make good contribution to knowledge (Mumford 1985, 
Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Nowhere in IS are these practices more prevalent than 
information security research. A brief background will suffice. Computer security, as a 
discipline, originated from research laboratories o f computer manufacturers and the 
mathematics departments of universities (Dorey 1991). As these roots suggest, methods of 
information security implementation have relied on the traditional approach to systems 
analysis also known as hard systems thinking (Hitchings 1995). Hard systems thinking starts 
from the premise of a carefully defined objective that systems engineers take as given 
(Hirschheim and Klein 1989, Hirschheim and Klein 1994). However, this approach is 
problematic in “messy, changing, ill-defined problem situations” (Checkland 1981, 
Checkland 1989, Checkland and Scholes 1990) that characterise organisational life.
Hitchings (1995) argues that despite the recent barrage o f criticism directed at hard systems 
thinking in systems design (Mathiassen and Stage 1992), security methods still rely on this 
approach. The approach originates in the functionalist paradigm (Burrell and Morgan 1979, 
Knights and Murray 1994). Put briefly, functionalists rely on objective and empirical 
scientific methods to discover binding laws o f causality for establishing cohesive and stable 
social structures (Burrell and Morgan 1979, Dhillon and Backhouse 2001, Latour 1991) like 
infrastructures. Similarly, technical security attempts to eradicate uncertainty in work routines 
by reducing exceptions (Stinchcombe 1968).
From a value-consensus standpoint, rationalists believe the suppression of exceptions is a 
legitimate pursuit because they expect all organisational actors to contribute to common
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objectives (Etzioni 1964). Organisations use infrastructures because managers view 
exceptions as illegitimate, disruptive and costly activities (Knights and Murray 1994, Romm 
and Pliskin 1997). Technical security as encapsulated in the CIA (confidentiality, integrity 
and availability) model also supports the value consensus view. Because by stopping the 
unauthorised disclosure, modification and withholding of information, the model focuses 
employees on their assigned tasks in support of common organisational objectives. However, 
compliance is difficult to achieve because as segmented institutionalists argue, individuals 
and subgroups have conflicting goals leading some to view security as a hindrance to getting 
work done (Parker 1997, Schwartau 1998).
Objective social science known as ‘sociological positivism’ (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001) 
informs most information security work. The approach applies models and methods derived 
from natural science to study human affairs. However,
“Critics point to the futile search for the same type of knowledge as found in nature science, which 
can be characterised as analytical and value free and with only occasional efforts that consider the 
subjectivism of the applications (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001).”
Because this literature relies on a value consensus proposition, it sees security problems as 
purely technical not social or organisational (Knights and Murray 1994). The mixed interest 
nature o f organisations links conflict, power and politics to security practice (Hirschheim and 
Klein 1989). Besides, since systems succeed or fail on their ability to transcend these 
problems, the natural scientific approach is problematic because,
“Science ...does not inquire after the motives of an action, as if these have been present in 
consciousness before the action; but it first breaks up the action into a group of mechanistic phenomena 
and seeks the previous history of this mechanistic motion -  but it does not seek it in feeling, sensation, 
thinking. It can never take the explanation from this quarter: sensation is precisely the material that is to be 
explained (Nietzsche 1968).”
The literature reliant on functionalist views is not useful in understanding power because it 
ignores the telling impact o f people (Backhouse 1997, Hitchings 1995) in security practice. 
Consequently, in a departure from security orthodoxy, we adopted an interpretive approach to 
underpin our study o f the role o f power and politics in PKI institutionalisation. We believe 
we can understand organisational power plays better if  we appreciate the assumptions and 
intersubjectively shared meanings that people assign to events and actions. Using interactive
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interpretive techniques, chiefly interviews, we assess both the formal power structures and 
politics (Pfeffer 1992, Silva 1997). Next, we consider the assumptions behind methodologies.
Research Strategy
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that ontological and epistemological assumptions about the 
relationship between human beings and their environment have direct methodological 
implications. They propose nomothetic and ideographic approaches as two broad 
methodological choices. The nomothetic view is associated with the objective dimension of 
social science and stresses the role of systematic protocols and techniques. Like natural 
science, nomothetic approaches focus on rigorous hypothesis testing using quantitative 
techniques such as surveys, questionnaires and personality tests (Burrell and Morgan 1979, 
Creswell 1994, Galliers 1991). This approach seeks general laws and restricts itself to 
procedures acceptable to exact science (Luthans and Davis 1982). Until recently, IS research 
in a “rush for scientific respectability” had opted for this approach leading to the shunning of 
approaches such as traditional case studies because they were deemed not ‘scientific enough’ 
(Franz and Robey 1984, Luthans and Davis 1982).
The ideographic perspective is associated with the subjective dimension. The main emphasis 
is that researchers can only properly understand the social world by obtaining first-hand 
knowledge of the subjects under investigation (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Research includes 
detailed explorations o f the background and life history o f the subject. The findings give 
researchers insights into the life o f the subject revealed in impressionistic accounts. Overall, 
“the ideographic method stresses the importance o f letting one’s subject unfold its nature and 
characteristics during the process o f investigation (Burrell and Morgan 1979).”
The dichotomy is largely artificial because the two approaches overlap and can profitably be 
combined to enrich IS knowledge (Luthans and Davis 1982). However, Franz and Robey 
(1984) argue that because o f threats to internal validity and the virtual impossibility of 
experiment control, it is questionable whether “many scientifically-based conclusions can be 
drawn from IS implementation in the real world.” They believe that other than using control 
groups, researchers can address threats to validity with intense data collection using a variety 
o f measurements. Thus, Franz and Robey (1984) advocate the ideographic approach in IS
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research because it provides more in-depth explanation (Luthans and Davis 1982) o f 
particular events and their context (Benbasat et al. 1987) than the nomothetic approach.
Rationale for Case Study strategy
Our methodological stance follows the ideographic approach. Although some scholars see 
power as directly measurable and hence observable through scientific study, we believe the 
subjective orientation o f the ideographic approach better informs research o f this 
fundamentally disputed concept. Since, we do not regard power as a ‘thing’ but as a relational 
concept manifest in outcomes, we required a research strategy that could elicit the 
intersubjectively shared meanings that agencies assign to outcomes o f power. We chose a 
case study approach. Next, we discuss the key features o f case study research and its efficacy 
in illuminating socially constructed reality.
Benbasat et al, (1987) argue that there is no standard definition o f a case study (Cavaye 
1996). Likewise, to Yin (1994) the most commonly encountered definitions o f case studies 
merely repeat the types o f topics researched with the strategy. He believes the citing o f topics 
such as ‘organisations’, decisions’ and ‘processes’ is insufficient for establishing the needed 
definition for a case study. Yin reveals that most social science textbooks completely 
disregard the case study as a formal research strategy because scholars consider it an 
exploratory stage for other research strategies. However, to Benbasat et al, (1987) the unique 
feature o f case studies is that they examine a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing 
multiple methods to gather information from entities such as people, groups or organisations. 
This is similar to the definition o f interpretive research (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991).
Yin (1994) argues that the choice o f a research strategy depends on the type of research 
questions, the control an investigator has over the actual behavioural events and the focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena. He believes case studies uniquely 
contribute to knowledge o f individual, organisational, social and political phenomena because 
they allow an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics o f real life 
events. He believes case studies are desirable when, “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being 
asked about a contemporary set o f events over which the investigator has little or no control 
(Yin 1994).” This is because these explanatory questions deal with operational links and 
require tracing over time rather than assessment o f mere frequencies or incidence. Benbasat
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et al, (1987) also emphasise the emerging nature o f case study strategy by arguing that, to a 
degree, researchers have a little a priori knowledge about key issues and their handling.
We chose this strategy because we asked ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, expected little control 
over the research environment and we focus on contemporary phenomenon within real-life 
contexts. This strategy is appropriate because our focus is on how power and politics enable 
public key infrastructures to become part o f real-life contexts (Benbasat et a l  1987). Indeed, 
PKI institutionalisation occurs when the “boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident (Yin 1994).”
Although some authors associate this strategy with the scientific research tradition 
(Checkland 1981, Galliers 1991, Lee 1989), case studies are a preferred strategy for 
interpretivist research (Benbasat et a l  1987). Walsham (1993) claims, “The most appropriate 
method for conducting empirical research in the interpretive tradition is the in-depth case 
study.” However, authors like (Cavaye 1996, Eisenhardt 1989, Galliers 1991) disregard the 
appropriation o f the strategy by either positivist or interpretivist researchers and stress that 
case studies can be o f either tradition. This is because case study research,
“Can be a highly structured, positivist, deductive investigation of multiple cases; it can also be 
unstructured, interpretative, inductive investigation of one case; lastly, it can be anything in between these 
two extremes in almost any combination (Cavaye 1996).”
She believes the versatile and pluralistic nature o f the strategy has led to confusion because 
authors only present specific variations. She is concerned that while researchers such as (Lee 
1989, Walsham 1995) acknowledge other types o f case research, others such as (Benbasat et 
a l  1987) present their own versions as if  they were the only type. Cavaye (1996) insists there 
is no one ‘best way’ o f conducting case research and all variations are legitimate uses of the 
strategy. Lee (1989) argues that efforts to clarify the methodological basis for conducting 
case studies continue in reaction to accusations that they are not ‘scientific enough’ (Franz 
and Robey 1984, Luthans and Davis 1982). He claims that although natural scientists are the 
loudest critics o f this strategy, a scientific methodology actually complements and supports 
the methods traditionally associated with the case study.
The failure by researchers to decide whether case research represents a strategy or just a 
method also causes confusion. After Weick (1984), Galliers (1991) describes methods as
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ways o f systematising observation. We believe a research strategy is a synonym of what 
Galliers calls an approach because it defines a way o f going about one’s research (Yin 1993, 
Yin 1994). Like strategies, approaches are more generic than methods because they may 
embody a particular style and employ different methods or techniques (Galliers 1991). 
Indeed, Yin (1994) stresses that the case study is neither a data collection tactic nor merely a 
design feature but a complete research strategy.
In line with the ideographic approach, Galliers (1991) sees case studies as common strategies 
for studying ‘real world’ situations in information systems. A key strength o f the strategy is 
its ability to facilitate the understanding o f complex ‘reality’ in considerably more detail than 
most other approaches. This is because case studies draw on a wide array o f techniques. For 
instance, while a case study may rely on similar techniques as a history,
“It adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the historian’s repertoire: direct observation and 
systematic interviewing. ...the case study’s strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence 
-  documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations -  beyond what might be available in the 
conventional history study (Yin 1994).’’
Benbasat et a l  (1987) see three fundamental reasons for the value o f case research in 
information systems. First, researchers study IS in their natural settings and leam about the 
state of the art from which they can generate theories for improving practice. Second, as Yin 
(1994) argues, case studies are suited for answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, which are 
invaluable in explaining the complexity o f IS implementation. Lastly, case studies are suited 
for studying phenomena with little previous information. This applies to most IS because the 
rapid rate o f innovation brings new twists even to established technologies that could 
generate valuable insights for building theories (Eisenhardt 1989).
Case study types
From a theoretical standpoint, Yin (1993) identifies three types o f case studies. They are, 
causal, exploratory and descriptive. Causal case studies focus on cause and effect 
relationships in a study situation. This search generates causal relationships and explanatory 
theories o f phenomena. Exploratory case studies represent the traditional type o f case studies, 
which were normally part o f other research strategies. Data collection occurs before the 
formulation o f theories or specific research questions (Yin 1993). Yin (1994) believes this 
application o f case studies is a major reason why many social science textbooks disregard the
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approach as a formal research strategy (Walsham 1995a). This research adopted the 
descriptive case study. Descriptive case studies require the selection o f a theory in advance o f  
research design and data collection and use it to guide the two research stages. As such,
“This theory should be openly stated ahead of time, should be subject of review and debate, and will later 
serve as the ‘design’ for a descriptive case study. The more thoughtful the theory, the better the descriptive 
case study will be (Yin 1993).”
Case study designs
Yin (1994) regards a case study design as the logical sequence that connects the empirical 
data to a study’s initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions. “The main 
purpose o f the design is to help to avoid the situation in which the evidence does not address 
the initial research questions. In this sense, a research design deals with a logical problem and 
not a logistical problem.” The designs can either be single or multi-case studies. Within the 
two types there can also be unitary or multiple units o f analysis. Therefore, Yin proposes four 
types o f designs namely: single-case (holistic); single-case (embedded); multi-case (holistic) 
and multi-case (embedded).
Single-case study is appropriate under several conditions. First, when it represents a critical 
case in testing a well formulated theory. Second, this design is useful if  a case represents an 
extreme or unique case. A third rationale is revelatory when the case offers the researcher an 
opportunity to observe and analyse phenomena previously inaccessible to scientific 
investigation. A key risk with this design though is that the case may not turn out as unique or 
revelatory as expected (Lee 1989). Single-case (embedded) studies are one where the same 
case involves more than one unit o f analysis. However, a case is single (holistic) if  it covers a 
whole organisation or program.
We adopted the multiple-case design. Yin argues that the evidence from multiple cases is 
more compelling and scholars believe the overall study is more robust. Besides the rationale 
for single-case studies is hard to support because, “the unusual or rare case, the critical case, 
and the revelatory case are all likely to involve only single cases, by definition (Yin 1994).” 
However, we admit the multi-case design, “is resource intensive, intellectually challenging 
and highly demanding o f the social and political skills (Pettigrew 1990)” o f the researcher.
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Like experiments, multiple case designs follow ‘replication’ instead o f “sampling” logic. 
Sampling involves enumerating an entire universe o f respondents and selecting a subset of it 
deemed representative o f the entire pool. Yin believes applying a sampling logic to case 
studies would be misplaced for the following reasons. First, case studies are generally not 
appropriate for assessing the incidence of phenomena. Second, since case studies cover both 
the phenomenon and its context, they normally yield many potentially relevant variables. 
Third, a sampling logic could make the empirical research o f vital topics impossible because 
some generate too many variables. After Yin, we selected the two cases to assess whether 
they produced similar results (literal replication) or gave contrasting results but for a 
predictable reason (theoretical replication). We took each case as a ‘whole’ study and sought 
convergent evidence and conclusions from it, which we compare with the second case.
Case Study research controversies
To Yin (1994), perhaps the greatest concern over case study is the claimed lack o f rigour. He 
argues, “Too many times, the case study investigator has been sloppy and has allowed 
unequivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction o f the findings and 
conclusions.” He believes the biggest obstacle to wider case study application is the limited 
codification o f its research designs. Thus, researchers need to report all evidence fairly.
Positivist researchers identify an additional limitation o f case studies as, “the lack of control 
of individual variables -  and hence the difficulties in distinguishing between cause and effect 
(Galliers 1991).” The problem associated with distinguishing between cause and effect, are, 
to a degree, circumvented by undertaking longitudinal case studies (Romm and Pliskin 1997). 
To Pettigrew (1990) the longitudinal case method provides the opportunity to examine 
continuous processes in context and draw in the significance o f various interconnected levels 
of analysis. Similarly, Franz and Robey (1984) argue that longitudinal data collection 
improves the measurement validity and offers alternative interpretations for events. Validity 
improves because data collection occurs as events occur. Different interpretations are easy to 
seek because activities ostensibly undertaken for rational reasons, to say deliver a better 
system, may also serve political interests o f the actors. Thus, by recording activities as they 
happen with the respondents’ interpretations, longitudinal studies elucidate both the cause 
and effect o f the events.
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Critics see the assignment o f different interpretations to observations by stakeholders as 
problematic because of bias concerns. However, Yin (1994) believes the accusation is unfair. 
He insists bias can also enter into the conduct o f experiments and the use o f other research 
strategies such as designing questionnaires for surveys or conducting historical research. 
However, he concedes that case studies are more prone to risks o f bias because not all 
researchers adequately overcome the problems.
Yin (1994) reveals critics have also downplayed the usefulness o f case studies because they 
reportedly take too long, generating a daunting mass o f unreadable documents. He claims that 
while past procedures may have justified this, recent innovations in case research, including 
his book, would lead to change. He argues that the belief that case research necessarily takes 
time is home out o f a perception that Avrongly confuses the strategy with specific data 
collection methods like ethnography and participant observation. Case studies do not solely 
depend on these methods. Indeed, Yin (1994) believes that depending on the topic, one could 
conduct a valid study without even leaving the library and telephone.
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Selection of case study organisations
Huang (1997) argues that the selection of field studies depends on relevance and purpose. On 
relevance, the selection depends on the potential to “replicate or extend an emergent theory” 
(Eisenhardt 1989) from a substantive area. Regarding purpose, the number of field studies is 
a trade-off between theoretical understanding and generalisation (Huang 1997). Huang goes 
on to claim, “The greater the number o f varied studies, the greater the possibility o f  
generalisation achieved.” However, this view perpetuates a sampling logic (Yin 1994). 
Together with controversies we discussed above, critics claim case studies have limited 
application because they are usually restricted to a single event or organisation, which makes 
it difficult to acquire “similar data from a statistically meaningful number o f similar 
organisations (Galliers 1991).” The criticism is invalid because case studies are generalisable 
to theoretical propositions not universes (Yin 1994). The goal is “to do a ‘generalising’ and 
not a ‘particularising’ analysis,” according to Yin.
Walsham (1993) believes the view o f generalisation depends on the epistemology. He argues 
that statistical generalisability is vital under a positivist stance. However, for interpretivists, 
“the validity o f an extrapolation from an individual case or cases depends not on the 
representativeness o f such cases in a statistical sense, but on the plausibility and cogency o f  
the logical reasoning used in describing the results from the cases, and in drawing 
conclusions from them (Walsham 1993).”
Bryman (1988) also insists inductive case studies are capable of addressing generality as long 
as it means theoretical rather than statistical aspects. He believes the problem o f case study 
generalisation is not as recalcitrant as its traditional depiction implies. He draws on Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) whose notion of ‘grounded theory’ offered an alternative framework for 
generalisation different from that associated with the statistical criteria. He contends, “Case 
study researchers have often been very apologetic about the external validity o f their findings, 
but there is a growing view that such diffidence may be unwarranted (Bryman 1988).” Next, 
we discuss our research decisions.
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Background to research decisions
We regard this section as an important part o f the dissertation because it explains our research 
decisions. This is vital because the decisions determined the data we gathered and the insights 
we drew from it. Pettigrew (1990) asserts that researchers should codify and organise the tacit 
knowledge acquired through empirical work for the benefit o f scholars conducting similar 
studies. Hence, we support a call on researchers to state their epistemological stances because 
behind every method lies a belief (Mingers 2001, Zuboff 1988).
Buchanan et al. (1988) argue that while conventional textbooks gloss over the ‘darker’ 
realities o f research, they are central to success in field studies. They claim it is common 
knowledge that “accounts in academic journals depart considerably from the research 
practices o f their authors.” Indeed, a growing body o f IS literature takes a ‘confessional’ 
approach to illuminate actual research practices (Schultze 2000, Scott 2000). Scott (2000) 
coins the notion o f ‘Lived methodology’ to encapsulate a situation where researchers 
appropriate methodologies and continually interpret them. She adds, these,
“Abstract interpretive principles intensify into experience, and we are confronted by the dilemmas of lived 
methodology: the particular people, places and times that promise to condition the practice of one’s IS 
research methodology (Scott 2000).”
Scott asserts that greater methodological openness would both reflect a growing self- 
confidence among IS researchers and support further development and understanding o f  
interpretive research (Pettigrew 1990). Similarly, Schultze (2000) argues that if  researchers 
render their actions, failings, motivations and assumptions open to scrutiny and critique, they 
put themselves on a par with their ‘subjects’ o f study who feel exposed. Consequently, the 
deconstruction o f the rigid dichotomy between theory and practice improves the expertise of  
IS researchers (Scott 2000).
To reiterate, we adopted the multiple-case study design. Since multiple case studies are useful 
for comparison purposes (Walsham 1993), this approach satisfied our goal of expanding and 
generalising theory and obtain insights to inform security practice. We looked for two global 
organisations that we could contrast in terms of structure and business because operational 
differences create varying security needs and hence PKI uses.
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From the outset, we knew that relevance and purpose are key factors in deciding our 
candidate study organisations. An equally important driver was the possibility o f gaining 
access. Why? In the first place, it is extremely difficult to gain academic research access 
(Huang 1997) because the deluge of requests makes many organisations feel over-researched 
(Buchanan et a l  1988). Second, we conducted our research during a global economic 
downturn during which academic research was not a prime concern for managers. Hence, the 
conditions demanded innovative responses to concerns about research disrupting work and 
commercial confidentiality (Buchanan et a l  1988).
A further issue was that we focused on an information security infrastructure. Public key 
infrastructures are restricted systems because computer security has traditionally been 
synonymous with secrecy (Russell and Gangemi Sr 1991). As if  a security focus was not 
problematic enough, the subject matter of our study is power and politics. Within 
organisations, workers fear discussing politics because they suspect researchers could inform 
rivals (Buchanan et a l 1988). This owes to the semiotic nature o f agency where agencies are 
both executors o f action and carriers and creators o f meaning (Clegg 1989, Silva 1997).
As such, we employed a “pragmatic, almost opportunistic approach” to getting access 
(Buchanan et a l  1988). To Buchanan et a l (1988) whatever well constructed views a 
researcher has about issues such as the nature o f social research and data collection methods, 
this vision is constantly challenged by the practical realities, opportunities and constraints of 
conducting research. Zuboff (1988) advocates a similar approach when she states, “As a field 
researcher, I understood the importance of opportunism and serendipity.” A realistic 
approach was helpful because organisations are bounded institutions to which one must seek, 
negotiate and gain access (Bulmer 1988).
Buchanan et a l  (1988) advise researchers to “use non-threatening language when explaining 
the nature and purpose” o f their studies. For instance, the terms ‘research’ and ‘interview’ 
have strong negative connotations. Therefore, our first measure was to use the words “power 
and politics” sparingly because they are so emotive. During our research requests, we stated 
that we were interested in the “Organisational and management implications o f introducing a 
PKI.” We hoped to explore the impact o f the PKI on organisational roles and responsibility, 
procedures and rules for information access. We also focused on the benefits or problems 
different groups may have experienced with the infrastructure. The “high level” phrases
I l l
actually add up to the main thesis o f the CoP framework -  how agencies achieve outcomes of 
power and how these relations are stabilised long enough to generate the effects and 
conditions of power (Law 1991b). We should stress that we did not follow,
“A ‘free for all’ or ‘anything goes’ approach to data collection, in which you get what evidence you can 
anyway you can .,, The claim for research as an art of the possible and the plea for opportunism do not 
therefore rule out the need for controlled, systematic, morally justifiable methods and scientific rigour 
(Buchanan ef aZ. 1988),”
We selected the pragmatic approach because o f its effectiveness in opening doors to the few 
organisations that had been able to implement this novel and sensitive technology on a large 
scale. The strategy did not divert us from the professional duty o f writing an account that is 
plausible and interesting (Klein and Myers 1999). As subsequent chapters show, the ‘high 
level’ terms were so successful that respondents readily volunteered to discuss power and 
politics. We summarise the contributions o f the approach in Chapter 8.
Procedure for getting case studies
Buchanan et al, (1988) warn that negotiating access to organisations, for the purpose o f  
research, is a game o f chance not skill. They insist that there is no conventional way to gain 
research access but suggest two ideas. First, they advise researchers to use friends and 
relatives, where possible, to gain access. Second, their talk o f access being a game o f chance, 
not skill, actually refers to serendipity (Zuboff 1988). Let us explain.
We hoped to research at two large global organisations, preferably engaged in different 
sectors, to contrast PKI usage and impacts. Although our focus was on big and important 
users o f PKI, size was not an overriding factor because of the degree o f novelty attached to 
using this technology on any scale at all (Radicati 1998). The Gartner Group reported in 
December 2000 that about 80% of available products and services were still restricted to pilot 
projects (Townsend 2001). Thus, while it was pleasing to get big PKI projects, novelty meant 
we would have been happy enough to get any good sized but operational project. Through 
contacts and serendipity, we gained access to two large and important PKI global 
deployments. We briefly reconstruct the story as follows.
We contacted candidate organisations in late 2000 after establishing the macro-criteria. We 
used the social, business and academic networks o f the Computer Security Research Centre
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(CSRC) and the Information Systems Department at the LSE to identify the candidates. At 
the time, the CSRC was engaged in a number of projects with commercial and government 
organisations in the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Italy that had big PKI projects. We did 
not make much progress due to the novelty and secrecy surrounding the PKI projects.
Our research breakthrough came in November 2000 and combined serendipity and the use of  
contacts. A fellow PhD student passed on an invitation to Infosecurity Europe at Olympia, 
London. The exhibition also hosts conferences. We attended a workshop organised by the 
European Electronic Messaging Association (EEMA). The association opened doors to 
organisations, offered tutorials, actual empirical data and the current thinking o f leading PKI 
vendors. For instance, a flagship EEMA project, under its objective to promote global 
interoperation in an open environment, is the PKI Challenge (pkiC). The CSRC is a 
registered member o f EEMA. We shall explore the EEMA contribution more under the data 
collection techniques. Next, we give a brief background o f the organisations we studied.
Comparing the two organisations
This dissertation presents accounts of two global organisations that have implemented PKI on 
a large, albeit chaotic, scale. These firms belong to the energy and financial services sectors. 
We believed the different sectors would contrast PKI use and adoption process. However, the 
organisations also have common features. First, both are large businesses with offices in over 
a thousand global locations. For instance, the oil company has many people with important 
responsibilities away from the head office. The employees generate intellectual property that 
needs secure transmission. The firm also has numerous e-business ventures that have opened 
its network to external partners. Similarly, in response to internet pressures on margins, the 
Swiss bank provides banking “at any time, in any place, by any device.” Thus, PKI is vital 
for the success o f both organisations.
Second, the two sectors face some o f the most stringent regulations in the world. The energy 
industry is subject to tough health and safety regulations. Companies must demonstrate good 
practice or risk heavy fines and/or damage to their brands. Likewise, the financial sector has 
suffered from tough regulations because o f fears that alternative banking channels may 
siphon money value from the regulated banking industry. Regulators fear the money would 
go into the ‘underground’ economy undetected leading to money laundering (Comrie 1998,
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Gilmore 1993, Gilmore 1999, Hance and Balz 1996, Morgan 1998, Smith 1996). The noose 
is tighter because o f recent corporate scandals and the so-called ‘global war against 
terrorism.’ The bank is also a leading player in wealth management in Switzerland where 
secrecy is vital. Thus, the bank needed a security system to support record keeping, detection 
and reporting o f suspicious transactions and maintain an audit trail.
Because these are ongoing PKI projects, one of the conditions of access was that we conceal 
the real identities o f our field organisations. Therefore, we refer to the oil company as Oilcom 
and the financial institution as Bankrecht. However, people familiar with both sectors may be 
able to individuate the organisations. We briefly outline how we got permission to research.
Oilcom
We first got a contact for Oilcom at an EEMA meeting organised at De La Rue offices in 
Basingstoke in February 2001. We got into conversation with a London-based Oilcom senior 
Security Consultant who was interested in our research topic. Fortunately, the consultant was 
an old friend o f Dr James Backhouse, our supervisor. From his work with PKI at Oilcom, he 
agreed with our assertion that addressing the organisational impacts o f this infrastructure 
remained the biggest challenge. He promised to help if  we sent him a ‘decent’ proposal.
We later fortuitously discovered that a student who had taken the Security option on the MSc 
ADMIS course at the LSE, also worked on the same team at Oilcom as the senior Security 
Consultant. These two contacts initiated the access process after we sent them the research 
proposal. We met the second contact soon afterwards and conducted an impromptu interview 
that generated excellent insights into the objectives o f the Oilcom PKI project. However, the 
research did not proceed as quickly as anticipated because the contact had global security 
responsibilities that fi*equently took him away from London. With hindsight, this was a good 
development because we used the period off-site to clarify our questions and during that time, 
the PKI project progressed and raised even bigger questions. During this period, we 
negotiated with Oilcom managers about time, confidentiality and the benefit the company 
would derive fi-om the research. We largely used the strategy offered by Buchanan et al, 
(1988) where a researcher provides pre-emptive answers to these common concerns.
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We made real progress when we found yet another ADMIS alumnus from the 2000/2001 
class employed as a business consultant. We had attended the same ‘Interpretation of 
Information’ classes as part o f the MPhil/PhD programme. Because the second gatekeeper 
was busy, the business consultant agreed to organise the interviews for us. This involved 
booking a meeting room -  a contested commodity at Oilcom -  and fetching more 
interviewees at the appropriate time. The research proper started in May 2001.
Bankrecht
Apart from the importance o f security, another reason for targeting the financial services 
sector was a pragmatic one. The CSRC and the IS Department have extensive links with the 
City o f London and the global financial community. Thus, we had a rich background and 
support network for research in this sector. Through our links with EEMA and the LSE, we 
contacted several members o f Indentrus^  ^ LLC, a network o f about 60 financial institutions 
worldwide that act as Identrus Certificate Authorities. We got good feedback.
While waiting for responses we serendipitously got permission to research at Bankrecht 
headquarters in Zurich and its London offices. In late 2001, we subscribed to Information 
Security, a good US trade publication. We liked the sceptical tone o f a correspondent who 
said he worked for a large financial institution in London. For instance, to typify the farcical 
vendor hype which classifies every product as ‘best in class’ and ‘leader’, he hilariously 
rewrote his own profile to state he “is a leading infosec specialist and leading author who 
works for a leading bank in a leading European country.” He supported the CSRC view that a 
purely technical logic cannot actually give security because at the end o f any technical fix 
there is a person and a social system (Backhouse 1999).
In March 2002, he revealed that Bankrecht had a PKI project in Switzerland and promised to 
inquire about research access. In May, we got the contact o f the Bankrecht IT Security 
Director and sent a proposal that pre-emptively answered concerns about time and 
confidentiality. We promised Bankrecht AG a quick report o f our findings. In late May, 
Bankrecht granted us access on condition that we allowed the IT Security Director to conduct 
the interviews and return consolidated answers. The bank later allowed us to conduct all
ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Bankers Trust (since acquired by Deutsche Bank), Barclays, Chase 
Manhattan, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and HypoVereinsbank founded Identrus™ LLC.
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interviews in Zurich on 23^  ^ July 2002. We kept in touch with the respondents and got 
updates on the PKI project. From the Zurich discussions, we got contacts for PKI engineers at 
Bankrecht’s investment division in London whom we interviewed in August 2002.
In brief, our research access resulted from a creative use of informal contacts and luck. Apart 
from the severe time constraints imposed for the interviews, both organisations allowed us to 
use the findings as we saw fit. This was on condition that we disguised the identities o f the 
organisations in any subsequent writing. The anonymity guarantees were vital because,
“Members of organisations speak from positions of conç>arative power, influence and vulnerability, and 
the researcher may seek information that could potentially compromise those positions (Buchanan et al. 
1 9 8 8 ) .”
Since, our research was about power and politics, anonymity helped us elicit personal and 
sensitive information. Buchanan et al classify this as ‘Getting on’, which involves negotiating 
access to the lives and experiences of respondents. It depends on confidence that the 
researcher is trustworthy, non-partisan and is genuinely listening to respondents.
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Data Collection Techniques
A key tenet o f the interpretive paradigm is that since knowledge o f reality is a social 
construction, multiple realities exist in any given situation. Therefore, to access the different 
meanings participants assign to the same phenomenon, action or event it is vital to employ 
the principle of triangulation. Triangulation can be o f theory, personnel and method. We 
focus on method here. To Zuboff (1988) it involves, “a continual juxtaposition and 
comparison o f data culled from different sources that purport to describe the same 
phenomena.” Likewise, for Trauth and O’Connor (1991) triangulation refers to checking 
inferences drawn from one set o f data sources by collecting data from other sources. 
However, multiple data sources do not necessarily result in convergent data but deepen the 
understanding of apparently contradictory data (Trauth and O'Connor 1991).
We used the techniques usually associated with interpretive research in information systems: 
semi-structured interviews and analysis o f documents. We explored personal, group and 
divisional perceptions o f and reactions to the PKI through interviews and assessed long-term 
patterns through documentary analysis (Buchanan et a l  1988). As discussed elsewhere, a key 
strength o f the case study research strategy is the unique ability to deal with a wide variety of 
evidence (Yin 1994).
Interviews
To Walsham (1995a) interviews are the main source o f data for interpretive case studies 
because they capture the respondent’s interpretation o f action and events, as well as their 
beliefs and aspirations. Therefore, our primary source o f data was interviews. We interviewed 
people with significant influence on the PKI project and any frequent users o f PKI-enahled 
applications. They included managers, system architects, designers, internal security and 
business consultants, project leaders and users. We specifically sought people with 
experience in different roles, departments and levels o f the organisational hierarchy to help us 
document the multiple viewpoints about the PKI deployment.
We captured the official agenda, workforce views and the technical environment. From these 
findings, we built an understanding of the role o f power in the contextual conditions pertinent
117
to PKI institutionalisation. We relied on gatekeepers to identify interviewees. We sought 
information about the emergence of the PKI project especially about how and why top 
managers were convinced that this is the technology to solve the identified security problems. 
This analysis helped outline the key events in the PKI lifecycle and summarised the desired 
and real outcomes from the perspectives of different agencies.
Being semi-structured, we prepared interview guides that corresponded to the CoP 
framework. Although we prepared the questions in advance, we rarely followed them to the 
end because the interaction with the interviewees brought up leads to information that our 
fixed list could not accommodate. We followed the advice o f Buchanan et al, (1988) that, 
“The researcher has to be attentive and ready to put the interview guide aside,” when 
respondents make seemingly trivial but potent remarks. We also changed the tone of the 
questions to reflect the status and experience o f the respondent. We divided the respondents 
into managerial, security, IT consulting, general user and vendor categories. For managers we 
targeted those with powers to determine budgets, hire staff, evaluate projects, resolve 
conflicts, appraise staff, select and purchase materials and equipment.
We corroborated controversial information by anonymously printing out views from previous 
interviews for the comment o f other respondents. This was a priceless technique because it 
removed the research abstraction and convinced cagey respondents to give refreshingly 
robust answers. With the exception o f a section o f one interview, we digitally recorded and 
fully transcribed all our discussions. Gatekeepers also gave us fascinating pieces o f 
information during coffee breaks and on our way out o f buildings.
In addition to the interviews with agencies within the two organisations, we interviewed some 
leading vendors. At Oilcom, PKI is part o f a Windows 2000 deployment that also includes 
smart cards and thin clients, which rely on the operating system’s native security features. 
Bankrecht Investment also has a Microsoft PKI deployment with clients running Windows 
2000 and XP. Hence, we interviewed Mr Stuart Okin, Chief Security Officer, Microsoft UK 
and Mr Tony Rice, the Head o f Business Critical Consulting in November 2002. We had a 
discussion earlier with Mr Steve Adler, Microsoft Product Manager, Europe Middle East and 
Africa after his presentation on Active Directory and Windows .NET at an EEMA meeting.
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SchlumbergerSema provides the smart card solution at Oilcom. We held a brief discussion 
with the manager responsible for PKI and smart cards at an “Executive Briefing” organised 
by Entrust in May 2002. Schlumberger has also published their experiences at Oilcom in a 
case study for the Smart Card Alliance. Siemens provides the smart cards at Bankrecht. We 
gathered enough information about these cards from Bankrecht AG and the five EEMA 
presentations between November 2000 and September 2002 from a senior member o f the UK 
Siemens Business Consulting division.
Documentary Analysis
The documents we analysed covered the whole PKI lifecycle. We hoped to ascertain why and 
how the organisation chose a PKI as the security infrastructure. From the documents, we 
hoped to identify the PKI sponsors and their attempts to convince other agencies to ‘buy into’ 
the solution. As stated above, we used interviews to gather some o f this information because 
they have the advantage o f capturing current events. However, retrospective documentary 
analysis helped trace ‘objective’ arguments advanced to support PKI at different stages.
The documents included the IT Strategy; IT Security Policy; Practices and Procedures; 
Infrastructure standards; Internet strategy; Cryptography guidelines; Certificate Policy and 
Certificate Practice Statements; Project plan/timetable; Documents about the selection, 
implementation o f PKI; project announcements and internal IT/IT security magazine. We 
also explored documents that contained information about evaluation and co-ordination o f the 
PKI, announcements and training documents, organisational charts and corporate annual 
reports. We also used newspaper and magazine articles and e-mail communications between 
the respondents and other PKI stakeholders. E-mail as a source had rich information because 
it was a vital tool for negotiating access and allaying fears about the research process.
We obtained interesting information and tips from vendor case studies o f PKI projects in our 
study organisations. Because o f the novelty of PKI deployment, vendors like Schlumberger 
used the ‘case studies’ to advertise their expertise. While the documents contain informative 
technical details, they looked too sanitised to be true. However, they were good for 
triangulation and generating questions for interviews.
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Also because o f the novelty, we attended an EEMA event organised under the UK Electronic 
Business Users Forum (UKEBUF) at which Oilcom managers discussed the PKI project. 
UKEBUF frequently covers security issues notably PKI and directory services. It was an 
excellent opportunity to leam about the project because the presentation was subject to 
extensive peer review. Since technical managers and staff attend EEMA events, participants 
expressed frustration with organisational politics. Although we were active participants, we 
switched to an observer capacity during the discussion o f the Oilcom project. We recorded 
the discussion and received soft copies of the presentation.
We also used studies and white papers published by Microsoft, Schlumberger, Entrust and 
Siemens. They provide good technical detail on PKI and smart card deployment. We 
classified and interpreted these documents using the Circuits o f Power framework. Given that 
they were marketing pitches, some parts sounded too sanguine about specific PKI products.
The Circuits of Power in Data Collection
As a prelude to discussing our contribution in Chapter 8, we reveal that we encountered 
numerous problems in our use of the CoP framework for data collection. One o f our intended 
theoretical contributions was to extend previous research on the CoP (Introna 1997, Silva 
1997) by exploring its methodological viability in IS empirical studies. We focused on the 
language and other aspects that could help researchers conduct empirical studies using this 
framework. As such, we assessed the usefulness o f a list o f questions suggested by Silva for 
guiding research (Silva 1997, Silva and Backhouse 1997, Silva and Backhouse 2003). 
However, we encountered problems with the list.
To Buchanan et al. (1988) the quantity and quality o f data collected during research greatly 
depends on the investigator’s ability to win and retain the tmst o f the respondents. Success 
largely depends on the personality of the researcher. However, trust is jeopardised when the 
researcher is suspected to be disorganised, sloppy and not in command of the subject. In sum, 
a poor interview schedule can be a recipe for disaster.
We got this impression from the interview that entirely used Silva’s questions. Although this 
respondent at Oilcom was a good fiiend, he kept saying, “Not sure what you are asking here” 
and “haven’t we answered that question already?” The problems arise from the very nature of
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the framework. The CoP signifies that outcomes of power keep circulating in organisations 
through rules and their relationships to techniques o f discipline and production. While at the 
theoretical level the ‘circulating’ conception is fine, it creates a bewildering number of 
repetitions between the circuits in interview schedules. Thus, wholesale conversions of the 
CoP concepts into an interview schedule could make a researcher look amateurish.
Data collection themes
Therefore, for two obvious reasons we promptly grouped the CoP concepts into business 
environment, technology adoption process and social aspects of the organisation themes. 
First, Silva’s list retained much of the awe in the original CoP. Hence, to avoid threatening 
language, we left out loaded terms such as episodic power relations, domination and standing 
conditions. Second, the list was impractical because it repeated the same themes across the 
three circuits, OPP and exogenous contingencies. As we were to leam, the overlaps were 
detrimental to a smooth interview because asking similar questions every ten minutes to a 
busy security manager risked shattering the hard-earned rapport. Put briefly, the questions 
were inelegantly repetitive and retained ominous language. The themes are as follows.
Business environment
This theme coincides with exogenous contingencies in the CoP. These represent coercive 
pressures from agencies with authority in an organisational field that transform or reinforce 
the mles o f meaning and membership. An organisational field includes key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, competitors and regulatory agencies. The CoP draws on 
concepts o f institutional isomorphism to explain how organisations adopt innovations and 
how they become stable in organisational fields. We gathered data about the history and 
operational conditions o f our study organisations under this theme. We also sought data about 
organisations and conditions that influence technology adoption.
Social aspects of the organisation
The theme is close to the episodic circuit because it gives a snapshot o f the organisational 
political landscape. We used the theme to identify the different political subdivisions within 
the organisations. It also shed light on the material resources, techniques and skills required 
to perform tasks (standing conditions). The identification o f the different agencies/groups
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engaged in organisational action actually justifies this theme because it highlights the link 
between the three circuits o f power. Episodic power both depends on rules o f meaning and 
membership and on techniques of discipline and production. Consequently, the theme 
explains the conditions that enable the exercise o f episodic power.
Technology adoption process
The theme unifies issues surrounding the use o f technology in organisations because of 
overlaps between OPP, system integration and episodic circuits. Since agencies could resist a 
new system because of the physical characteristics o f the system and resistance is associated 
with both circuits, a single theme makes sense. We discuss these issues in detail in the 
concluding chapter to amplify our contribution.
Data Analysis
For data analysis, we relied on the same approach used by (Silva 1997, Silva and Backhouse 
2003). From the broad CoP lenses, these works applied an iterative approach to data analysis 
characterised as telling-showing-telling. According to Golden-Biddle and Locke (1997), the 
concept underscores the relationship between depicting data and conveying its theoretical 
meaning. They attribute the distinction between ‘showing’ and ‘telling’ to the 1961 work of 
literary critic Wayne Booth. He explains that accurately observed details do not hold readers’ 
attention for long unless ‘if  the details are made to tell, only if  they are weighted with a 
significance.’ Presenting data both looks backward to the forms and process o f organisational 
life and forward to the theoretical points for resolving gaps in the literature. As such,
“We both show data and tell their significance. ... (Hence) we couple the fragments of organisational 
life with our theoretical points and commentaries. The life we portray always is theorised as, reciprocally, 
the theory that we develop always is contextualised (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1997).”
The telling-showing-telling characterisation is the absolute version of this interactive model. 
To Golden-Biddle and Locke in this sandwich structure, the first ‘telling’ explains how the 
theoretical point is manifest in the subsequent data. ‘Showing’ means the presentation of 
data. It is an aspect structuring a story in a way that bridges the worlds o f the readers and the 
field. The second, ‘telling’ connects the presented data with the theoretical concepts to 
explain or tell what the data showed. We use the model as follows.
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We present the theoretical concepts in Chapter 3, where we explain how the concept o f power 
is manifest in empirical research. We present the CoP as the tool for visualising power in 
terms o f outcomes, standing conditions, techniques o f control and discipline. We suggest the 
CoP because o f the realisation of numerous problems in the literature regarding the 
visualisation or even mere explanation of power. This Chapter extends the theoretical points 
made in Chapter 2 about the complex character of power. To resolve this problem, we 
explore the philosophical underpinnings o f IS research. In Chapter 4, we select the 
ideographic approach, as personified in interpretive research, because its subjective 
orientation is most effective for studying the disputed concept of power.
Chapters 5 and 6 show the data. Our goal is to ‘take’ readers to our field studies through 
conveying the elements o f power in the fragments o f the organisational life we present. 
Golden-Biddle and Locke argue that to transport readers into the field, researchers should 
portray first-hand experience with the subjects’ world. “However, efforts to take the readers 
into the field are, at the same time, pointing to the readers’ world and to the theoretical points 
being advanced (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1997).” Therefore, having drawn attention to this 
data, we tell the readers what it showed through our analysis o f the findings in Chapter 7. The 
depiction o f power in the two cases supports our theoretical propositions by concretising 
them in living organisational contexts. Thus, we spread the telling-showing-telling concept 
over several chapters. This dynamic approach conforms to our descriptive case study 
approach by showing the connection between the case, the fi*amework and our interpretation. 
In sum, the “interlocking o f data and theory reinforces the coherence o f our storylines, giving 
them the quality o f straightness (Golden-Biddle and Locke 1997).”
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Chapter summary
This Chapter presents the philosophical underpinnings of our methodological approach and 
places it within the broader IS traditions. Having surveyed the different approaches, we 
highlight and justify our choice of the interpretive tradition. We further undertake an 
extensive discussion o f our research strategy and show how it supports our theoretical 
agenda. We reveal the rationale for selecting the two studies and give the reasons behind our 
research decisions. We thereafter discuss our data collection techniques and the role o f the 
CoP framework in data collection and analysis. We link this discussion to previous and 
subsequent chapters and highlight issues for further discussion.
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CHAPTER 5: 
‘STEALTH’ PKI AT OILCOM
Introduction
This chapter and Chapter 6 show data by conveying elements o f power in our field studies. 
Since we used the Circuits o f Power (Co?) framework to direct our research (methodology), 
we present the findings fi*om the two cases based on the framework. However, the 
presentation follows the three themes we developed during empirical research to overcome 
repetitions and tone down ominous language. The themes cover the business environment, 
technology adoption and social aspects. We re-introduce the native Co? concepts in Chapter 
7. The rest o f this chapter is organised as follows. In the business environment theme, we 
discuss the history and current governance structures o f Oilcom. The governance structures 
link the business environment to the social aspects. Technology adoption starts with the 
mandatory PC standard named Group Infi-astructure-Desktop (GID) because it both supports 
and relies on the public key infrastructure. The discussion is vital because while this study is 
about PKI, GID provides a context for its usage and explains its success.
PKI and Desktop standard
As Stated in Chapter 4, a major reason for selecting Oilcom and Bankrecht was that the 
organisations are pioneers o f large-scale PKI use. However, PKI use is currently restricted to 
user authentication. These two cases are actually typical o f global organisations that run 
diversified businesses in numerous jurisdictions under localised organisational structures. We 
conducted 20 interviews at Oilcom each lasting about an hour. Our respondents included the 
Director o f Global IT projects. Principal Architect, Team leaders. Principal Security 
consultant, security and business consultants and users with both “User standard mode” and 
“developer” machines. The respondents have worked at Oilcom for between one and twenty 
five years. We also interviewed senior Security managers at Microsoft -  EMEA and UK -  
and attended a SchlumbergerSema briefing at an Entrust workshop for security managers.
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Business Environment
Oilcom is a large and diverse global energy and petrochemicals company that is among the 
world’s top three biggest oil companies. The Group claims competitive leadership in oil 
products, deep-water production, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and polyolefins. Oilcom had 
market capitalisation o f $149 billion in 2000 and aims to lead its sector globally. While most 
people identify Oilcom with service stations, global oil and gas exploration and production, it 
also delivers energy solutions and petrochemicals. These include transporting and trading oil 
and gas, marketing natural gas, producing and selling fuel for ships and planes, generating 
electricity and providing energy efficiency advice. Oilcom also produces and markets 
petrochemical inputs for plastics, coatings and detergents. The Group has also invested in 
renewable and lower-carbon energy sources but it does not process coal and nuclear power.
Nature of business
Naturally, energy services companies jealously guard the intellectual property generated in 
course o f their work because it provides the ingredients for innovation. Oilcom channels 
much o f this data through its research centres on which it spends over US $1 billion annually. 
The centres develop new products and processes. For instance, in 2001 Oilcom released a 
‘revolutionary’ type o f unleaded fuel developed at its UK global innovations centre. The 
centres also research in applied science and technology, which leads to new business 
opportunities. In 1998, the Group created a Technology Ventures division to liaise with the 
service industry to develop and market its proprietary technologies. The technologies include 
logging and drilling equipment, production enhancement devices and natural gas processing 
units. Oilcom claims its intellectual property extends beyond oil and gas to new energy 
utilisation devices, manufacturing processes and environmental remediation.
Therefore, the value o f the intellectual property and the hazardous location o f oil wells make 
the protection o f information a critical success factor. Oilcom also prizes security because its 
employees have recently become targets o f kidnappings in trouble spots across the world. 
Threats to staff and oil well accidents have emphasised the need to protect information from 
unauthorised access by third parties such as competitors and pressure groups.
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History of Oilcom
Oilcom is one o f the oldest energy services companies in Europe. The Group grew out o f a 
London shop in the first half o f the nineteenth century that later became a successful import- 
export venture. Oilcom later moved into the oil sector exporting lamp and cooking oil to the 
Far East. In early twentieth century, the firm merged with a European competitor to form one 
of the largest global commercial enterprises. The Group expanded with acquisitions in 
Europe, Africa and the Americas throughout the twentieth century. The period coincided with 
mass production o f cars. Oilcom's growth shuddered to a halt in the First World War because 
several governments confiscated its assets and/or closed them down. However, Oilcom 
received a massive sales boost in 1919 with the opening o f non-stop trans-Atlantic flights.
The Group also lost assets in World War II. It later invested in newer production, transport 
and refining facilities. This investment boosted output and sales to an extent that throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s Oilcom supplied almost one-seventh o f the world’s oil products. The 
period also saw the development o f natural gas as an alternative source o f energy. Oilcom 
benefited because it had made major oil & gas discoveries in the North Sea.
However, an economic recession combined with a steep rise in the price o f crude oil had a 
serious impact on the overall oil business. The illustration on the next page originally 
published by the US Department of Energy's Office o f the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, 
Analysis Division, summarises the World Oil market and prices during 1970-2002. The 
Energy Information Administration updated the figures for 1995-2002.
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Figure 8 - World Oil Market and Oil Price chronologies from 1970 - 2002
The chart shows the crises that sparked huge rises in crude oil prices. Point 9 saw a huge rise 
after OPEC announced a 15% revenue increase effective October 1, 1975. Other crucial 
points are 23 when the first major fighting in Iran-Iraq War occurred; point 42, showing the 
Iraq invasion of Kuwait and 59 after OPEC oil production cutbacks. The oil prices tripled 
between January 1999 and September 2000 because o f weather and low oil stock levels. 
Oilcom attributes its long-term survival to ‘scenario planning’. Writing in a 1988 issue of the 
Harvard Business Review, a senior Oilcom manager claims.
“The key to corporate longevity and success is the ability to adopt a survival mode when the business 
environment is turbulent and to switch to a self-development mode when the pace of change is slow. ... A 
very effective learning tool, which can be described as a form of game playing, is developing ’'what i f  
scenarios and planning responses to them.”
Oilcom claims to have used scenario planning in the 1980s to weather a huge drop in the oil 
price from $28 to a measly $16 a barrel. Despite new investments, Oilcom believes the oil, 
gas and chemicals businesses are central to its mission o f delivering high shareholder value.
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Governance structures
Official documents reveal that administration at Oilcom rests with a board o f management 
consisting o f at least two managing directors (MDs). The MDs hold office until retirement 
unless removed earlier. A supervisory board in turn oversees the policies o f the MDs and 
general business direction. The Board appoints one o f the MDs President, who thereafter 
determines the division o f responsibilities among fellow MDs. Since Oilcom has two holding 
companies, MDs of each organisation are also part o f the “Presidium of the Board of 
Directors” also commonly known as Group Managing Directors. The MDs are also members 
of a joint team known as the Committee o f Managing Directors (CMD). The CMD is the 
supreme Board. It develops long-term plans and reviews key investment decisions.
This structure is obviously complex. To add more intricacy, the two holding companies are 
separate legal entities that, as public companies, observe laws and corporate practices o f their 
respective countries o f incorporation. As we see later, these differences make any global IT 
implementation at Oilcom a complex socio-technical negotiation.
Service and Operating Companies
The holding companies do not directly engage in operational activities. This is the job of 
Operating Companies (OCs) based in 145 countries with over 115,000 employees. The 
management of each company is responsible for the profitable and viable operation o f its 
business. OCs share global experiences and are associated with the holding companies 
through two Service Companies (SCs). We based our research at the London offices o f one of 
the SCs. Admitting that, “Oilcom is not an easy company to understand,” a Team leader 
argues that SCs exist to provide general and specific services to OCs that are largely 
organised on a country-basis. Similarly, the Chairman o f the CMD argues,
“Our business model is of strong, locally-rooted companies -  harnessing the capabilities of focused global 
businesses ... global efficiency with local effectiveness. International mobility helps cohesion, as well as 
sharing experience. It is increasingly supported by electronic interaction.”
The Group claimed 6% o f its employees worked abroad in 2001. The service companies also 
provide the rules under which the local companies must operate. For instance, SCs stipulate 
and enforce minimum health and safety standard for all OCs. To a senior SC consultant.
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“This is a very heavily regulated industry. Our businesses are regulated in several ways. There are health 
and safety implications, brand value implications, good practice and legislative implications that we have 
to demonstrate that we meet. If we do not do these things properly then we are in trouble and we lose the 
value that we have built up over a hundred years. It is not something that we really want to take blame 
for, OK, and the businesses don’t want to take blame either, OK?”
Business structure
The business sits on top o f the Group physical structure discussed above. Oilcom operates six 
global business divisions: Exploration and Production (E&P); Downstream Gas and Power; 
Oil Products; Chemicals, and Renewables. Recently the Group added the “Other Activities” 
division that is split into customer, hydrogen and trading. A small team of about eight people 
called the Executive Committee (Excom) heads each o f the business divisions. An Excom 
recruits a team of about a hundred or two hundred people, which directly reports to it, to help 
run the business. The Excom sets the overall strategy for the business division and targets for 
operating companies. Some employees report to the local company and the Excom.
However, not all companies have the six business divisions although most have Oil products, 
the signature service. The only divisions with exploration, production, refining, marketing for 
oil products, downstream natural gas and power generation, chemicals and Renewables are in 
the UK, Germany, Netherlands, USA and Philippines. As we shall see with GID and PKI, 
these operating companies are powerful because they control enormous resources. The gas 
and power division is unusual because Oilcom typically runs the holdings in joint ventures 
especially in Asia. The Group teams up with other oil companies, specialist operators or even 
governments who directly run these businesses. Oilcom takes shareholdings that range 
between 20% and 50%. However, the ventures have complicated network administration and 
the deployment o f tools that help establish control over IT such as public key infrastructures.
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Social aspects of Oilcom
Dues to its size and diversity o f operations, Oilcom relies on a huge pool o f professional 
skills that include the following. In E&P, the Group employs geologists and geophysicists for 
exploration. Production employs chemical, mining and mechanical engineers. After this 
stage, the next processes are manufacturing, supply and distribution. Processing requires the 
skills o f chemical and mechanical engineers. Lastly, the key skills for Oil products are 
marketing, distribution and expertise in refinery technology.
Employment is conditional on the acceptance and continual adherence to nine principles that 
apply to all business affairs and describe the behaviour expected o f every employee. The 
principles cover objectives o f operating companies; responsibilities; economic principles; 
business integrity; political activities; healthy, safety and the environment; the community; 
competition and communication. They are contained in a “Statement o f General Business 
Principles” that governs how each company conducts its affairs. The guidelines stem from the 
principles o f honesty, integrity and respect for people first printed in 1976.
Oilcom requires chief executives of all companies and businesses to report on the application 
and success o f the principles throughout their organisations annually. However, despite these 
efforts, the distributed structure has traditionally encouraged the proliferation o f groups 
narrowly focused on their trade. Some o f our respondents blame the flefdoms for the political 
paralysis at Oilcom. Consultants are responsible for increasing cooperation within the Group. 
Next, we explore the consultancy role and its vitality to IT deployment.
Consultants
Oilcom uses consultants with different skill sets. For instance. Technology Consultancy and 
Research Services demands expertise in geosciences, engineering and pure sciences. The 
team we interacted with most sits within an area called Information Technology International 
(ITI). The division has consultants specialising in organisational architecture, IT, information 
security and business processes. Other consultants work in contracting and procurement, 
legal services, intellectual property, finance and treasury, among other areas. Consultants act 
as flexible resources because local companies cannot afford to keep a team of people with all
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the necessary expertise all the time. Business divisions such as Oil products may retain their 
own teams o f internal consultants. However, the majority o f consultants work for Service 
Companies (SCs) making them central to Group-wide information systems deployment and 
knowledge sharing. However, to a Team leader this role is controversial because,
“Often you are seen as somebody who is interfering with their work or as a spy from central office. I
think that is actually less true in smaller operating conç)anies because they know they cannot possibly have 
all the expertise. ...Where it is a big issue is with larger OCs, say Oilcom UK. They employ several 
thousand people and have many senior people with lots of knowledge and lots of experience and they 
would like to think that they can run everything themselves.”
Since the management o f each company is responsible for the long-term viability o f their 
own operations, they decide whether to accept the consultants and their advice or reject it. 
Indeed, the Director o f Global IT Projects stresses,
“It is their business. The whole purpose of Service Conçanies is simply offering advice. The responsibility 
for the business is with the national operating company and with the line of business and it is not up here. 
So yes, of course they can say ‘we don’t need these consultants’.”
In practice rejection is rare because either somebody in the company or on the Excom invites 
the SC consultants. Therefore, they get a mandate from an influential sponsor. However, the 
local companies retain the veto on how even mandatory standards are implemented. We will 
see that the companies can use these powers to either block or slow down large infrastructural 
projects. In our study, the delaying tactics o f the OCs have sharply increased the expenditure 
o f the supposedly cost saving GID and may pose enduring risks to PKI interoperability.
Oilcom brand
We previously saw that apart from the two holding companies, Oilcom relies on OCs to run 
its business in over 145 countries. In addition, a business structure composed o f six divisions, 
run by Excoms, sits on top of the aforementioned physical structure. The Oilcom brand holds 
together this complex organisational structure. According to a security consultant,
“Oilcom isn’t quite a corporate in the sense that we often get from American economists of a kind of 
joined together organisation. It is predominantly a brand, and people buy into it and the brand does 
different things. ... It is many different companies but the brand is ultimately the most important thing. It 
is sacrosanct. If  you damage the brand that is the worst thing you can ever do.”
Since branding is common to our two case studies, let us briefly discuss its key concepts. 
According to Interbrand, a global branding firm, a brand represents the relationship between
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a firm, its employees and customers (Interbrand 2001). Interbrand declares that to reap 
maximum benefits the organisation should ‘align’ its internal features such as culture, reward 
systems, key success activities and structure to its brand. Interbrand claims employees must 
‘live’ the brand and management must show commitment to the values in its behaviour and 
communications as illustrated below.
Satisfaction
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Leadership 
Actionsnuinct
Figure 9 -  Brand Culture Align Flow (Interbrand 2001).
The brand culture has an impact on the behaviour, attitudes and decisions o f agencies if 
supported by management actions and the organisational structure.
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Technology adoption process
Despite the professed importance o f IT in coordinating far-flung activities, until 1988 Oilcom 
did not drive mandatory infrastructures from the centre. The character o f the IT service 
mirrored the decentralised organisational structure seasoned with splintered and often chaotic 
arrangements in which each business division and local company runs its own infrastructure. 
For instance, Oilcom UK had separate IT departments for each business division such as Oil 
Products and E&P. Other companies replicated this structure. Even small markets like 
Oilcom Uganda would run their own IT Services. To the Principal A rch itect^“We were 
repeating many things ... This is obviously a recipe for doing more than you need.”
To arrest the mayhem and cut costs, Oilcom launched an IT standardisation drive. First, the 
Group consolidated the different IT groups across lines o f business to create a single IT unit 
that for instance covered Oilcom UK. After this success, Oilcom consolidated all the IT 
services for the companies into a global service. IT became part o f Services International (SI) 
in 1997. SI expedited efforts to centralise the provision o f computers, servers and network 
administration. However, the evolution of SI into an institute covering the whole services 
area created immediate disaffection. According, to a Team leader.
“It has been very difficult to make theses things happen ,.. Because local OCs originally hired most IT 
people, many wanted to work for Oilcom in their home country where they had national identity. ...now 
suddenly you are being told you are no longer part of Oilcom France but part of SI or whatever. People 
didn’t like that. In practice their job probably didn’t change very much but just that move of 
parentage, if you like, ownership led to many people leaving the company.”
To the Director of Global IT projects, the problems emanated from poor knowledge o f local 
businesses by SCs. However, a Team leader blames ‘governance issues’. He argues that.
“One o f the difficulties is that Oilcom has always been a very distributed company. ...the advantage of a 
centrally directed company is that if a man on the top says ‘do this’ it ripples down and gets done. In 
Oilcom, it really doesn’t work like that at all. The centre only sets the strategy, principles and general 
direction. ...the way those are implemented is at the discretion of local management. Hence, it is very 
difficult for IT to be provided in a common way across the whole business. ”
Oilcom later removed IT from Services International and created an independent division 
entitled Information Technology International (ITI). In 2000, as part o f GI standardisation
He is an Enterprise Architect and focuses on IT strategies and decisions that support business needs.
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drive, the Committee o f Managing Directors (CMD) appointed ITI as the sole supplier o f IT 
to all companies. We shall focus on the centrally managed desktop otherwise called GI- 
Desktop (GID) and its relationship with PKI after a brief discussion of Group Infrastructure.
Group infrastructure (GI)
Oilcom has a long history of standardising desktops with GI the fourth cycle o f this process. 
The first attempt was with the MS DOS era where service companies recommended hardware 
configurations, suppliers and software choices. The phases failed because the companies or 
Operating Units (OUs) ignored the optional advice leading to software incompatibility. For 
instance, the Director projects reveals that in 1992 a central office in Europe,
“Employed about 3,500 people who had 29 different word processing packages in that office. ... each 
of our Managing Directors’ secretary had their own particular word processing product so that when they 
were away nobody else could produce any typed documents for their particular MD.”
After 1992, the Group signed a software contract with Microsoft and standardised on MS 
Office. At the end o f this licence, Oilcom provided standardised pre-configured Windows 95 
desktop images and subsequently pre-configured NT Servers. The Group still run the 
infrastructure through local delivery organisations. However, according to a Business 
Consultant, many teething problems remained at this stage. He reveals,
“Apart from the E-mail system that was common, I could not take files around OCs because of version 
issues. You frequently had different upgrades across the desktop applications. For instance, I could send 
somebody an Office 97 document not realising they only had Office 95. Thus, you had to save it to the 
lowest common denominator. It was such silly issues like that getting in the way.”
The Director Global IT projects reveals the failure to respect hardware and maintenance 
structures created extraordinary IT management complexity justifying GI. Discussions on the 
Group Infrastructure (GI) started at a CMD meeting in late 1998. The committee endorsed GI 
on 19^ ’’ October 1999. To the Director, GI involved.
“Moving from a Windows 95 distributed management infrastructure to one where we had a single 
management framework overseeing the complete re-implementation of the entire desktop and server 
infrastructure and all the supporting services behind them such as mail and directories.”
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Group Infrastructure Desktop (GID)
This is the desktop component o f the GI set o f standards. According to the Principal 
Architect, GID involved the migration of all desktops and related servers to Windows 2000 
and Office 2000. The servers and desktop devices were sourced from Compaq through a 
Group procurement agreement. Oilcom loaded the laptops and PCs with a limited matrix o f  
standard applications. Wherever possible, Oilcom configured desktops to run the “User 
standard mode”. According to the GI proposal, in this locked-down mode,
“Changes to core desktop software will be strictly controlled from centralised Service Centres. This 
will allow (the IT division) to manage and automatically upgrade software via the network, thus obviating 
expensive individual visits to upgrade each device, and guaranteeing that standardisation is 
maintained.”
Most users are unable to change small things like wallpaper and screen savers on the PC. In 
the “User” mode, all new software requires scripting for GID in Malaysia. However, a 
limited number o f advanced users such as technical consultants have unlocked “Developer 
machines.” Oilcom claims GI is an attempt to leam from ‘world-class peer’ organisations 
such as IBM, Nestle and Unilever that manage their infrastructures with a focus on costs that 
sharply rise with mobile working. The ‘peer’ firms have implemented strict standardisation 
and simplified their demand, supply and support systems. Likewise, the GI proposal states,
“Group Infrastructure involves a managed transition to a centrally controlled and rigorously enforced 
technology platform that is implemented Group wide. ... The ability of the project to deliver the 
anticipated benefits will depend upon a standardised approach being adopted in all OUs with only limited 
flexibility to accommodate OU specific requirements.”
The Principal Architect claims GI exists primarily to reduce the Total Cost o f Ownership 
(TCO) for IT. For instance, based on the Gartner model with 1998 actuals, the Oilcom 
average direct TCO per annum was at least US$3,600. The cost varied between US$2,000 
and $9,000 across the Group. The IT division blamed the rising costs on customisation and 
independent adoption o f software, which led to fragmentation, high support complexity and 
delays in the implementation of software and functionality. Cross-business technology ‘fixes’ 
to enable connectivity and information sharing proved unreliable. Oilcom expected to 
standardise unit costs at $2,500 by the end o f 2001. The Group targeted 10% year-on-year 
reductions to stay ahead o f industry benchmarks. The Director o f IT projects argues that cost 
was a major driver o f GI because the oil price was low at the time o f its inception. Therefore, 
there were cost-cutting pressures on the businesses. However, he admits.
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“In fact, I think the value of what we have done is much more in terms of a business enabler than a cost 
reduction.”
The Principal Architect agrees. He argues that standardising on Windows 2000 would have 
had very little impact on the cost without changes in the support organisation. The changes 
saw the number of PCs under ITI control increase from 69% to 94% by the end of 2001. For 
instance, twelve companies classified as ‘large’ sites lost control o f over 19,000 machines to 
ITI. Western Europe companies liked the changes because to a Business Consultant,
“Some of the bigger, more powerful, more established operating companies were the ones that would have 
more sway when GI was being designed in the first place. So I would imagine that they would have got 
pretty much what they expected.”
Indeed, the GI proposal suggests sampling a “small number o f archetype companies, which 
will serve as a template to judge OU requests.” However, companies in poorer countries, 
notably in the Far East were dismayed because GID was more expensive than local sourcing 
arrangements. A Team leader agrees. He argues that,
“While the cost associated with this desktop is quite reasonable in Northern Europe, the same cost 
applies for instance, in Uganda too and there it is quite a high cost. We are saying to the Ugandan 
company, ‘you must have this’ and they say ‘we don’t have any money, how can we have it?”’
The Director IT admits cost overruns. ITI started with a budget o f US$1000 for each GID 
client but spent $1900 in the first phase. The project had a budget o f $70m to $100m for 
65,000 units at its launch in November 1999. However, by April 2001 the cost stood at 
$110m. Eventually, the project team discovered in July 2001 that it probably needed about 
$170m. He blames the cost overruns on failure to anticipate delays and poor information 
about the number o f PCs at Oilcom. Other respondents attribute the delays and cost overruns 
to the political fires that GI stoked. We discuss the power issues after the coverage o f PKI. To 
maintain the standard GI client, Oilcom relies on PKI and its support features like Active 
Directory. Next, we discuss e-business activities and their influence on PKI deployment.
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Focus on E-Business
One o f the “Value Benefits” o f the Group Infrastructure (GI) proposal is that it was a “pre­
requisite for effective use o f e-commerce and rapid uptake o f business-to-business 
commerce” at Oilcom. With the blessing of the CMD, the rollout o f GI saw a rapid launch of 
e-commerce projects across various business divisions starting in 2000. The Group sought 
major cost improvements in oil drilling, finding, development and production and saw the 
internet as a useful medium especially in procurement. By the end o f 2000, Oilcom had e- 
procurement sites at eighteen locations in North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and Afiica. 
Signing the e-commerce projects off, the CMD Chairman argues that,
“To continue our history of continuous profitable growth, we must respond to a range of issues that 
define the context in which we do business. These include globalisation, liberalisation of political 
systems and markets, and the effects of new technologies such as the internet.”
Oilcom launched the savings drive through a number o f extranets for customers and 
suppliers. The Group also co-founded or participated in nine business-to-businesses (B2B) 
marketplaces and exchanges. Oilcom Trading spearheads the exchanges. A key example is 
Trade-Ranger, an energy and petrochemical B2B exchange. Launched in July 2000, Trade- 
Ranger is an independent initiative built with the support o f the world's 15 foremost energy 
and petrochemical companies. The founding members include ENI, Mitsubishi Corporation, 
Repsol YPF, Royal Dutch/Shell, Statoil, Total, Unocal and British Petroleum. Trade-Ranger 
delivers the cost savings sought by the Group.
The Group also extended the internet into business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. Oilcom 
claims to use the “internet to extend and deepen relationships with customers.” Customer- 
focused initiatives have included integrated energy services for households, differentiated 
motor fuels and financial products for motorists. Oilcom launched several internet-enabled 
insurance products in 2000. The Group also changed its internal business practices. The focus 
“has been on digitising the business, and on the cost reductions and process efficiencies 
which this brings.” As we see next, ventures with competitors and customers have totally 
changed the Oilcom network administration and security paradigm.
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GID and Information Security
While the internet enables low cost transactions, the medium lacks the traditional identity, 
commitment, evidence and trust safeguards. A key implication of this change is that security 
is no longer primarily about limiting access but maximising it to the right people. Thus, 
internet security focuses not on intruders but on potentially fraudulent insiders and business 
partners. This is what forays into e-commerce made Oilcom realise.
Security regime
Another reason we selected Oilcom is its security reputation. For instance, the Group actively 
participated in the development o f BS7799 that formed the basis for ISO 17799. Indeed, many 
o f its former employees have top security jobs in public organisations in the City o f London. 
We saw that security is critical to Oilcom because it generates trade secrets from the over a 
billion dollar research budget. Good security also assures health and safety regulators and 
environmentalists that it takes due care. While most SCs advice is optional for operating 
companies, security has always been mandatory. Oilcom outlines its security regime in 
documents that include “Porcupine”^^ or the Seven Point Plan, Business Communication 
Principles and Trust Domain. They are part of a security initiative launched in 1997/98. The 
principles guide the creation of all documents and hence minimise legal and security risks.
Trust Domain
The goal o f Trust Domain is to create a Group-wide, trusted network environment to support 
global business applications and information sharing. The CMD made the adoption of Trust 
Domain and its related standards and controls mandatory. Trust Domain requires companies 
to implement minimum-security standards, independent o f technology, but consistent with 
BS7799. The GI proposal states.
“The remote access solutions (e.g. dial in, mobile office) will also be implemented in a Trust Domain 
compliant manner. ‘Strong authentication’ will be incorporated. This will provide the ability to 
authenticate the remote users securely and control their access to resources on the Group’s network. The 
new infrastructure will allow ‘On-site’ partners, 3^** parties and JVs to have controlled access to the 
required parts of the Group’s network using similar degrees of authentication.”
The Group argues that aggressors find it difficult to attack a porcupine because an impenetrable defence of 
sharp points protects it. Oilcom hoped to use the same principle for its own Information Security.
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Trust Domain supported the CMD effort to increase information flow within the Group and 
with its business partners, customers and suppliers. As BS7799 recommends, Trust Domain 
relies on independent certification to confirm the compliance o f counterparties. Indeed, even 
when an operating company outsourced IT, the company remained responsible for ensuring 
that contractors comply with Trust Domain. In brief. Trust Domain launched the concept of 
an open internal network, which Oilcom only selectively closed. The Group later extended 
this fundamental shift to transactions between itself and the outside world.
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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
We previously saw that Oilcom believed Group Infrastructure (GI) was a precondition for its 
e-business drive. This was because GI enables common global processes and practices, easier 
mobile working and enforcement o f business discipline. The GI proposal further envisages, 
“greatly increased data and information security.” GI also allows users to “log on anytime, 
anywhere, on any Group desktop” because all data and applications are stored on network 
drives. However, this change in the network access logic made password-based 
authentication inadequate. Therefore, instead o f investing all resources on defeating intruders, 
Oilcom sought robust measures to protect against fraudulent behaviour by parties accessing 
its network. The Group believes cryptography is an appropriate tool for this job.
Oilcom has used cryptography for over 20 years. However, because these products were 
largely proprietary, over time they became very expensive to maintain. With e-business at 
full speed in the late 1990s, the Group decided to replace these special security features and 
products with off-the-shelf products. GI offered the platform for new cryptosystems. While 
GI-Desktop (GID) provides the context for the use o f PKI, cryptography underpins both GI’s 
enabling (roaming) and restrictive infrastructure (locked down PC) features. Thus, Oilcom 
aligned PKI with efforts to standardise desktops and rationalise IT services. The result is a 
symbiotic relationship, which makes it difficult to extricate PKI from GID fortunes and 
troubles. The GI proposal stresses the importance o f cryptography to GID by stating that,
“Various forms of encryption will be offered as a service in the new environment, e.g. secure
(encrypted and/or digitally signed) e-mail. For secure communication over un-trusted networks, such as the
Internet, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) will be set up using encryption.”
The proposal stipulates that security efforts must build on activities already underway in the 
Group and be compliant with Trust Domain, US Export (Cryptography & Data) and 
European Privacy Export regulations. According to a security consultant, PKI is associated 
with GID because the latter is a Windows 2000 solution that relies on its core component 
Active Directory to handle certificates and smartcards. Thus, GID gives the backbone for 
using certificates. The Principal Architect agrees. He argues.
“PKI is a technology component within the infrastmcture which allows things like SSO. ... PKI is an 
essential component for using smartcards The main reason for having a smartcard is to do the
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authentication of users to the desktop and the server so that you no longer need to have a password in that 
circumstance. It also gives you the ability to roam around anywhere. ... However, smartcards are not 
useful on their own without PKI because the latter enables us to benefit from the security strengths of 
smartcards such as a tamper resistance. So PKI, sm artcards and other supporting technologies are tied 
together to provide a service delivered to users via a GI-Desktop.”
PKI is part o f the eArchitecture initiative launched by a new Chief Information Officer in 
2000. He raised funding from business divisions to pull together disparate projects into fewer 
strategic e-business initiatives. The initiative broadly assessed the potential o f e-business and 
e-commerce in boosting profits and cutting costs. In June 2000, the CIO and representatives 
o f the businesses agreed that the infrastructure should be “common user, generic and capable 
o f adoption by any piece o f the business and could be mixed and matched.” Oilcom created 
an e-business security work stream within eArchitecture and divided it into Trust Confidence 
Services, eDirectory and eRegistration projects. PKI belongs to the e-security stream run by a 
global team with representatives from the UK and other rich countries.
Rationale for PKI
Oilcom hoped to increase security and reduce password management costs through the 
adoption o f PKI, smart cards and thin clients integrated with Windows 2000 native security 
features. The Group believed PKI would provide better trust and confidence in transactions. 
A security consultant revealed that,
“We had accepted that passwords were expensive to support. If you lose your password, you have to wait 
for an amount of time before the situation is rectified. This means that you do not make a good use of your 
time. This is an obvious business case. So we justified the use of PKI and the corporate badge by also 
looking at the password problem in our changed network access logic. Smart cards could also save 
time for the employees because they combined logical and physical security.”
The Group also sought an infrastructure that could assure shareholders, regulators and 
auditors that Oilcom had proper controls around its business applications. As we previously 
saw, energy companies constantly reaffirm their controls because o f the severe brand value 
and regulatory implications o f negligence. The senior Security Consultant argues Oilcom 
selected PKI because it suited it changed network administration paradigm. He states,
“The reason we needed to do this is that Oilcom has completely moved its basic network controls or user 
administrative network controls. Once upon a time Oilcom in common with other big companies we had 
a closed network, which was opened selectively under very strict controls. W hat we now have is an 
open network, which we selectively close. .. One method of selectively closing this network is 
providing strong authentication, identification, non-repudiation and all these good things which you get 
from PKI -  if you do it properly.”
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The consultant argues that PKI was an easy choice because, “there is no other alternative at 
this moment.” He adds that Oilcom selected PKI because a number o f regulations across the 
world have made it difficult to resist legally acceptable and binding signatures. These include 
the UNICITRAL Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures, the Utah Digital Signature Act, 
UK Electronic Communications Act, EU Electronic Signature Directive and the US Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
The consultant argues that because the legal and regulatory fi*amework was still in flux, 
Oilcom sought to understand these laws to control its legal liability and exposures effectively 
(Oilcom 1997). However, liability and concerns about operability, cost and convenience led 
Oilcom to reject the idea o f acting as a Certification Authority (CA) for the outside world. 
According to the senior Consultant the major advantage is,
“You don’t carry any liability whatsoever. You wash your hands. You say ‘we don’t do this, therefore if 
you need an external certificate this is where you go.’ The nature of Oilcom’s business is such that we are 
used to controlling our own liabilities. ... W hat we are not good at, and there isn’t a company alive 
that is, I suspect, is managing unknown risks. Issuing out a certificate to a third party potentially 
introduces unknown risk, with it comes unknown liability. We have seen what happens when someone 
faces unknown liability with Enron and Andersen. It isn’t a good idea.”
Thus, Oilcom preferred to buy the PKI services on demand. However, the Group initially 
struggled to find providers who could offer a dependable global service. This was because 
Oilcom needed support for global services in multi-time zones. The security team also asked 
for permission to customise the security features o f Group Infrastructure (GI). The need to 
modify the infrastructure arose because consultants discovered that GI security features were 
only suited for internal use. The senior Security consultant argues,
“It isn’t a gizmo entirely suitable for e-business applications particularly the PKI component. It is 
no coincidence that no commercial CA uses Microsoft PKI. The view is that it simply does not fit 
requirements of a robust external service solution. There are concerns about a number of the detailed 
pieces of the implementation, which is to do with the design of the product. We understand that is being 
recognised by Microsoft. It was essentially a toe-in-water, possibly because they decided or weren’t able 
to buy any pieces of the con^etition ... I won’t say any more ...”
In response to this charge, Microsoft has taken two steps. First, they bolstered PKI features 
since Windows 2000 (Microsoft 2002a). Second, in our interviews with three senior 
managers, the Corporation claimed customers were misusing its software.
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Microsoft PKI direction
We have seen that the GI proposal explicitly identifies encryption as critical to the success o f 
GID. Therefore, it is impossible to extricate PKI from the problems caused or faced by the GI 
because cryptography, smart cards and other supporting technologies such as Citrix servers 
collectively provide a service delivered to users via a GI-Desktop. As we emphasise in 
Chapters 7 and 8, our discussion o f GI dispels a common belief that PKI is an artefact only 
personified in keys devoid o f a context (Microsoft 2002). The technical discussion o f Oilcom 
PKI largely relies on Microsoft’s official documents because as a Senior Security Consultant 
states, “This is a Microsoft shop very much.” However, we substantiate this information with 
comments from our interviews. This section will also be useftil for part o f our second case 
study because one protagonist at Bankrecht AG, uses Microsoft PKI. According to Microsoft 
Corporation a PKI,
“Is a system of digital certificates, certification authorities (CAs) and other registration authorities (RAs) 
that verify and authenticate the validity of each party that is involved in an electronic transaction through 
the use of public key cryptography (Microsoft 2002a).”
Microsoft claims that while it is possible for a single enterprise to use a proprietary vendor 
solution, open standards lessen the complexities o f cross-enterprise exchanges with multiple 
vendor PKI components. The developers o f open PKI standards include the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and ITU. While admitting 
that the PKI standards are still evolving, Microsoft claims it.
“Works closely with these impartial bodies to ensure that its implementation of the standards are correct 
and fully interoperable. The reason for these standards is simple: the only way to achieve true 
interoperability is through the wide distribution and use of open, vendor-neutral standards. Microsoft has 
embraced the key PKI security standards and has implemented them (Microsoft 2002).”
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To highlight its “openness”, Microsoft enumerates the standards it has adopted.
X.509 version 3 Format and content o f digital 
certificates
W ithout a standard for certificate formats, there's no 
way to exchange certificates between vendors
C R L  version 2 Format and content o f  
certificate revocation lists
Sites need to have a way to interchange revocation 
information
P K C S fam ily Format and behaviour for 
public-key exchange and 
distribution
Allows different vendors’ implementations to 
request and move certificates in a way that all 
understand.
PK IX Format and behaviour for 
public-key exchange and 
distribution
PKIX is an emerging PKI standard that many major 
vendors and enterprises are adopting in place o f the 
PKCS standards.
SSL version 3 Encryption for web sessions. SSL is the best-known and most widely used 
security protocol on the Internet, but it's subject to 
export controls.
SG C  (S erv er G ated  
C ry p to g rap h y )
Provides SSL-like security 
without export complications
SGC allows full 128-bit security and is exportable 
for certain uses
IPSec Encryption for network 
sessions using the Internet 
Protocol (IP)
IPSec promises to offer transparent and automatic 
encryption o f network connections.
P K IN IT Emerging standard for using 
public keys to log on to 
networks that use the Kerberos 
authentication protocol
Kerberos identifies users on the network; PKINIT 
allows Kerberos to use digital certificates on smart 
cards as credentials.
PC /SC  (P ersonal 
C o m p u te r/ 
S m a rt C a rd )
Standard for interfacing 
computers to smart cards
Any vendor’s smart cards that adhere to this 
standard can be used under W indows 2000 without 
the need for proprietary software
Figure 10 -  PKI standards supported by Windows 2000 (Microsoft 2002).
Microsoft claims the use of the open standards developed by security-reliant computing, 
banking and financial services, legal and governments sectors makes its PKI dependable. The 
firm claims the ultimate test o f the security o f an algorithm or protocol is the length o f time of 
its success in public use. Microsoft must have learnt this from its own failed attempts to force 
proprietary protocols. For instance, Schneier raps the Corporation over its covert work on 
Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP) to replace IPSec. The company invented its own 
authentication protocol, hash function and key generation algorithm (Schneier 1999a). 
However, PPTP failed miserably.
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Windows 2000 supports most respected cryptographie algorithms such as RSA and Digital 
Signature Standard (DSS) for public encryption; MD4^ ,^ MD5 and SHA-1 for hash 
algorithms; RC2, and RC4 for secret key encryption. Therefore, Microsoft claims that 
Windows 2000 offers an open security architecture that allows third party applications 
including PKI, to use its features. Tellingly, the Corporation adds.
“The best place to implement a PKI is in the operating system. Operating systems already provide a 
number of other infrastructures, like the printing infrastructure ... and file service infrastmcture that 
retrieves files from shared storage. In both cases, the operating system provides a capacity to transparently 
and easily use a network service, just as PKI does (Microsoft 2002).”
As we shall see, this is a key statement in the tussle between Microsoft and specialist PKI 
vendors and current market leaders notably Entrust and VeriSign.
Oilcom PKI components
A number o f Windows 2000 security functions use public key cryptography. These include 
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MEME); digital signatures; communication 
using Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL); local and remote 
network logon; secure logon credentials using smart cards; Encrypting File System (EPS); 
secure executable code signing and delivery, and IPSec. Oilcom uses PKI for certificate- 
based smart card logon, S/MIME, SSL and TLS.
Schlumberger Network Solutions Infosec Group designed the integrated PKI solution. The 
solution covers physical access, thin client and desktop access using smart cards integrated in 
Windows 2000. The smart card or Corporate Badge project is a central feature o f the GID 
initiative. In 2000, Schlumberger integrated its DeXa.Badge solution with the Windows 2000 
PKI to create a comprehensive set o f public key cryptography-based security services and 
technologies. In 1996, Schlumberger joined forces with Groupe Bull, Hewlett-Packard, 
Microsoft and Siemens Nixdorf to form the PC/SC Workgroup to address smart card 
interoperation issues. In 2001, Schlumberger strengthened its IT integration and solutions 
capabilities with the acquisition o f IT consultancy Sema Pic to form SchlumbergerSema. The
MD stands for Message Digest. Like other hashing scheme, MD helps transform data into a unique result that 
is impossible to change back to the original form.
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Oilcom solution below resembles any Microsoft PKI. However, we discuss the specific 
features incorporated by Sehlumberger.
Domain Administrator
A pplies secu rity  G roup 
Policy
j Active Directory
U sed  for G roup Policy 
distribution, certificate  
publication, certificate 
m apping to  u se r  
a c co u n ts  an d  so  forth.
Certificate Services
Certificate enrollm ent, 
renew al, and  revocation
Key Distribution Center 
Domain Controller
U sed  in dom ain  
logon p ro cess
Domain Client
S m art card  
logon p ro cess
Figure 11 -  Windows 2000 Public Key Infrastructure components (Microsoft 2000a).
Certificate Services
Windows 2000 (Win2K) uses X,509v3, the conventional certificate format. Win2K 
Certificate Services enable an organisation to implement PKI without depending on an 
external Certification Authority (CA). According to the PKIX Certificate Management 
Protocols, a CA establishes the identity o f certificate holders, revokes suspicious or expired 
certificates, and publishes a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). In a simple PKI model, an 
organisation may have one root CA. However, large organisations typically run a number of 
CAs organised into certification hierarchies (Microsoft 2000a). However, a security 
consultant claims that Oilcom has not deployed PKI. He states.
“W e had this conversation  before. T here is no PK I at O ilcom . T hey  are called certificates and certificates 
and PK I are very  different. PK I constitutes the m anagem ent processes. It encom passes the understanding 
that covers the use o f  these system s. T here is no PK I roll out in O ilcom  but there is a ro llout o f  internal 
certificates. W e use these certificates in ternally  at O ilcom . T hese certificates are p lugged  into A ctive 
D irectory. ...No and no. No, we are not using Microsoft PKI. We are using Microsoft certificates. 
There is a distinction. A re users aw are o f  this? N inety-five percen t do no t know  and d o n ’t understand.”
This is startling because, “While public keys are required for PKI-based security, they’re 
usually packaged as digital certificates (Microsoft 2002).” Thus, a certificate is evidence of
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PKI. However, certificates only incorporate public key because private keys have to be stored 
securely for decryption. According to another security consultant,
“S trictly  speaking there is no specific rule that you have to be in the certificate schem e. But the strict 
answ er is that ‘yes’ you do need to have a certificate. There are circum stances w here people  are not, 
currently , on the certificate schem e not because o f  certificates but o ther technological reasons. That again 
is a reflection that certificates and associated technologies cannot properly accommodate legacy 
systems and some of the legacy ways we have been doing business.”
The Microsoft Management Console (MMC) manages all certificates as illustrated.
%  File Action View Favorites Window Help
_ J  Console Root
S  ^  Certificates (Local Computer)
B  _ J  Personal 
I   ^ C J  Certificates
É  C J  Trusted Root Certification Autfiorlties
B ' CZ) Enterprise Trust
B  C ]  Intermediate Certification Autfiorities
El L J  Active Directory User Object
El CD Trusted Publishers
E) iCD Untrusted Certificates
E) LD Third-Party Root Certification Authorities
El CD Trusted People
E! CD o th e r People
B-CD R
B CD Certificate Enrollment Requests
Logical Store Name
CD Personal
CD Trusted Root Certification Authorities 
CDEnterprise Trust
CD Interm ediate Certification Authorities
CD Active Directory User Object
CD Trusted Publishers
CD Untrusted Certificates
CD Third-Party Root Certification Authorities
CD Trusted People
CD Other People
Û R
C J  Certificate Enrollment Requests
l i Jj
Personal store contains 7 certificates.
Figure 12 -  Microsoft Management Console for certificates (Microsoft 2002a).
Windows 2000 removes the need for ‘physical’ certificate signing because Certificate 
Services incorporate CA Web enrolment pages that allow the automatic management of 
certificates. The module installed by default with a Microsoft CA, enables the submission of 
certificate requests through a browser. Using Active Directory (AD) and Group policies, 
computers and domain controllers can automatically enrol for machine-type certificates. 
Machine auto-enrolment facilitates IPSec or L2TP^^/EPSec VPN connection with Windows 
2000 servers (Microsoft 2001). It is also possible to install CA Web pages on Win2K servers
20 Layer Tw o T unneling  Protocol (L2T P) is a secure protocol used for connecting  V irtual Private N etw orks over 
public lines such as the Internet. Practically , L2TP com bines tw o o ther secure com m unications protocols 
nam ely Poin t-to -Poin t Tunneling  (PPT P) and C isco System s' Layer Tw o Forw arding (L2F). M icrosoft and other 
firms developed  PPT P for secure T C P/IP  packet transm ission (Source: C N E T ).
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that are not running a CA. Windows XP Professional extends auto-enrolment to user 
certificates as illustrated below.
j, -'■-'Sÿ 4k .
*1 Enioll use» and  co n fu te*  ceilificales automatically
^  O  Do nol enrol ceitificates autoirvaticaliy
W  0  E nrol ceitificates automatically
 ^ e
D  Benew et<pired certificates, update pendng certificates, and remove 
revoked certificates
E  Update certificates that use certlicate templates
I OK I I Cancel Apply
Figure 13 -  Auto-enrolment Settings (Microsoft 2001).
User-certificates in Windows XP also rely on Group Policy and certificate templates. 
Certificates templates are rules and settings applied against incoming certificate requests. 
Customised templates are stored in Active Directory for use by all CAs in a forest (Microsoft 
2002a). With AD, Windows XP automatically enrols for certificates at log on consequently 
enabling PKI applications like smart card logon, EPS, SSL and S/MIME. Microsoft claims 
auto-enrolment cuts the PKI total cost o f ownership (TCO). We explore the political 
implications o f auto-enrolment, AD and Group Policies in Chapter 7.
Domain Client: Smart Card logon
Oilcom users authenticate to the GID client using smart cards. According to Microsoft 
(1999a), a smart card is a class o f credit card-sized device with varying capabilities that range 
from stored-value cards, contact-less cards and integrated circuit cards (ICC). Shelfer and 
Procaccino (2002) believe a ‘true’ smart card has on-board embedded processor or smart 
chip. Roland Moreno filed the first ICC patents in France in 1975 and the US in 1978. 
Motorola and Bull produced the first smart card chips in 1977.
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I. ISO contacts 
(used with reader)
2. Electronic module 
(see Figure 2)
3. Silicon-based 
Integrated circuit (1C)
4. Layer of epoxy Plastic card
Figure 14 - Cut away side view of a smart card (Shelter and Procaccino 2002).
Microsoft (1999a) argues that IC cards are the most useful for network security because they 
perform sophisticated operations such as digital signature and key exchange.
Smart cards, GID and PKI
Windows 2000 introduced the capability for logging onto workstations and servers with 
smart cards. The authentication is either interactive, client or remote (Microsoft 1999a). 
Interactive login involves Active Directory, Kerberos v5 and certificates. With client 
authentication, permissions rely on a certificate that matches an account stored in AD. Lastly, 
remote logon involves a certificate with the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) to authenticate a remote user to an AD account. Oilcom uses 
smart cards for interactive and remote logons. We focus on interactive logon and give a 
detailed account o f the procedure under the Key Distribution Centre/Domain Controllers 
section, which explains the Kerberos Authentication Protocol Version 5.
We saw that Oilcom claims to have deployed smart cards to reduce the costs of passwords, 
encourage information sharing and improve security. Schlumberger reveals Oilcom hoped to 
reduce password management costs from the industry estimates of $100 per user annually to 
$50. As we explain in Chapter 7, smart cards have become at once the primary and yet less 
threatening personification o f PKI at Oilcom. Interviewees largely attributed this success to a 
long history o f badges at Oilcom. In a case study of the Oilcom project for the Smart Card 
Alliance^' SchlumbergerSema argues.
“W hen used  as part o f  an infrastructure that incorporates public-key  cryptography, sm art cards can provide 
tam per-resistan t storage for PIN  codes, p rivate keys, d ig ital credentials, and other personal inform ation.
T he A lliance is a m ulti-industry  association  w orking to accelerate sm art card technology  application.
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Companies can use PKI and sm art cards to authenticate users requesting network access, to digitally 
sign and encrypt documents, and to achieve non-repudiation."
Apart from the cost issue, smart cards offered Oilcom a simple, user-friendly interface that 
supported the management committee goal of building e-business capabilities across the 
Group. The DeXa “corporate badge” solution comprises smart card technology, integration, 
and program management, and support services. Oilcom choose smart cards for PKI because 
unlike computer hard disks, they offer secure private key generation, storage and portability 
(Crossley 2002). A security consultant argues,
“The medium which we chose was a smartcard and have the certificate on it, on the chip of the smartcard. 
...the only way we issue a certificate is by smartcard. I have a certificate because I have a sm artcard and 
it is p art of the GI standard that I have a sm artcard. Thus, the certificate is on the smartcard and the 
certificate is for authenticating you as you log onto the system."
Oilcom awarded the PKI contract in the winter o f 1999. However, the Group fired the vendor 
in June 2000 for failure to deliver a working solution. Schlumberger won the contract in 
January 2001 on condition that they met the original schedule. Apart from the restricted time, 
the number o f employees to receive smart cards also increased from 85,000 to 105,000 at 
1,200 sites in 145 countries. Oilcom had both underestimated the PCs it owned and acquired 
new businesses during the project duration.
The DeXa.Badge solution is a centralised credential management system that enables 
multiple authentication mechanisms like PKI, biometrics and One Time Passwords. The 
solution also manages building access because of the card’s compatibility with most physical 
access control systems. Schlumberger produces the cards and adds special features on 
demand. Oilcom uses 16k and 32k Cyberflex Access smart cards that have the Group’s 
colours as background and an image o f the cardholder. The card has a return address at the 
back. However, after corporate advice, the card does not identify Oilcom. The card readers 
are from the Schlumberger “Reflex” range that supports standard peripheral interfaces such 
as PCMCIA, USB and Serial, as shown next.
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Reflex USB V2 Reflex 20 PCMCIA
Figure 15 -  Some of the Schlumberger card readers at Oilcom
The smart card platform includes a Schlumberger Self Service Module centred on a web- 
based card management system. Developing this web-based, low-overhead system was a 
huge challenge because nothing comparable existed in the marketplace.
Citrix and Terminal services
Oilcom also asked Schlumberger to design a certificate-based smart card authentication 
mechanism to a remote MetaFrame server for thin client (Citrix) sessions. No other 
organisation was using this technology at the time. Citrix enables the deployment of business 
applications such as Microsoft Office, SAP and Oracle across the network regardless o f the 
client device in use. However, Citrix is more important for retaining centralised IT control. 
Citrix maintains the locked down PC in association with “Terminal Services” a Windows 
2000 feature that allows the creation o f independent user profiles in Active Directory. 
Administrators use the Terminal Serviees profile to restrict access to applications by 
removing them from the user’s Start Menu (Microsoft 2001a). The same service creates and 
stores network connections to printers and other resources for user sessions. In Windows 
2000, all application execution occurs on the terminal server and only keyboard, mouse and 
display information moves over the network. Terminal services support the centralised 
management o f applications irrespective o f client and network connection.
A Schlumberger add-in enables MetaFrame servers to recognise client card readers as local. 
DeXa.Badge also runs PKI over Citrix that enables mail signing and encryption, secure web 
access and high security with two-factor authentication (Crossley 2002). Schlumberger 
admits these were huge challenges because no organisation had conducted a smart card and 
Windows 2000 PKI deployment o f this scale anywhere in the world. Smart card deployment
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started in early 2001 with a deadline o f the first quarter 2002. However, on 18^  ^October 2002 
a senior Security Consultant confirmed the project was still ongoing because implementation 
problems and acquisitions had increased the workload. Schlumberger claims its solution is 
flexible because it works with all major PKI vendors. Apart from the initial trouble with 
printing the cards, a Security Consultant believes the smart card deployment has been 
smooth. While the success is widely linked to the history of using badges, the new smart card 
is much more powerful than users realise. The security consultant reveals,
“This new card has an extra bit on it. It has a ‘proximity swipe’ on the back, smartcard on the front. The
card gets me my lunch everyday; it gets me into the building and logs me onto my machine That
was quite a conscious thought when they were formulating the smartcard project. ... They did say ‘we will 
consciously put the certificate on the access mechanism to your PC on the same card you get lunch with 
because in that case you won’t forget it’.”
As such, contrary to the official IT security line, the DeXa.Badge is revolutionary. The link 
of the card with the cafeteria was clever because lunch sessions are professional activities at 
Oilcom. According to a technical consultant project teams use lunch to present reports and 
share knowledge. She says consultants also use lunch to resolve problems and pitch for future 
work by highlighting their expertise in specific areas.
However, the combination o f functions on the card took time. A security consultant reveals 
that at the beginning all users had separate cards for physical and network access. He claims 
this was because o f technological and organisational issues that the project initially struggled 
to overcome. We shall see that Bankrecht AG not only has separate cards for logical and 
physical security, employees still use cards fi*om two banks that merged in 1998 to create this 
Group. A senior Security Consultant stresses,
“We are committed to a single infrastructure across the world which means I can go to any other office 
with or without my laptop but certainly with my sm art card and my data is there for me. Certainly, 
we have a large number of travellers. Some people travel an enormous amount. Others travel infrequently. 
We must turn our various businesses into single entities across the globe, which they haven’t been. They 
should be able to see exactly the same thing wherever they have their people, which is as it should be. 
Gone are the days when Oilcom was managed on a country basis.”
Therefore, smart cards are cardinal tools in the efforts o f Oilcom to establish the identity of 
users on its gargantuan network, which was proving very difficult with the proliferation of 
networks, the Internet, thin clients and PCs. In addition, the combination o f logical and
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physical security on one card has not only set a firm foundation for security but is also the 
mainstay o f the efforts to standardise IT provision within the Group.
Active Directory (AD)
Active Directory is at the heart o f Windows 2000 PKI (Lowe-Norris 2000, Microsoft 2000a, 
Microsoft 2001a). Although PKI can function without directories, a combination o f the two 
technologies delivers better business value (Austin 2001). Microsoft enshrined the 
dependence o f its PKI on AD by attaching most o f the critical functions for large 
organisations to the directory. Microsoft reveals,
“Active Directory is tightly integrated with Windows 2000 security services such as Kerberos 
authentication protocol, public key infrastructure, Encrypting File System (EPS), the Security 
Configuration Manager, Group Policy and delegated administration. This integration allows Windows 
applications to take advantage of the existing security infrastructure (Microsoft 2000a).”
Other key features requiring AD are IntelliMirror, a configuration management system and 
Global Catalog (GC) for unified information view. The Corporation claims that while 
Windows 2000 Server and Professional individually have security features to protect 
information stored on individual PCs, “comprehensive, policy-based security that controls 
access to networked resources” should incorporate AD and enjoy its distributed security 
features. Microsoft warns that most advanced Windows 2000 security features require Active 
Directory (Microsoft 2001a). Like other large organisations, Oilcom uses the directory to 
store information about users, hardware, applications and data on network users. To a senior 
Security Consultant,
“We realised that Active Directory is a complex piece of infrastructure. We knew AD was going to be 
even more critical than the X.500 directory it replaced. We are using it for a whole range of different 
things, which are not immediately obvious to the users of Microsoft systems. ... Active Directory is more 
of what we thought it would always become: a multipurpose animal. ... It (AD) is an absolutely 
critical piece of infrastructure because if we cannot find people or certificates in it, we cannot operate this 
business. As simple as that.”
Active Directory is also a focal point for the validation of information on Certificate 
Revocation Lists (CRLs), facilitates key recovery and storage o f encrypted private keys. 
Microsoft claims that since Windows 2000 uses AD to store public key information, its PKI 
is easier to manage because there are no new tools to leam, components to install or manage. 
In contrast, many other PKI products create unique stores for certificate and CRL data and
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require separate databases for users, computers and PKI data. Critically too, Microsoft 
claims, “Third-party PKIs must be purchased separately, and require per-certificate license 
fees  and increased management tasks (Microsoft 2001).” We return to the certificate fee issue 
in the Bankrecht case study. The storage of certificates, CRLs and policy details in AD 
allows the replication o f the data using the directory’s native features. Microsoft argues,
“U nlike the flat-file d irectory  used  in the W indow s N T  Server operating  system , W indow s 2000 A ctive 
D irectory  stores inform ation in a logical h ie ra rc h y  th a t  re p re se n ts  y o u r  b u sin ess  s t ru c tu r e . T his allows 
for greater g row th and sim plified  m anagem ent (M icrosoft 2000a).”
Active Directory divides the hierarchy into domains, organisational units (OUs) and objects. 
The hierarchy logic attempts to organise network resources in a way similar to the storage of 
files and folders on a Windows PC. The AD hierarchical structure looks as follows.
Domain Tree
Microsoft com
Domain
Europe M laosoft com
FarEasl. Microsoft, com
OU
OU
Use,
F ig u re  16 -  H ie ra rc h ic a l s t ru c tu r e  o f  th e  A ctive  D ire c to ry  se rv ice  (M ic ro so ft 2000a).
A central concept o f the logical hierarchy is a domain. Microsoft defines a domain as a 
collection o f network objects such OUs, user accounts, groups and computers that share a 
common directory database with respect to security (Microsoft 2000a). Domains play a 
critical role in security because they form the core unit o f the logical structure within AD. 
Grouping objects into domains allows the network to reflect the organisational structure.
As illustrated above, large organisations may contain multiple domains creating a hierarchy 
named a Domain Tree. The tree contains multiple domains connected by trust relationships 
and a common schema, configuration and global catalog (Microsoft 1999a). The first domain 
under the Tree is a Root Domain and all domains beneath it are Child domains. Oilcom has 
largely amalgamated all its domains into one. However, the Service Companies were yet to
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migrate from the child domains. Domains contain OUs, which are containers for organising 
objects into logical administrative groups. An OU can include user accounts, groups, 
computers, printers, files shares and other OUs (Microsoft 2000a). By October 2002, Oilcom 
had over 100,000 device and 110,000 people records in AD. The Group used AD to populate 
the global address list within the Exchange infrastructure until the completion o f the 
migration to Exchange 2000. The migration slowed down after the records negatively 
affected Active Directory’s performance.
Group Policy
Active Directory supports fine-grained access controls that allow administrators to specify 
who can see, change and copy directory information (Microsoft 2002). This feature depends 
on the ability to group information into domains and OUs enabling administrators to manage 
security for a collection o f objects such as computers rather than each object individually 
(Microsoft 2000a). This is a ftinction o f Group Policy (GP), a primary tool for defining and 
controlling how programs, networks resources and operating systems ftmction for users and 
computers (Microsoft 2001a). In brief,
“G roup Policy is a significant feature of Active Directory because it lets you apply all types of 
policies to large numbers of computers in a uniform way. For example, you can use Group Policy to 
configure security options, manage applications, manage desktop appearance, assign scripts, and redirect 
folders from local computers to network locations (Microsoft 2000a).”
Group Policy applies to users or devices based on their membership in sites, domains or OUs. 
The settings apply to computers at boot time and to users at logon. Administrators use Group 
Policy to define extensive security policies for the domain say defining minimum password 
length and intervals for their changing. Group Policy can override settings at lower levels.
Active Directory permits administrators to delegate responsibility within a forest or domain. 
Administrators may create OUs and assign control for particular users or groups to someone 
else. The control covers specific operations such as creating groups, controlling membership 
lists and adding accounts to the domain. However, “Group Policy settings and user groups let 
administrators precisely define delegated authority. ... Further, because o f fine-grained access 
control, administrators can narrowly define the scope of the delegated tasks (Microsoft 
2000a).” This is a key centralising feature o f Active Directory because while support groups
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have power to undertake some activities, the administrator retains full control over user 
accounts. Group Policy also controls PKI. For instance,
“PKI components that integrate with Active Directory can use its policy mechanisms to control who 
may request certificates, who may fetch them from the directory, how long certificates remain valid,
and so on (Microsoft 2002).”
Group Policy automatically distributes certificates to users and machines, establishes 
certificate trust lists and lists o f trusted CAs and manages recovery policies for the 
Encrypting File System (Microsoft 2000a, Microsoft 2002a). Windows 2000 also stores 
certificate templates in AD. Enterprise CAs use the templates to determine certificate format, 
key size and the required X.509 extensions (Microsoft 2001).
Key Distribution Centre/Domain Controiiers
The KDC/DC is central to the domain logon process. Windows 2000 implements the Key 
Distribution Centre (KDC) as a domain service which uses Active Directory as its account 
database (Microsoft 1999a). The KDC is a Kerberos service. The Kerberos Authentication 
Protocol provides a mechanism for mutual identification between a client and server, or 
between different servers (Kohl and Neuman 1993, Microsoft 1999a). Kerberos is a product 
of an MIT project entitled ‘Athena’ that hoped to stop hackers from capturing network 
passwords (Bellovin and Merritt 1991, Neuman and Ts'o 1994).
Kerberos Version 5 (v5) relies on the shared secrets authentication technique. A Kerberos 
client (Windows 2000 workstation) and Kerberos Server use a symmetric cryptographic key 
to verify one another’s identity. Kerberos derives the encryption key from a password 
(Neuman and Ts'o 1994). This is an improvement on the Windows NT 4.0 proprietary NT 
LAN Manager (NTLM) Challenge-Response, which requires a separate client authentication 
for each network resource the user accesses. Kerberos v5 is the primary security protocol for 
accessing resources in Windows 2000 domains. By default, Kerberos v5 creates a two-way 
transitive trust relationship between security authorities.
Kerberos authentication depends on tickets. The Key Distribution Centre (KDC) provides 
these tickets through a single process comprising o f the Authentication Service (AS) and the 
Ticket-Granting Service (TGS). The AS issues Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) to users.
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machines and services, or authenticated principals, for admission to the TGS. The TGS issues 
tickets for admission to other services in the domain or to a TGS in another trusted domain 
(Microsoft 1999a). Windows 2000-based Domain Controllers (DC) implement Active 
Directory with an integrated KDC to ensure the storage o f information in a single directory.
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Figure 17 -  The Kerberos authentication process
When a user logs onto a domain, Windows 2000 locates an Active Directory Server and 
Kerberos authentication service. Smart card authentication uses information encrypted from a 
private key with its public key registered in AD. The ability to authenticate users initially 
with public key certificates instead o f passwords or shared secrets is an extension to the 
Kerberos v5 protocol proposed by the IETF called PKINIT. PKINIT is the basis for Windows 
2000 smart card logon support. Interactive smart card logon begins when a user inserts a 
smart card into the reader causing the display o f the Graphical Identification and 
Authentication (GINA) component of Windows 2000 logon. This prompts for a Personal 
Identification Number (PIN) instead o f a username, password and domain name. However, 
the PIN only authenticates users to the smart card not the domain as illustrated.
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Figure 18 -  Interactive Logon with certificate in Windows 2000 (iT SEC 2002).
After the initial stage, Kerberos v5 protocol and its PKINIT extension authenticate the user to 
the domain using a certificate stored on the card. Windows 2000 uses the PIN and certificate 
to initiate actions that identify and authenticate the principal. The logon request goes to the 
Local Security Authority (LSA), which forwards it to the Kerberos authentication package 
running on the client (Microsoft 1999a). From here, the Kerberos package sends an 
Authentication Service (AS) request to the KDC service on the Domain Controller asking for 
authentication and a TGT. The Key Distribution Centre verifies the path of the certificate to 
ensure that it can be trusted before satisfying the AS request. If the KDC fails to build a valid 
path, it turns down the request. The KDC also verifies whether the CA is authorised to issue 
certificates that are a basis for authentication within the domain. Windows 2000 demands that 
tmsted issuing CAs must be of enterprise type published in Active Directory.
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Politics of GID and PKI implementation
We previously highlighted the link between PKI and GI-Desktop (GID). This relationship 
both helped PKI institutionalisation but also exposed it to the problems of GID. This was 
inevitable because GID drastically reconfigured the support arrangements in favour of the 
central IT team at the expense o f local providers. One o f these changes was the creation o f a 
network of international support centres in Malaysia; Texas, US and Manchester, England. 
The rationalisation led to job losses because the centrally managed infrastructure required 
less support staff. The GID centralisation drive also clashed with the historically distributed 
Oilcom organisational structure causing huge resentment. A business consultant reveals,
“I think the problems we have had inçlementing GI are synq)toms of a wider issue that we have had for 
decades in Oilcom, which is that nothing is really ever driven from top-down. We are not a kind of 
company where there is a very strong command and control structure. Everything historically has been 
consensual and operating companies have had a lot of autonomy. So you have got this company that has 
got a deep culture in history of OCs doing their own thing and then you appoint some poor GI Project 
Manager and tell him to drive something from top-down when that is just counter to the whole culture of 
the company. So I don’t envy the person who has had to manage GI.”
A team leader agrees. He argues that the biggest problem with GID is that it abandoned the 
traditional approaches to system deployment at Oilcom. All large system deployments 
normally start with a ‘Stakeholder Analysis’. The analysis looks at how an IT system impacts 
on different people, whether they are ready to change, how much they understand the change 
and whether they have reached a stage o f actively supporting or preventing the system. From 
the analysis, ITI assigns much o f the system responsibility to the user division. To the Team 
leader, “What we try and avoid is a belief that a bunch o f IT people come in from nowhere, 
put a system in and go away.” However, this is exactly what happened with GID because top 
management directed its swift deployment without consulting operating companies.
The central IT team also lacked control over GI costs because Oilcom raises funds for big 
projects from business divisions. In return, the divisions demand a comprehensive business 
case, especially the impact of the new infrastructure on autonomy. A technical consultant 
believes the GI deployment problems were inevitable because the decentralised Oilcom 
structure encourages politics. She reveals.
“It is not as easy to work together through different departments of Oilcom because of political reasons. 
There is a lot of talk about ‘stealing’ work even internally, which is not a very good situation It doesn’t
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always feel like it is one company in that sense because different people and departments have their own 
goals and they are not always willing to share the knowledge they have throughout the company ... I  don’t 
think things are quick enough because of the politics.”
As part o f our triangulation exercise, we showed this view to respondents at various levels of 
the hierarchy. The statement excited heated debate. For instance, a security consultant totally 
disagreed with the observation. He insisted,
“When that person talks about ‘because of political reasons’ that makes it sound like there is an under­
current of Machiavellian people running around the place building empires etcetera. I do not believe 
that is the same Oilcom I work for. ... departments not working together is common ... However, it is not 
an inhibitor at Oilcom. But stealing work? No. Not that I am aware of!”
The Principal Architect also doubts the statement. He argues politics is a covering word and 
often an excuse when people fail to achieve their objectives. However, he apparently reveals 
the political angle of Group Infrastructure (GI) when he says that a key project objective was 
to support full information access within Oilcom. He states.
“Interestingly, a key driver of GI is full access to information because now the businesses are too 
restrictive. ... In a way, we are using IT to break through the barriers of people creating their own flefdoms 
... The IT would not change people’s attitudes, the businesses and the organisations or the people factors, 
but at least we will make sure that the IT is in support of what we want to achieve. Oilcom is a big 
conçany which operates in many cultures and countries around the world, so the people side of things is 
probably the bigger challenge facing a new information system. ”
Chapter summary
This Chapter presents the first o f our two case studies. We discuss the Oilcom business 
environment including its history, nature o f business and governance structures. The 
technology adoption process follows. We assess the IT standardisation efforts especially the 
rigidly enforced GID client that provides a context for PKI usage. Next, we discuss the PKI 
technical features. We conclude with a focus on the politics o f PKI and GI.
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CHAPTER 6: 
BANKRECHT PKI EFFORTS
Introduction
This chapter shows field data by discussing the power issues surrounding PKI at Bankrecht. 
Despite mergers and acquisitions abroad, Bankrecht is an archetypal security-conscious 
Swiss bank. Thus, apart from pioneering large-scale PKI use, Bankrecht is an interesting case 
study because security is vital for its survival. We proceed as follows. First, we summarise 
the two phases o f the study. Next, we describe the business environment and the effects o f  
secrecy laws on governance structures. Under social aspects, we explore the cohesive power 
of the Bankrecht brand. The technology adoption theme traces the life o f the PKI since 1992. 
The first phase ends in chaos with many independent divisional CAs because Bankrecht 
failed to mobilise institutional support for the infrastructure. Branding intervenes in the 
second phase to give wings to the fledgling dream o f a centralised PKI.
Pioneering PKI efforts
The PKI project preceded the merger between two Swiss banks that created the current 
Bankrecht AG. According to an original member of the PKI team, one o f the two banks, we 
refer to as Bankrecht X, decided in 1992 to use X.509 certificates and smart cards. However, 
unlike Oilcom, that uses smart cards for interactive certificate-based logon, Bankrecht largely 
employs the card as a password and certificate repository.
We conducted fifteen interviews in both Switzerland and London averaging an hour. Our 
respondents included a member o f the original PKI team who is now a Vice President, the 
Director IT Security, Associate Director IT Security/PKI Project Leader, a member o f the 
original PKI engineering team and Head o f Smart Card Infrastructure (SCI) Project. Others 
were leader Smart Card Production team, members o f the second and first-level User Support 
teams, an engineer o f the PKI/Windows Core Technologies team and several users. We also 
include data from iT SEC the integrator of the PKI solution and Entrust. This information 
covers the first phase o f the PKI from 1992 to September 2002.
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The second phase starts after a management decision in late 2002 to abolish all subsidiary 
brands by June 2003. Bankrecht claimed this is “a further evolution o f its brand strategy and 
portfolio.” We evaluate a series o f lively e-mail exchanges between several parties led by 
Zurich-based Wealth Management & Business Banking (WM&BB). The PKI became a part 
of Orlando, the re-branding drive, following Bankrecht Investment’s inconsistent naming of 
its root Certification Authority (CA). In the first phase, Bankrecht Switzerland (BS) claimed 
BI should adopt the Swiss PKI because they had more experience with large deployments. In 
contrast, WM&BB promotes centralised PKI by proxy because it focuses on branding.
Like Oilcom, we were obliged to protect the real identity o f our study organisation and 
respondents as a condition for research access and ownership of the data. As the readers will 
realise, we present controversial information from an on-going project, which may worsen 
the already frosty relations between the divisions. However, we present enough hints for 
people conversant with Swiss banking to guess the organisation.
Business Environment
Bankrecht claims to be one of the world’s leading financial firms “serving a discerning global 
client base” with assets worth over £428 billion. Bankrecht AG operates worldwide as an 
integrated investment services firm with a diversified portfolio ranging from wealth 
management & business banking, asset management, securities, investment banking and fund 
management. It has five business divisions. These are Private Banking covering Swiss and 
international clients; Wealth Management in the US; Investment Banking and Securities 
under Bankrecht Investment (BI); Institutional Asset Management and Funds and lastly. 
Retail and Corporate Banking in Switzerland.
Bankrecht claims world leadership in private banking services and a good position in global 
asset management. Its investment banking division (BI) is also among the pre-eminent global 
houses especially in Europe. Bankrecht, with a close rival, easily lead corporate and retail 
banking in their native Switzerland. The firm operates in over 50 countries covering all major 
international financial centres and employs over 70,000 people. Bankrecht supplements its 
global physical presence with online services. The Group also has business relationships with 
more than 3,000 financial institutions.
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Nature of business
Bankrecht believes that as an integrated Group, not merely a holding company, it provides a 
better service to clients by drawing on expertise from its various businesses. It was in 
pursuance o f this “one firm” approach that in late 2002 Bankrecht consolidated its trading 
into a single brand. We explain the implications of the re-branding drive on PKI later. The 
bank serves what it terms a ‘discerning’ global client base o f ‘high net worth’ individuals. As 
such, Bankrecht focuses on wealth management because,
“The secular trends affecting the investment world make wealth management the most attractive segment 
in the financial industry. As individuals continue to increase their reliance on equity investments ... the 
demand for wealth management products and services will increase. This growth is expected to be 
highest among our core affluent target market.”
Bankrecht already claims leadership in global wealth management. It has over 11,000 client 
advisors who manage CHF 1.5 trillion o f invested assets. Bankrecht runs the operations 
through a US investment firm, a global private bank, and uses third party banking products 
and services. The Group insists that private banking is not just a niche within the Group but 
wealth management is central to overall strategy because,
“Wealth management is a profitable business, with low capital requirements, a stable revenue base and 
high barriers to entry, thanks to the breadth and depth of products and services that today’s demanding 
clients require.”
The products and services range from investment services and portfolio management to 
comprehensive financial planning, real estate advice, Islamic funds and art banking.
Swiss Banking Secrecy
Probably the biggest reason for the success o f Bankrecht and other Swiss banks in wealth 
management is the country’s Banking Secrecy laws. To Schneider (2002) the concept of 
financial privacy is firmly entrenched in Swiss laws, regulations and culture. He argues that, 
“In an instance o f profile following principle, financial privacy also provides a competitive 
advantage for Swiss financial institutions (Schneider 2002).” However, the recent storm over 
the Swiss handling o f bank accounts for Jewish holocaust victims showed that secrecy is a 
subject o f impassioned conflicts and debates (Guex 2000, Studer 1997). The Swiss have been 
accused o f other questionable deals like.
164
“In the ‘70s, it was the Wall Street insider traders, in the ‘80s it was the Pizza connection, a drug ring 
operating out of US pizzerias and the Lebanon Connection, a Lebanese-Turkish drug operation, and in 
the ‘90s came news of Italy’s corrupt officials using Swiss bank accounts as a hideaway. Claimants are 
still fighting over who should get fimds deposited in Swiss banks by former Philippine president 
Ferdinand Marcos (Studer 1997).”
Guex (2000) argues that the maintenance o f secrecy has been a major objective o f Swiss 
authorities throughout the twentieth century and exerted a substantial influence on domestic 
and foreign policy. He contends that Swiss authorities devised their financial system to create 
conditions for the expansion o f secrecy explaining why the policies have been consistent over 
the years. However, banking secrecy has caused recurrent tensions between Switzerland and 
other countries notably the USA over Jewish deposits (Guex 2000) and recently the USA 
Patriot Act^  ^(Schneider 2002).
Secrecy has been rooted in Swiss banking activity since the end o f the nineteenth century. 
Guex (2000) argues that the Swiss ruling circles strengthened the law as a business strategy 
to take advantage o f the exorbitant taxes levied by many European countries on the wealthy 
propertied classes. Recognising that Switzerland could not compete with the commercial 
power o f London, Paris and Berlin, Swiss bankers saw heavy taxation as an opportunity to 
attract foreign capital (Guex 2000). This was around 1901. However, after a crisis in 1931, 
farmers and Socialist parties pressured the Federal government to take more control o f the 
banking sector to protect the lower and middle classes. Surprisingly, the Federal Banking law 
adopted in 1934 reinforced the practice by making,
“Violation of banking secrecy subject to criminal law and the possibility of both heavy fines and up 
to six months’ imprisonment. In principle, such violation had to be automatically prosecuted by the 
legal authorities, even if the injured party did not sue (Guex 2000).”
What does the history o f Swiss banking secrecy have to do with our study? The answer is as 
follows. Security, or more precisely confidentiality, is a matter o f survival for Bankrecht. 
Good security not only gives the bank competitive advantage in wealth management, it averts 
the risk o f heavy fines and criminal liability. This explains the drive to deploy a centralised 
PKI and the relative ease o f its acceptance in Switzerland. However, the PKI solution run into 
difficulties abroad especially in London because the foreign divisions are more concerned 
about availability than confidentiality.
The Act imposes tough sanctions on US and foreign banks that fail to identify sources o f foreign assets.
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Brief history
Bankrecht AG is a product o f a 1998 merger of two Swiss banks. We refer to the bigger of 
the two banks as Bankrecht X and the other as Bankrecht Y. The new entity created a 
network of 645 branches in Switzerland and another 159 offices abroad. Unlike many other 
countries that distinguished between deposit and investment banks in the 1930s, the Swiss 
‘universal’ banking model offered various services under one roof. However, foreign 
acquisitions transformed the banks from archetypal purveyors o f “Swiss universal banking” 
into global financial groups. We briefly discuss the histories o f the two banks.
Bankrecht X was created in 1912 by a merger o f two Swiss banks. From its inception, the 
bank focused on the local market by taking over several banks in Swiss cantons and setting 
up its own branches. In 1945, Bankrecht X moved its head office to Zurich and acquired a 
major bank. After years o f relentless growth, it became the biggest bank in Switzerland in 
1962. Bankrecht only moved abroad after World War II with the opening o f a London branch 
in 1967 and New York in 1975. The bank had acquired a British brokerage firm in 1966. 
Despite these foreign forays, Bankrecht remained a promoter o f the Swiss universal banking 
concept. By 1998, Bankrecht X had assets o f CHF 557.6 billion. The bank managed a Swiss 
business network o f 357 branches and another 82 abroad.
Bankrecht Y was founded in Basel, Switzerland in 1872. From the outset, the bank 
emphasised foreign operations leading to the opening o f its first branch abroad in London in 
1898. A New York agency followed in 1939. Bankrecht Y focused on foreign operations to 
an extent that despite opening branches in other regions o f Switzerland at the start o f the 20th 
century, it only made major nationwide expansion in the 1960s. In 1945, Bankrecht Y 
acquired a big Swiss bank, which improved its local network. In Switzerland, Bankrecht Y 
applied the universal bank model to corporate and retail accounts but it concentrated mainly 
on commercial banking for corporate clients abroad.
In the 1990s, Bankrecht Y bolstered its international credentials with major acquisitions. For 
instance, in 1995 it acquired a venerable investment bank in London. The investment bank 
became Bankrecht Investment (BI) after the 1998 merger. The independent-minded BI is a 
major protagonist in PKI institutionalisation fallout at Bankrecht. In the same year, Bankrecht
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Y acquired two banks in Chicago, USA and took 90% ownership o f an Italian partnership. At 
merger, the bank was worth CHF 438.9 billion and operated a Swiss network o f 288 branches 
and 77 offices abroad with over 27,000 employees. The merged entity acquired a prominent 
New York securities firm in 2000.
Governance structures
The top administrative bodies at Bankrecht AG are a Board o f Directors and the Group 
Executive Board. The Board is the supreme body with responsibility for the overall direction 
of the Group and the supervision o f its executive management. A chairman who is 
responsible for corporate governance, public and political affairs and strengthening corporate 
culture, heads the Board. The executive board has the management responsibility for the 
company. It implements strategy, aligns business divisions to the ‘integrated model’ and 
exploits synergies within the Group. The board and its head, the President, are answerable to 
the Chairman. The board performs these functions through the ‘Corporate Centre’, which 
ensures that the divisions operate as a coherent and effective whole. Thus, Bankrecht always 
aspires to carefully plan the portfolio o f its businesses and ensure they stick to the overall 
corporate goals. Bankrecht claims that its organisational structure both creates robust checks 
and balances and allows management the flexibility to make appropriate decisions.
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Social aspects of Bankrecht
Unlike Oilcom, whose Service Companies only perform an advisory role, Bankrecht tightly 
controls policy from its headquarters in Zurich and Basel. The bank claims that while to the 
outside world its strength derives from products and technology, it also has powerful 
intangible features. The bank claims the intangible factors include, “the values we share, our 
culture, our client relationships and our brands.” Bankrecht coined five elements to 
encompass all the intangibles. The elements are brand and identity, knowledge and 
innovation, talent and culture, client relationships and financial intelligence. To Bankrecht 
while each element is individually important, they collectively define the personality o f the 
Group. We shall restrict ourselves to brand and identity, talent and culture because they are 
directly relevant to the PKI project. Bankrecht claims its name is,
“A seal of quality guaranteeing trust, dependability and professionalism ...Its effect is to instil 
confidence in us from our clients and to act as a unique door-opener, granting all of our business Groups 
around the world access to new and successful relationships.”
The bank declares that a key strength o f its culture is the close co-operation between different 
businesses. It requires all employees to demonstrate its principles and values and act as 
‘brand ambassadors.’ Bankrecht places particular emphasis on the consistency o f the brand 
because o f its centrality to business strategy. The Group demands that all advertisements, 
branch network and publications such as websites consistently reflect the brand. As such, the 
bank requires all its businesses to show a clear understanding o f the brand contours because,
“The key is to create a broad brand vision or identity that recognises our brand as something 
greater than a set of attributes that can be imitated or surpassed. In particular, a company must 
consider its brand not just as a product or service, but as a symbol and even a personality,”
Bankrecht AG claims the ‘brand-as-personality’ perspective associates people, culture and 
values with the brand. The link reportedly strengthens the bank because the outcome is more 
resistant to imitation than product attributes. Bankrecht further claims a personality makes a 
brand more memorable and becomes a vehicle for expressing customer identity. However, 
the bank concedes the challenge o f brand consistency is.
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“By no means small when we consider the diversity present within the (Bankrecht) Group, There are 
various business groups, each with their own character, spread across six continents, dozens of 
languages -  and yet there is only one (Bankrecht).”
Bankrecht claims diversity is not an encumbrance since its culture takes the best from all 
divisions to create a corporate image. The bank argues that from innovation, client focus, 
global appreciation, client privacy or technological skills, every merger and acquisition 
contributes to a defining characteristic o f the Group. Thus, Bankrecht declares,
“We do not pretend to inject a uniform ... culture across all 70,000 staff. Not only would this be 
impossible, it would also negate the strength of national and business individuality, and that would be 
wrong. It is a strength that in Tokyo for example, our local culture will reflect national culture and this 
will be quite different from the culture we project, say, in Madrid or San Francisco. ...So, our approach 
to culture in (Bankrecht) is to accept and acknowledge that diversity is a strength.”
Thus, despite efforts of the “corporate centre” to control policy, in practice business units 
operate under localised organisational structures with enormous autonomy from the head 
offices. However, Bankrecht warns that diversity is not a licence for a free-for-all culture 
jungle. The bank promotes openness, intellectual honesty and ethical standards as core 
cultural values common to all divisions. Openness deals with acceptance o f new ideas and 
unfettered communication with stakeholders. Intellectual honesty focuses on a consistent tone 
of communication and respect for all views, including controversial ones. The ethical 
standards value rejects all forms o f discrimination. However, diversity is wobbly because the 
Swiss “corporate centre” frequently seeks to dictate organisational culture.
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Technology adoption process
Information Technology is a critical resource for all banking services and products. The IT 
division aims to operate, “a stable, secure, efficient and reliable IT infrastructure at 
competitive prices.” However, Bankrecht insists, “The aim is always to develop products, 
services and technology that align the interests o f the bank and all its client groups.” The IT 
division manages all applications throughout their life cycle on behalf o f the business 
divisions, which control the budgets. Despite claims that IT is a “core competency” 
Bankrecht underlines its support role by arguing that,
“Technology can help advisors to match their clients with appropriate products and services. Technology
supports but never supplants the client/advisor relationship.”
However, technology is important. For instance, in private banking a web-based interface 
allows client advisors to model and demonstrate portfolios and their risk characteristics 
online. Likewise, the US wealth management division operates a portal that allows clients to 
access full account information; monitor potential investment with portfolio software and 
receive stock quotations and news from Reuters. The Group also uses web-enabled 
proprietary platforms to help financial advisors track clients and markets through up to the 
minute access to research. In 1996, Bankrecht Investment (BI) launched a web-based instant 
messaging service, which links the bank and thousands o f its customers.
Changed role of IT division
Before the merger Bankrecht X ran a common desktop standard that disabled many user 
features across Switzerland. The bank designed the system entitled Abacus after a fiasco with 
a grand mainframe system in 1974. Abacus is a client-server architecture running on Unisys 
platforms. It gave Bankrecht X huge IT lead over its Swiss rivals who relied on IBM 
mainframes. However, since the applications resided on several servers, under Abacus the 
bank lost the single-sign-on feature leading to the proliferation o f passwords. This was the 
first justification o f PKI. In contrast to the harmony established by Abacus in Switzerland, the 
foreign divisions o f Bankrecht X operated locally implemented but globally incompatible 
systems. The bank attempted to end the anarchy with a middle-level system to coordinate its 
foreign exchange, equities, bonds, dérivâtes and precious metals divisions. However,
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Bankrecht X discarded the system in the face of stiff resistance from regional managers for 
Europe, North America, Asia and Japan. The regions virtually run banks within the bank and 
invidiously guarded their independence. Incompatibility was just a little annoyance until the 
late 1990s because Switzerland, which still produced 90% of the revenue, had centralised IT.
The same problems befell Abacus after the merger when the Swiss-IT division dominated by 
former Bankrecht X staff attempted to deploy the solution in global offices. However, the key 
difference this time was that foreign divisions, especially investment banking, generated a 
larger proportion o f the revenues. We focus on the power struggle between Switzerland and 
Bankrecht Investment (BI), a former Bankrecht Y division, in London. A support specialist 
reveals that the IT culture clash was inevitable because,
“Bankrecht X was much more standardised. ... But Bankrecht Y was different. All the branches in the 
regions had separate servers. And if you logged into one you could never connect to a server in the next 
building. ... Bankrecht X had one domain for the whole of Switzerland. So we had a lot of problems with 
applications after the merger because some could not be easily moved to a single domain. Users ended 
up having about three different logons depending on where they were.”
Even before the merger, the small Bankrecht X business in London rarely listened to their 
Swiss bosses. The merger worsened the situation because BI took over the profitable capital 
markets activities. This proud investment house rejected orders from Zurich because it 
managed the most profitable business. Apart from Abacus, the Bankrecht X IT team also 
initiated the PKI and smart cards project and spearheaded efforts to export it. However, since 
most senior management positions in the new bank went to Bankrecht Y executives, the 
Bankrecht X dominated Swiss-IT team lacked political support for their pet projects. The new 
bosses also demoted IT to a support role. According to the PKI project leader,
“The IT  infrastructure is no longer an independent division/entity, as in pre-merger Bankrecht X, but 
it is part of the business divisions. ... we have business divisions like Bankrecht Investment, Bankrecht 
Switzerland, a division in the US and IT is part of these organisations. But in Bankrecht X, IT was on the 
same level as these business divisions and had the same clout.”
Business divisions govern IT because they control money for technology projects and the IT 
team must obtain their authorisation to work. Since the divisions have different needs, the 
result is fragmented IT. Apart from network connectivity, which is a Group-wide service, 
divisions have ad hoc interactions. A PKI engineer at London-based BI reveals.
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“I am not aware of any common IT services. ... we don’t have an IT team within Bankrecht that tries 
to enforce common practices within the divisions. It would probably be a good thing but it isn’t there.
It would probably been cheaper if the finances were from above and resided there. At the moment, it is 
the business divisions that have the money to pay for IT projects so centralising the service will involve 
moving the money away from them. 1 have been in organisations before where they tried to remove the 
financial control of the people below and this wasn’t very easy.”
Indeed even Bankrecht Investment has four relatively autonomous IT support centres for the 
Americas, Europe, Asia-Pacific and Switzerland. The PKI engineer adds, “Switzerland is a 
division of its own so that tells you a lot!” The clash of cultures between the two banks 
started soon after the merger. To a support analyst,
“In the past you used to hear people saying, ‘oh, in my old bank this and that was a lot easier. A lot 
more efficient. A lot whatever.’ ... If anything wasn’t working this was always the reaction of people. 
These days 1 no longer hear people saying that ‘1 am from or 1 was in Bankrecht X or Y ’.”
The charged atmosphere forced Bankrecht AG to create autonomous business divisions. 
However, this arrangement has implications for services whose benefit derive from scale o f 
use such as PKI. It was in an attempt to reduce conflicts and confusion between divisions that 
Bankrecht decided to discontinue all subsidiary brands. The branding exercise code-named 
project ‘Orlando’ is already forcing divisions to work together.
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Security challenges of e-bankIng
We have seen that Bankrecht businesses widely use the internet in customer dealings. This is 
because e-commerce drastically reduces the cost of marketing, distributing and servicing 
financial products (Clemons and Hitt 2000). Bankrecht has deployed alternative services to 
satisfy customer demands for banking “at any time, in any place, by any device.” However, 
the special features o f the new channels have put pressure on the traditional security 
procedures. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
“These characteristics include the unprecedented speed of change related to technological and customer 
service innovation, the ubiquitous and global nature of open electronic networks, the integration of e- 
banking applications with legacy computer systems and the increasing dependence of banks on third 
parties that provide the necessary information technology (BIS 2001).”
BIS argues that while the internet does not inherently create new risks, its features amplify 
some o f the traditional banking issues notably strategic, operational, legal and reputational 
risks. Bankrecht’s expansion beyond Switzerland raised issues about the nature o f service 
provided and its security. For instance, diversification from the Swiss ‘universal banking’ 
model forced the bank to cede control to foreign divisions notably the brokerage houses in 
the US and the UK. Indeed, it was the demands o f the new business lines that forced 
Bankrecht X to supplement its global physical presence with on-line services. We should 
reiterate that Bankrecht X only opened its first foreign branch in London in 1967. It always 
attempted to instil Swiss culture in all its businesses. This profile sharply contrasts with the 
internationalist Bankrecht Y that opened a branch in London in 1898. The bank mirrored US 
financial houses and did not force its culture on acquisitions.
Therefore, the erosion o f the legal and regulatory certainty provided by Switzerland, the 
increased autonomy of global divisions and the demotion of the IT division to a support role 
amplified the difficulties o f implementing Group wide services. The biggest casualty o f the 
changes was the centralised PKI project. Next, we discuss the technical context; explore the 
security regime and assess the PKI institutionalisation discourse at Bankrecht.
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Bankrecht technical Context
The central Bankrecht applications rely on 15 Unisys ClearPath IX/2200 mainframe systems 
running Abacus and MAPPER. Abacus is an integrated banking application. After the merger 
Bankrecht moved the data and applications of the two banks onto the Abacus system. The 
migration was difficult because the banks used totally different technologies for instance, in 
account reconciliation. In total, Bankrecht runs over 3,000 servers, which include 1100 Sun 
Solaris Unix servers, 1100 Novell servers, 850 NT servers and 150 DEC VMS servers. Apart 
from the core mainframes and application servers, these systems largely serve Switzerland.
Actually, Bankrecht Switzerland (BS) still operates a relatively centralised IT ftmction. The 
division is composed o f two main development teams focusing on banking applications. The 
Operations team runs all systems on behalf o f business divisions. BS also has Support teams 
one for users and the other covering aspects such as training and client engineering. The 
client engineering team focuses on the desktop and signs off any application integrated into 
the client machines. BS runs the so-called “global IntraLAN” that supports Windows NT 4.0 
computers. The Switzerland division has enhanced the NT platform with many components 
and applications. According to a Vice President,
“We have a highly standardised end-user platform and that is rather rigidly enforced. At the end user 
platform -  40,000 PCs -  equalling to 40,000 users they are as much as possible totally the same. 
Moreover, although users occasionally change the software on their PC, 95% of all users will have a 
completely and totally similar PC. ... on that type of end user platform  it is not very difficult to 
have a standardised, centralised certifîcate management in place.”
The bank named this rigidly defined Windows NT client. End User Platform Domestic 
(EUPD). Like Oilcom, users cannot install any software on the PC or modify its settings. 
EUPD users may install software if the PC resides in a relaxed resource domain. This is 
Resource Domain 3. This covers less than 5% o f the bank. BS also has 1,000 Sun Solaris 
Unix workstations. However, standardisation does not extend beyond Switzerland because 
according to the VP, “We are not in a position to completely keep all PCs alike.”
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Bankrecht PKI efforts
We previously saw that by 1901, the Swiss banking circles had transformed secrecy into a 
potent tool for international competition. In 1934, the Swiss Federal authorities introduced a 
law that, for the first time, made secrecy violation a criminal offence. The result of the desire 
to maintain competitive advantage and avoid criminal litigation is that Switzerland is a 
leading developer o f information security products especially cryptography. For example, the 
country is home to the IBM Zurich Research Laboratory with many cryptographic 
innovations to its name. IBM credits its Zurich researchers with the invention o f the first 
practical and provably secure public key encryption scheme and crypto tools that power all its 
Java-based products. Zurich also worked on Secure Electronic Transaction (SET), reputedly 
the most secure credit-card payment protocol available on the internet.
The excellent International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) was also developed at Eth in 
Zurich. Bankrecht includes IDEA, a 128-bit block cipher, in its solution. Switzerland is also a 
player in quantum cryptography research. In 1995, the University o f Geneva implemented 
quantum cryptography in a 23-kilometre fibre optic fi*om Geneva to Nyon (Singh 1999). 
Bankrecht is reportedly the “biggest software house” in Switzerland because it employs over 
3,400 IT professionals. PKI research started in 1992. A PKI engineer on the original team 
believes this work was revolutionary because,
“By 1997 PKI was not even widely written ab o u t.... most companies did not even know what this was.
I was asked to give presentations on what PKI is. Today do see anyone giving presentations on what PKI 
is? No. Why? Because the fad has died. ... The reason is that they are realising the cost of deploying 
PKI. The PKI itself is not expensive. It is getting all your applications to work with it. Literally, the cost 
is not the cash. It is the amount of time necessary to make it work.”
The bulk o f the original PKI team eventually left Bankrecht. In 1997, the team became a 
100% subsidiary o f Bankrecht that offered IT security products to the Group and other 
companies. The subsidiary developed the Bankrecht PKI architecture. However, in 1999 
Bankrecht sold the division and it is now a major provider of certificate and smart card based 
security software products in Switzerland, Germany and Austria.
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PKÊ business requirements
PKI was part o f a general drive to provide a cost effective, flexible and responsive IT service 
to support changing business requirements. The need for different security protocols was in 
reaction to mergers and acquisitions abroad that exposed the bank to regulatory and other 
risks. However, the immediate justification for PKI was the desire to arrest the proliferation 
o f passwords that were both causing disenchantment and reducing security. The bank also 
believed passwords were reducing productivity and increasing help desk support costs. We 
saw that passwords became widespread at Bankrecht X with the implementation o f Abacus, 
the integrated client-server based system. The Vice President argues that while it was not 
clear at the time, the mainframe architecture provided Single Sign On (SSO). He adds,
“In the client server paradigm whenever you moved onto a different server and application resources you 
had to sign on again. Thus, we had a tremendous increase of user IDs and passwords. All of a sudden, 
a user did not have two or three of passwords; they had 15 or 20 of them. Besides, we did not see 
anything that would stop the developers from creating more client server applications.”
We saw that after the merger Bankrecht X moved the applications and data of its partner from 
IBM mainframes onto Abacus, Bankrecht AG ended up with 120 heavily used applications. 
The disempowered IT team came under pressure to avoid the nightmare situation where 
senior users kept passwords for over 30 applications in a working day. To a PKI engineer a 
casual survey o f office desks showed that users survived the password nightmare by writing 
them on post-it notes. Of course, this was bad security practice. Bankrecht resolved to re­
create SSO without resorting to mainframes first by using scripting solutions. However, the 
Vice President reveals the bank abandoned scripting because,
“The solutions were extremely unstable and required extreme administration efforts from the side of the 
IT to keep them alive. Little things like a vendor changing fields on a sign on mask would make the
whole script topple over and not work any more We concluded in 1992-1993 that we would use a
combination of X.509 certificates plus sm art cards.”
A four-man team initiated the PKI project at Bankrecht X. The group included a senior 
manager in-charge of IT Operations and systems development, our respondent who is now 
Vice President, a middle manager and a PKI engineer. After restructuring, a team in charge of 
server platforms added six members to the core PKI group. Server platforms covered 
mainframes, Unix servers and other new platforms. The server team was a vital addition to 
the PKI effort because it developed middleware that controlled all IT applications. The joint 
team took key decisions such as the selection o f a smart card infrastructure-based on a
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Siemens card. The VP concedes decision-making was easy in this small team. However, the 
PKI effort ran into trouble after the merger, especially abroad.
Bankrecht PKI components
The PKI uses a combination of X.509 certificates and smart cards with the private key never 
leaving the card. According to an original PKI engineer on the project,
“With the PKI our goal was that all communication should be encrypted ...But how do we guarantee that 
kind of purity, safety and sanctity of the information? We are a networked global organisation that means 
that you can see our data all over the world. ... The law here (Switzerland) is that you must be physically 
in the country to access the data. PKI gives us a way of ensuring that the information is not revealed 
easily.”
The implementation of the PKI began in earnest in early 1997. This was five years after the 
research on the PKI began in Bankrecht X. We discuss the reasons for this delay later in this 
chapter. The solution offers secure Single Sign On (SSO); remote access and communication 
for file transfer. It also supports secure electronic messaging between servers, key generation 
and management and certificate-based logon with smart cryptocards. The security framework 
includes security base services; a distributed smart cryptocard and PKI and operational 
guidelines incorporating bank-wide security policies and procedures. Below is its illustration.
Secured ApplicationsI I ITP
Operational GUcfellnos
Smart Cryptocard and PKI Infrastructure
Security Base Services
Figure 19 -  Bankrecht security solution architecture (iT SEC 2000)
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Security Base Services
This is the foundational layer of the solution. It incorporates cryptographic technologies, open 
standards and interfaces. The cryptographic technologies include Swiss developed 
symmetrical IDEA (128-bit), DES (56-bit) and asymmetrical RSA (512-, 1024-bit) 
cryptographic algorithms. Also included is Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) for browsers, 
S/MIME and PGP for e-mail. Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) for directory 
access (Chadwick 2002, Wahl 1997) and OCSP for certificate validation services. We discuss 
the directory later.
The Vice President reveals that the PKI components on the end user PC include a card reader, 
the card driver and interfaces such as PKCS#11 and Generic Security Services Application 
Program Interface (GSS-API). The cryptocard reader attaches to workstations via serial ports. 
The bank uses PC card based readers for laptops. Public Key Cryptography Standards 
(PKCS#11) specify an API entitled ‘Cryptoki’ to devices performing cryptographic 
functions. The layer also incorporates the X.509v3 specification for certificates. Bankrecht is 
considering replacing PKCS#11 token interfaces with the Microsoft Crypto API/Service 
Provider interface used at Oilcom. It also wants to replace the expensive PC/SC cryptocard 
reader interface with OpenCard.
GSS-API provides system-to-system security capabilities in heterogeneous environments. 
GSS-API defines an interface for the implementation o f strong cryptographic authentication 
and other security services independent o f underlying mechanisms. The security services 
available through GSS-API are compatible with a range o f mechanisms based on secret-key 
and public-key cryptographic technologies (Linn 1997). At Bankrecht, GSS-API 
authenticates servers and, if  required, provides encryption for services such as FTP.
PKI and Smart cryptocard infrastructure
Above “Security Base Services” is the Entrust Intelligent Client. The Entrust PKI is part of 
the second layer, which also includes the Smart Card Infrastructure (SCI). According to the 
Vice President, Bankrecht selected Entrust because it was an off-the-shelf, market proven
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component from an independent vendor. This was because Bankrecht had resolved to adopt 
open standards and protocols such as TCP/EP, wherever possible. Entrust is popular because 
independent software vendors offer ‘Entrust-ready applications.’ However, the choice was 
controversial. Bankrecht originally ran a home grown CA but a constituency strongly argued 
for UniCERT, a CA by Baltimore, an Irish company. According to the Vice President,
“W e thought o f  using B altim ore’s CA because the CA is not from  the U nited  States and m ay  be a little b it 
less infam ous for being fed w ith  T ro jan  horses from  som e A m erican agency. W e had a cam p that was 
m uch in favour o f  B altim ore. B ut in the end, we used E ntrust because B ankrech t Investm ent -  the other 
d ivision -  big division to ld  us that ‘if  you go w ith E ntrust we w ould presum ab ly  board  your so lu tion ’.”
We discuss this decision further beeause it has been a major souree o f diseord between 
Switzerland and BI. The second layer has two eomponents. To iT SEC, the PKI interfaee 
handles “trust” while the SCI deals with “confidentiality” as illustrated below.
PKI
CA
1
SCI
CIS
# 1
Figure 20 -  A combined SCI-PKI at Bankrecht (iT SEC)
The Smart Card Infrastrueture (SCI) is an add-on that manages eertificates and private keys 
on the cryptocard for users. Aecording to a support specialist, the SCI was critical because.
“Y ou need to help people if  their certificate or private key gets destroyed or w hen  they  lose or forget the 
passphrase that opens up the private key that belongs to the public key and the certificate. . . .  you had to
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automatically renew a certificate upon expiration. You have to withdraw the certificate when somebody 
leaves the enterprise without the end user even knowing anything about it.”
The bank’s engineering division customised an iT SEC system to create the SCI. To the VP 
the modification increased user convenience and helped PKI adoption. He argues,
“Most PKIs require end user intervention. We decided very early on that this is going to kill the 
project, if you need too much end user intervention. ... Many products that support certificate-based 
sign on have their own proprietary certificate storage. So you have application proprietary certificate 
storage and end up with ten certificates, ten private keys and ten passphrases to open up those private 
keys. So again, the area of SSO is not there. So we agreed on application independent certificate storage 
on smart card accessed through standard APIs like PKCS #11.”
According to iT SEC, the key components of the combined infi-astmcture are an Entrust CA 
server, a Smart Card Information Server (CIS) and a key generator and repository for both the 
SCI and PKI environments. Other elements are decentralised Registration Authorities (RAs) 
that request and issue cryptocards. The framework also includes ‘security officer level’ 
Assistants (A’s) who resolve card problems locally or remotely. The CIS server is vital to 
SCI operations because it is the centralised infi*astructure for smart card creation. The CIS 
takes requests for card creation and certificate signing from the RA and ships them to the 
Entrust CA. If satisfied with the request, the CA signs the certificate and publishes it onto an 
LDAP server. The signed certificate returns to the CIS for onward storage into a local 
directory that keeps all end user data like encryption certificates and private keys. According 
to the Vice President,
“We do not keep the authentication certificate private keys because we create the smart card with two 
certificates -  encryption and authentication certificates. We keep the private key of the encryption 
certificate to create a clone at any point in time. For instance, if you use your encryption certificate for 
e-mail and you lose your card, you need a new certificate and smartcard to read your mail. It has to be 
the same encryption private key as the lost one. So you have got to be able to do key recovery in an 
enterprise unless you sacrifice all your e-mail, which you won’t do.”
Although Bankrecht actually runs the Entrust CA and CIS on the same server, these are 
normally separate for security reasons. The CIS keeps an audit trail as it communicates with 
the CA over the status o f keys and certificates on behalf of RAs, Assistants and users. The 
RA coordinates with the CIS server to produce the smart cards physically. Bankrecht uses 
standard end user workstations for RAs as well as local and remote Assistants. The RA also 
incorporates a card printer or coder personalisation device.
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Smart cryptocards
Smart cards are central to the PKI and mandatory desktop at Oilcom. Similarly, smart 
cryptocards are vital at Bankrecht Switzerland. According to iT SEC,
“Anchoring the security framework and the various security applications it supports is the use of ‘smart 
cryptocards’ with associated PIN numbers. Each cryptocard can contain and process various encrypted 
items, for example application log-on passwords. As a result, it is no longer necessary for a user to 
remember multiple passwords, merely a single PIN number,”
The security infrastructure provides mechanisms for retrieving the appropriate password from 
a cryptocard and passes it to the application. The card also allows users to identify themselves 
and use any workstation at Bankrecht Switzerland. The card supports strong authentication 
with certificates and private keys. To a London-based security analyst,
“We have rolled out something of a PKI in Switzerland, but our other divisions are much more reluctant 
to start. ... Users authenticate themselves to the card once, and then they have full access to everything 
they are authorised for. We have full time file encryption, too. The rest of the world has to catch up. ... 
Although we do not have a true Single Sign On, the user experiences it as if they were part of such 
a system. Users must insert their smart card and authenticate to it before they can use NT. The logins to 
NT, email, and the file encryption subsystem are actually password based, but login is scripted through a 
routine in the smart card.”
To the Director IT Security, apart from the two certificates, the card stores about twenty four 
passwords. At logon, the system shows the name and identifier o f the application and 
password and PEN fields. The cards authenticate in three ways. The first type uses a ‘scripting 
engine’ that automatically enters, or changes user IDs and passwords upon request. Scripts 
control this login and require no change to applications like Microsoft Outlook that use it. 
The second type involves ‘drag and drop’ facilities that enable the retrieval of passwords 
fi*om a file on the cryptocard. Users simply select the application name and drop it onto the 
password request field. The third approach involves an Application Program Interface (API) 
providing access to passwords stored on the card. Most banking applications authenticate 
with scripts. Next is a screenshot o f one respondent logging on with a scripting engine.
181
£ile £ d it E i f c c tc y  O p tio n ; y ie w  i^ in d o w  t le lp
v ig  g  T oday  > » B
Monday 22
8:30
9:30
10:00
10:30
11:00
11:30
12:30
14:30
15:00
15:30
16:00
Tuesday 23 W ednesday 24
Hf
(F»jr)6
.Û0-18m m
%  In terv iew  ( y )  
(B u ro .. .
Interview: (y )
B e sp re c h u n g  CbU (B A M S(?)) 
10:00-11:00
%  In terv iew  0  
P K k P * r # # # ( B ù r a
BIN Pas;sso(l« Zeilifikale hilfe
BeSecureMobile
# #  CATS*
CORPTIME
# 0  cBanking Charlotte - ID
# 0  cBanking Charlotte - PIN
# 0  cBanking JUrg - ID
# 0  Entrust ID
j ( 0  Entrust PWd
# 0  CMX
# 0  ISO TC 68 /SC 2
# # IT IS
« 0 J T C 1
# 0  KeyStore FE420
41  ^ NISPLUS
NT:SWISS-DD
# #  NT:waib1c4j
# 0  OUTLOOK:
# 0  OUTLOOK:SH-NARP
j ^ 0  Quallflyer
# 0  Smartcard Forum CH
4 ^ 0  Symferix Webshop
3^  A bgabe te rm ln  W bB e (H ardtt
For H elp, p te s s  FI 1.2 3  J d .  2 0 0 2 W52
Figure 21 -  Example of automated password entry to a calendar application
The Director adds, “All these passwords are protected on the card, yeah it is not very top 
protection, but you cannot just read them off like that.” According to iT SEC, the security 
relies on the personal cryptocard concept where each card contains a ‘crypto-processor’ that 
physically protects secret elements, even during cryptographic operations.
However, logging onto applications for the first time is slow. For instance, to get the 
screenshot above, we waited for about ten minutes for the computer to download the profile. 
The Director admitted this occurs when a workstation downloads a user’s profile for the first 
time. While the speed improves after the initial logon, he reveals the system is slow for 
offices far away from Zurich. The Head of the Smart Card Infrastructure argues.
“The current authentication  procedure w orks. However, it is primitive. For exam ple, w hen I fetch the 
passw ord from  the card m anagem ent system  and drop it into N otepad, you can read  it in plaintext! T hat 
is not good security  really .”
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While the cryptocard contains authentication and encrypting certificates, the SCI director 
reveals that only laptop users are required to encrypt their connections and data.
Smart Cryptocard issues
The Associate Director IT Security/PKI Project Leader reveals that despite issuing 35,000 
cards to employees in Switzerland, for a long time, only 25% were in use. IT SEC blames 
the low uptake on “implementation issues.” The company argues that although Switzerland is 
a small country, Bankrecht divisions exist in regions with different dominant languages, 
namely German, French and Italian. IT SEC reveals that the big regional cultural differences 
demanded the provision o f documentation, learning programs and help desk support in the 
three major languages and English. We return to these issues in Chapter 7. The PKI Project 
Leader also identifies resistance within the IT division. He states,
“In principle everybody said it was the right thing to do. However, it was quite difficult for exan^le, to get 
the developers on-board. They like to do things their way and link from one computer to the other and 
were not sure of the benefit of PKI for them. The same happened with the Support team. The new 
system gave them more work so they were not happy. It was quite difficult to get the benefits to the end 
users because those two teams need to be involved. This took a long time to change.”
Indeed, iT SEC reveals problems with attempts to align the project with the organisational 
structure and implementation practices. The firm says that even pilot projects, “required 
careful planning and sensitivity to different requirements and priorities in different sections of 
the bank.” To the PKI Project Leader the ‘sensitivities’ became clearer after the merger 
because o f the move to a divisional structure. He originally worked for the IT Operations 
division o f Bankrecht X. The hierarchical PKIX model was acceptable to this bank because 
of its centralised IT structure in Switzerland. The Vice President reveals,
“When we started with the sm art cards, it was very centralised but in the process of trying to 
deploy it became completely decentralised. Today the Bank is divisionalised. We have divisions and 
the divisions are completely on their own. There is no one in the Bank who can give orders that they 
want this done. So we have no way of ordering anything in the IT area to any of the other divisions. They
are autonomous and they do what they want  In Switzerland there is a certain amount of
centralisation, but other divisions are on their own.”
As we see later, Switzerland failed to extend the PKI solution abroad because they lacked 
power over the autonomous divisions. The Director Security also believes the IT division 
could not rely on top management support because, “there is a big distance between the very 
important decision makers and those who really do the job.” He argues that because the
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managers do not really understand what is behind the IT solution, the PKI could only survive 
i f  seen as serving the banking activities. Likewise, the Vice President reveals that because 
management thought in banking terms they asked the PKI team to develop a ‘killer 
application’ to encourage cryptocard use. However, the team failed to identify the use 
because the most vital banking applications did not support certificate-based logon at the 
time. In 1997, the team ‘reinvented’ the PKI as a tool for improving user convenience by 
removing the need for passwords. The Vice President states,
“Everyone was too cautious and said ‘hey, we want to make money’ and people are supposed to do their 
work. Could we then tell them “hey, you are not using your smart card .... Tomorrow you will be forced 
to use it?”  They won’t allow us to do that. They would simply refuse to use the new application. ... So 
we had no means to make one application that is important to the bank mandatory to use with a smart 
card. The only way was to make it convenient. Make it more convenient that not using it and take care 
of all the situations that can cause trouble like ‘I ’ve forgotten my smart card. I’ve forgotten my PIN, and 
I’ve lost the card.’ That is it.”
Convenience became such a critical objective because the bank failed to create stmctures to 
support the PKI in the face o f user resistance. Unlike Oilcom, Bankrecht uses different cards 
for physical and logical access. The Director IT Security admits, “It is not smart keeping the 
cards separate. However, this card issue generates endless debate.” He sees the cost of 
designing a custom Bankrecht card and card readers as restrictive. Tellingly, he sees the 
biggest obstacle to a single access card as the “diverging goals today.”
Cryptocard usage in Switzerland received a big boost following the restmcturing o f IT 
support. According to the PKI Project Leader, the steps included the rollout o f a new 
standardised NT desktop and the centralisation o f IT support. The desktop team moved from 
general support to IT Consulting. About 150 o f the new consultants embarked on an 
extensive effort to explain cryptocard usage. After this effort, card usage increased from 25% 
to 87%. The Director IT Security admits the increased uptake was a relief because rivals 
found it amusing that few employees used the cards. Usage became even more impressive 
from early 2001 after the bank attached internet access to the cards. To the Vice President,
“Cards are now used by 97% of all the users in Switzerland completely ‘voluntarily’. Not quite. No, no, 
it is completely voluntarily. But there is one thing that we made mandatory. ... If they want to use the 
Bank to access the internet, they need a smart card.”
By making certificate-based internet surfing mandatory the bank forced developers to use the 
cryptocards. By the time o f our research, only 2.5% of employees in Switzerland did not use
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their cards. The Vice President claims, “I don’t care because 2.5% is nothing.” Having 
conquered Switzerland, could the IT team convince other divisions to accept a centralised 
PKI solution as originally planned? We focus on efforts to deploy the solution at Bankrecht 
Investment, the London-based investment banking and securities division.
PKI at Bankrecht Investment (BI)
We saw that despite strong support for UniCERT, Bankrecht Switzerland (BS) replaced its 
‘home grown’ Certification Authority (CA) with Entrust because BI promised to adopt the 
integrated solution. Curiously, BI bought the Entrust CA that BS adopted. According to the 
Vice President, BI spent $0.5 million to purchase Entrust licenses for all its employees. The 
deal covered a CA and an Entrust Intelligent Client on each computer. BI later rolled out 
certificates and Entrust-ready applications. However, the Vice President claims,
“After having spent the money they discovered that ‘hey spending the money is not having done it. ’ So 
you have got work to do! And then they didn’t do it. They could not achieve it. So the money was a 
total waste. A total waste! And they have nothing.”
It was after this fiasco that BI convinced BS to integrate the Entrust CA into the SCI-PKI 
solution. However, after the integration BI rejected the solution and instead opted for a 
Microsoft CA. Since we extensively discussed Microsoft PKI under the Oilcom case, we only 
focus on the PKI services deployed at BI, not the infrastructure itself. We interviewed the 
PKI Engineer responsible for the BI proposal in August 2002. He argues,
“The general IT direction we are taking is one of use of out-of-box solutions. Bear in mind that we have 
a worldwide license for Microsoft products. With PKI, the out-of-box Microsoft solution is not that 
expensive and it is fairly easy to implement. Alright, it is not the greatest product in the world but it 
is a product that introduces Microsoft to the m arket and we believe subsequent versions are going to 
be much better. It is a foundation I would say for what we could do in future.”
PKI primarily encrypts data on laptops and file servers. The engineer argues that despite the 
availability o f standalone encryption solutions, PKI offers better manageability. It also offers 
scalability for the deployment o f solutions such as secure e-mail signing and encryption and, 
in the future, smart card logon, digital rights management and services. The division also 
does code signing to ensure the integrity o f its environment. BI hopes to use PKI for 
workflow controls like certificate-based software issuance. However, the engineer admits that 
due to the weakness o f the business case, the BI team opted to start with Encrypting File
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System (EPS) that is free with Windows 2000 and XP (Professional and Server). He believes 
the EPS product is easy to deploy and manage. The EPS feature in XP look as follows.
Advanced Attributes
C hoose th e  options you want for this f i l e , ^
^  Archive and Index attributes  ^ ..C
'  U N e isjead  ^ Q
^  0  For fa st  searchingTallow Indexing Service to  index this file
^""com press or Encrypt attributes 
 ^ Q  Compress con ten ts to  sa v e  disk space  
0  Encrypt con ten ts to  secure data Details
Cancel
Figure 22 -  Encryption attributes (Microsoft 2001).
The engineer stresses that Microsoft PKI improves security at little additional expense. 
Indeed, cost is a source of contention. BI believes it can operate a Microsoft CA at £4 a year 
per user using a better support model. Although Switzerland is proud of its experience of 
running an Entrust CA, the managers concede that the cost of £200 a year per user is 
restrictive. To the Director Security the cost covers certificates, tokens and Entrust support. 
He admits a lower cost could convince other divisions to adopt the Swiss PKI. However, the 
Vice President believes BI would have implemented the Swiss solution.
“B ecause we know  how  to use it, we have deployed it but that would have meant that they would 
have to live with an application that they did not invent. Everybody has that. I am not blaming 
them because we all have the same Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome. .. .  T herefore, they rejected  
it. The thing that w orks they  w ill not use because they did not invent it. It is not theirs. The thing that 
they could  use does not w ork. ...an d  w hat they  hope is that m aybe in five years from  now  M icrosoft w ill 
have a CA  and a PK I and a w orking solution  not only a toolkit. T oday  M icrosoft has m ay have a PK I and 
m aybe has a CA  but it does not have a w orking solution that scales w ell.”
Bankrecht Investment (BI) predictably dismissed the BS assertion. The engineer contends BI 
selected Microsoft PKI because of its superior technical and financial proposition. He claims 
London conducted a broader PKI requirements analysis than Switzerland. The engineer 
insists that EPS is apposite for the primary BI requirements of end-to-end security and data 
encryption. He further sees the major drawback of the Swiss PKI solution as its reliance on
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cryptocards. He argues that smart card logon at BI “is only on the wish list here” because o f  
the cost o f rolling out the cards and readers. Besides, he reveals,
“We are not really required by the project to connect with everybody else in the Group. That is not 
required. We are just Bankrecht Investment. Of course, we would want to have a solution in place, which 
allows the Group to function as a Group. However, we are in a tricky position in that we do not have the 
business driver, remit or financial resources to roll out a Group-wide solution.”
However, the Vice President insists Microsoft PKI is not scalable to over 10,000 users. The 
PKI Project Leader agrees. He argues Microsoft PKI is problematic because it issues 
application specific certificates that may become too numerous. Because Microsoft PKI 
issues certificates for different purposes a login certificate is for example different from an 
EPS certificate. He claims that despite auto-enrolment features, Microsoft certificate life 
cycle management demands more intervention than Entrust, which he sees as “click and 
control.” A founding PKI engineer in Switzerland also dismisses the cost and technical 
claims and blames the conflict with BI on politics. He states,
“London has killed Group wide PKI because of political reasons. ... BI has rejected our Entrust 
certificates and claims they will use Kerberos instead for Single Sign On, which just makes me laugh. 
That guy in London making decisions does not really appreciate that some of us had to keep awake until 
4am to make the infrastructure work. They are putting our efforts to waste because of politics. I hear 
London has published internal papers declaring our Entrust PKI useless. If they already know the 
problems why don’t they share them and help us to avoid them in the future?”
London-based BI insists its choice o f PKI was sound because they are increasingly using 
Microsoft infrastructural and productivity products. Despite not having a mandatory desktop, 
the division has upgraded its workstations from Windows NT 4.0 and 2000 to Windows XP. 
The engineer also questions the technical efficacy o f the Swiss PKI solution. He states,
“The Swiss solution does not actually use the smart card for authentication. They use the card as a 
password repository. ...in my experience, it is very difficult to enable smart card logon if you don’t have
Microsoft PKI Using the sm art card as a password repository is one thing. It is easy. ...
However, having the Microsoft authentication process and Domain Controllers work with non-Microsoft 
certificates is something else. ... I don’t think Microsoft officially supports it.”
A Bankrecht security analyst in London believes that unlike BI, the Swiss are under more 
regulatory pressure to implement PKI. However, he believes some personalities have 
overplayed the differences to achieve political objectives. He states.
“Due to their Banking regulations the Swiss have to proceed very, very carefully than we do in terms of 
the requirements for data protection. Their environment affects the type of technology they adopt and its
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shape. It affects you every time you think about the design of anything at all. ... That is where I think 
you need to keep a level head but it is so easy to develop a siege mentality. In my view, political 
considerations should be left out of technology decision making. There are issues, which are maybe risks, 
there are manageable risks but can be over-emphasised to achieve political objectives.”
Enterprise Active Directory
The Bankrecht SCI-PKI infrastructure supports LDAP directory access and OCSP (Online 
Certificate Status Protocol) for certificate validation services. Bankrecht uses the directory to 
keep copies o f encryption certificate private keys that support key recovery. BI uses Active 
Directory (AD) to issue certificates automatically. The division believes AD eradicates costly 
operational processes since a person receives a certificate with an e-mail account. However, 
Bankrecht lacks an enterprise directory. The BI engineer argues,
“The key benefit of our internal PKI is that we can leverage the Microsoft Active Directory. We only 
issue user and machines certificates. But we lack a Group wide Active Directory. It was planned but 
for various political and security reasons we have to divisionalise the directory. One of the big 
problems that we come across is that to issue certificates from one division to another in different 
directories you lose a great deal of that automation. And all of a sudden we have an increase in support 
requirements and operational processes yet we want to reduce costs.”
BI argues that since Switzerland designed the directory and its support model alone there are 
inevitable administrative strains on a global scene. Different support scenarios are vital 
because o f the global nature o f Bankrecht operations and the cultural differences in the 
divisions. We saw that cultural differences exist even within Switzerland. Inevitably, the 
differences are sharper across countries. A London-based security analyst claims,
“It is very difficult stereotyping an entire nation, but 1 think the Swiss have a different mentality to 
may be the English or the Americans. ... That is my observation and it is probably unfair. ... However, if 
you are a Risk Analyst and then you had a British hat on you might tend to take a pragmatic view 
whereas may be the Swiss would have to be satisfied 100%. In reality, you cannot operate a shared 
network service if you cannot take decisions accordingly. If  we adopt a policy where we accept zero 
risk then we cannot deploy a shared service and we end up becoming a defence organisation, which 
we are not. We are a bank trying to make money.”
Active Directory is problematic because it assumes a hierarchical IT structure with one 
division to enforce standards. Bankrecht lacks this function. AD presumes distinct user 
groups. However, a founding PKI engineer argues that Bankrecht has numerous intersections 
of geographical and functional roles. He states.
“Bankrecht has six, seven, eight, nine subdivisions? I do not know how many! You see where my 
problem begins? There are official and non-official subdivisions. How do you classify those? 
Because what a PKI can allow you to do is by creating groups, you can make people have access only to
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certain data. If you say everyone is a Bankrecht enq>loyee then you do not have that finer granularity that 
the application offers to have more inbuilt security.”
Indeed, because the bank is still integrating newly acquired business in the US and even 
Switzerland itself, it will take some time to get clearly defined groups. The difficulty o f  
establishing distinct categories afflicts most role-based access control systems. The absence 
of a central IT function has created interoperability problems because Bankrecht divisions 
have, for legal, technical and political reasons, implemented either diverse technologies or the 
same technologies differently. For instance, the BI engineer argues that while services like 
secure e-mail thrive on a single PKI they are too expensive to deploy and support due to the 
different platforms. Ironically, he sees the biggest impediment to the “one firm” dream as the 
failure to create a Group wide directory. He warns,
“One of the key things that I think is gonna affect the ability of Bankrecht to function as a Group is 
the failure to deploy Group wide Active Directory. Over the future that will be significant. This was 
because of AD technical issues and political issues. What do I mean by political issues? Well, a single 
directory implies, to a degree, a single body of administration. I know there are delegation 
capabilities within the product but there is only so far you can go with that. There are certain areas where 
you want to achieve consistency and that is the goal of a single directory across the Group. But there are 
different requirements across the Group...”
The absence o f an enterprise directory also accentuated the proliferation o f PKI islands. At 
the end of this stage, BI easily won the cost argument because its PKI was obviously cheaper. 
However, Switzerland insisted they had wider experience and saw the Microsoft CA as a 
mere toolkit. These disagreements formed the basis for the next phase o f the PKI solution.
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Branding: Whose domain Is It?
In April 2003, we e-mailed the Director IT Security to know whether Bankrecht AG had 
resolved the conflicts about the PKI management structure. The Director revealed,
“Yes, the decisions you are referring to have been taken. However, this has led our management to 
realise that there may be potential conflicts or at least confusion if we don't coordinate PKI
activities at group level BI has decided it will install and run its own hierarchy of CAs, based on
Microsoft’s offerings (mainly for financial reasons, but they are probably not unhappy about the fact 
that this enables BI to remain independent of Bankrecht Switzerland as regards PKI). BI has set up 
a "general purpose" root CA that will then certify the individual CAs issuing end user certificates for 
particular purposes, the first being EPS (secure e-mail is not actively pushed by BI).”
Running fully independent divisional PKIs seemingly killed the vision o f a centralised system 
based on the Bankrecht X solution. However, an innocuous branding announcement on 12^ *’ 
November 2002 resuscitated the idea. We call this the second phase. The decision led to the 
abolition o f all subsidiary brands in June 2003. Bankrecht claimed simpler branding reflects 
the ‘integrated business model’ and the ‘one firm’ approach. The main casualties were 
Bankrecht Investment and a US-based Wealth Management division that both lost illustrious 
non-Bankrecht monikers. However, centralised PKI benefited greatly. The Director IT 
Security reveals that after the decision to run divisional PKIs,
“People in BI decided to put just "Bankrecht AG" as company name in their root CA and CA certificates. 
This has raised the attention of our branding people and management in that they realised that PKI 
naming could not be done randomly by individuals setting up a CA. Thus, we are now trying to set up a 
coordinating body that will eventually govern not only PKI naming on group level, but also the definition 
of CA policies and the like.”
Switzerland-based Wealth Management & Business Banking (WM&BB) announced the 
‘coordination’ drive on 17 March 2003. The details are in a document entitled, “Request for 
proposal for centralised ‘Bankrecht’ Group-wide SSL certificate management for internet- 
facing websites.” WM&BB annoimced that all internet-facing websites in the Group were to 
reflect the new brand and move to the bank’s main domain by 9^  ^ June 2003. The Head 
WM&BB IT Operations, Security and Contingency argues.
“From a legal perspective only the owner of the domain name is entitled to order certificates or 
assign this task to a third party. This requirement favours centralised management. ... The
operation of the server would remain with the individual divisions, our responsibility would concentrate 
on the management of the certificates. ”
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The rebranding activities were coordinated under a project named Orlando. The project 
started at a workshop on 12-14 March 2003 that resolved to have centralised management of 
SSL server certificates at internet-facing websites. The import o f the decision would be to 
bring divisional PKI under centralised control. Orlando is a cross-Group IT team with 
members from all business divisions. As we saw, the actions Bankrecht Investment and its 
contractor Perot Systems on a new root CA on 6^  ^February 2003 actually spurred Orlando. 
BI attempted to make their PKI general-purpose to make it useful for other purposes by other 
projects and/or divisions. However, the “Bankrecht AG” name for the root CA did not reflect 
the single-brand strategy. Responding to the Orlando proposal, a WM&BB manager argues,
“The question of having multiple root CAs with the Bankrecht Group is certainly something which needs 
central coordination and approval by the relevant authorities. It sounds like the ‘coordination meeting 
legal/security/web communications’ that you mention would be the ideal place to start.”
Interestingly, WM&BB appointed senior BI managers to Orlando coordination positions. For 
instance, the manager who facilitated the first Orlando workshop is in-charge o f renaming 
domain names, servers and certificates that BI obtained fi*om VeriSign and Thawte to meet 
rebranding requirements. Another BI manager deals with vendor relationships. The project 
team also included technical contacts for web applications and certificate management 
contacts within the business divisions. However, the Orlando workshop appointed 
WM&BB’s IT Operations & Contingency team as the lead support division for the 
Centralised Certificate Management (CCM) scheme. This is a powerful position because the 
activities include vendor (CA) contact, initial ordering, receipt o f issued certificate and 
forwarding them to website owners, renewal and revocation.
The Orlando Project set mid-May as the deadline for the completion o f the CCM scheme. 
This required the issuance o f new SSL server certificates signed by a commercial CA for 
about 100 websites across the bank. The project agreed that the ‘vendor management’ team 
arranges a Group-wide pricing agreement for certificates with one or two vendors. Orlando 
suggested a phased expiry o f over 100 certificates to avoid their simultaneous expiry in 
May/June 2004 or 2005. However, the divisions were to manage certificates not associated 
with the Bankrecht official domain until revocation. We previously saw that BI rejected the 
Swiss PKI solution because o f concerns over support structures. Orlando incorporated the 
requirement for 24-hour support in the CCM. However, WM&BB expressed concern about 
this provision because they lacked the funding for the estimated additional 900 person hours
191
per year. Bankrecht Investment (BI) also continued its effort to convince top management 
that it has a cheaper and more flexible infrastructure than the CCM scheme. Despite these 
hurdles only six months after the re-branding directive, and two months after the launch o f  
Orlando project, Bankrecht was on the road to a Group-wide PKI. This is a big feat because 
the Group had, since 1992, tried but failed to establish such an infrastructure.
Chapter summary
This chapter presents PKI institutionalisation efforts at Bankrecht in two phases. The first 
phase covers the lengthy interaction between the Bankrecht head office in Switzerland and its 
investment banking division in London. This phase ends in chaos with the main protagonists 
going separate ways because o f disagreements about the cost o f the PKI. Switzerland retains 
the Entrust-based PKI solution and BI opts for a ‘cheaper’ Microsoft PKI. The second phase 
follows the abolition o f subsidiary brands in June 2003. The phase ends with Switzerland- 
based WM&BB being appointed lead support division for the centralised certificate 
management (CCM) scheme. The scheme advances the centralised PKI idea.
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CHAPTER 7: 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
Introduction
The previous chapters depict elements o f power and politics in PKI institutionalisation. In 
line with the telling-showing-telling concept, the studies transport us to the two organisations 
by portraying first-hand experiences o f different stakeholders with PKI. The depiction o f  
power concretises our theoretical propositions into living organisational contexts. Having 
drawn attention to the data, this Chapter tells readers what it showed. We use the Circuits of 
Power (CoP) framework lenses to explore the political undercurrents o f the two PKI projects. 
We base our analysis on the theoretical ideas presented in Chapter 3. Our goal is to ascertain 
the value o f the CoP in explaining the real world events presented in the two case studies.
We organise the chapter as follows. First, we briefly restate the CoP elements. Next, we 
evaluate the political factors affecting PKI and its proxy GID at Oilcom. The second part 
focuses on Bankrecht AG. We explore a concerted effort by Switzerland to control its global 
divisions first with PKI and later branding. We assess how the two strategies attempted to 
modify the political configurations of the bank and the impact o f power on their execution.
The Circuits of Power: Analytical tool
In Chapter 3, we saw that scholars widely see power in terms o f dispositional, agency and 
facilitative concepts. However, Clegg (1989) claims that none o f the concepts fits into a 
narrative structure constructed around a single, essentially contested concept o f power. Thus, 
he introduces the CoP as a tool to unravel the problem. Clegg believes his framework is 
suited for the role because it incorporates different debates and offers well-grounded 
alternative power conceptions. With roots in the Sociology o f Translation, the CoP provides 
specific language for visualising and thinking about the material nature o f power in everyday 
organisational relations (Introna 1997). Clegg named it a ‘Circuits’ framework to signify that 
power is relational concept and not a ‘thing’ to be owned.
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CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: Oilcom
The PKI at Oilcom is part of Group Infrastructure (GI), a Windows 2000 desktop and server 
standard. The technical components o f the infrastructure include a standard client or GI- 
Desktop (GID), Microsoft PKI, Active Directory and Exchange 2000. However, GI involves 
a radical change o f the politics, IT support structures and culture o f the entire organisation. 
Oilcom uses X.509v3 certificates. As we saw in Chapter 2, the PKIX standards are offshoots 
o f the X.500 directory access standard proposed by ISO and ITU. X.500 is a command and 
control standard because it assumes a root entity and dependent roles such as subscribers and 
relying parties. X.509 offers a framework for authenticating X.500 services by defining the 
structure o f certificates and any optional extensions.
Episodic Circuit
Social theorists traditionally define power as the ability o f individual A to make B do 
something they would otherwise not have done. The definition coincides with the episodic 
circuit that focuses on the production o f tangible and foreseen outcomes. In Chapter 5, we 
saw that PKI, smart cards and supporting technologies such as Active Directory collectively 
provide a service delivered to users via a GID client. GID is part o f a long-term effort by the 
Committee o f Managing Directors (CMD) to end fragmentation and restrictive business 
practices within the Group. The CMD argues,
“It is essential that the (Oilcom) Group becomes faster and more flexible. Free flowing information and 
making optimum use of our resources helps achieve these objectives. And to maintain a competitive edge 
we have to share our knowledge and talents globally, both inside the Group and with our business 
partners, customers and suppliers.”
The committee believed these changes would cut costs, increase profitability and respond to 
challenges such as globalisation. Why then did Oilcom need to become more flexible? In 
Chapter 5, a technical consultant complained that work was slow because o f politics. She 
claims Oilcom rarely feels like one company because departments often clash owing to 
contradictory goals and unwillingness to share information. Oilcom has also been criticised
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by City o f London analysts for being slow and reactive to market events. Other respondents 
believe Oilcom is slow because it relies on committees.
‘Management by committee’ is a product o f the complex Oilcom organisational structure. 
Oilcom consists o f two holding companies that are separate legal entities. Apart from this 
arrangement, the physical structure o f the Group consists o f service companies (SCs) and a 
network o f strong, locally rooted operating companies (OCs). Business divisions such 
chemicals tie the companies together and report to the Excom. The Committee o f Managing 
Directors (CMD)^  ^ sits above all these entities reviewing long-term plans and key investment 
decisions. A defining character of the structure is that Oilcom is traditionally a distributed 
organisation. Oilcom also lacks a strong command and control structure because most 
decisions are consensual. The only mandatory areas are the brand and business principles.
To transform Oilcom into a more flexible organisation, the CMD mobilised resources and 
made alliances with various stakeholders. However, changing the character o f Group proved 
complicated. The process saw conflict between parties with different interests and degrees o f  
power. This was little wonder because the episodic circuit represents a struggle for power and 
attempts to limit or resist and escape its exercise (Clegg 1989). Hence, thé committee made 
GID a key driver o f the transformation. GID continues a standardisation effort started in 1988 
when SCs recommended hardware and operating software to the OCs. However, because the 
structure o f strong local companies remained intact, the businesses ignored the advice 
creating massive application diversity.
In 1997, Oilcom created Services International (SI) to change the delivery structures for IT 
and other services across the Group. SI expedited efforts to centralise and standardise the 
provision o f computers, servers and general network operations. Let us explore the As and Bs 
in the power relationship. The committee is obviously the prime A. However, SI and Excoms 
represented it in the direct power exercise. SI became the most prominent player after the 
1997 re-organisation o f service provision. The division implemented IT systems and services 
to ensure that all OCs, the Bs, complied with the committee goals o f increased openness and 
information sharing. The desired outcome was a flexible organisation with a low cost for IT. 
This was a contentious issue because the companies traditionally prized their autonomy and
We also refer to the Committee of Managing Directors (CMD) as the committee
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had defied earlier attempts to impose similar changes. The standing conditions of the 
operating companies stem from their management responsibility for local operations. The 
changes led to departure o f employees because o f a “move o f parentage” after the 
consolidation exercise. Therefore, despite immense dispositional and facilitative powers, SI 
failed to realise cost savings because o f the resistance o f local companies.
After the failure o f standardisation to deliver the flexible Oilcom, the committee created 
Information Technology International (ITI) to focus on IT provision. The standing conditions 
of ITI derive from their expertise in information technology. The committee legitimated ITI 
power through documents such as the Seven Point Plan, Business Communication Principles 
and Trust Domain. The guidelines advocated increased information sharing and security. 
Trust Domain defines a framework for creating a trusted network environment to support 
global business applications and information sharing. However, Trust Domain suffered from 
low uptake because o f disparate hardware platforms, support arrangements and IT ftmding 
sources. Ironically, the committee also undermined Trust Domain by claiming,
“It is unrealistic to expect all your Operating Unit services to be inside the Trust Domain. Therefore, you
have to decide which of your global services need to be with the Trust Domain.”
Allowing companies to select the systems to include in the Trust Domain gave them a good 
reason for ignoring the measure totally. The result was widespread local customisation and 
independent adoption o f software that exacerbated fragmentation, increased support costs and 
delayed the implementation o f new software and functionality. Consequently, the committee 
saw GID as a tool for breaking down fiefdoms and supporting full information access. The 
committee further legitimated the power of ITI in the GI proposal by appointing the division 
as the sole provider o f IT support for all local companies. Unlike previous systems, GID is 
mandatory. The committee believes GID must remain a “centrally controlled and rigorously 
enforced” platform to succeed. PKI holds the GID architecture together.
With the technical platform in place, the committee mobilised a field o f force to champion its 
objectives. This was vital because the dispositional and facilitative power o f the committee 
were not decisive due to the lack o f a command and control tradition. The committee enlisted 
ITI, which is part of Service Companies (SCs), to align GID outcomes with its objectives. 
However, the SCs have an uneasy relationship with operating companies (OCs) especially the
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big ones. The companies often regard SC consultants as spies from the head office. 
Therefore, SCs traditionally rely on the goodwill o f companies to implement any system or 
dispense advice because local management is responsible for the profitable and viable 
operation o f businesses.
The large OCs based their resistance on the resources they activated in the struggle with ITI. 
This is because relative positions o f power depend on pre-configured standing conditions 
under the social and system integration circuits that enable agencies to achieve different 
outcomes. While ITI had a CMD mandate, the local companies had a stronger power base 
because they controlled the financial resources. The companies bitterly complained about the 
loss o f flexibility due to the locked down GID client. An ITI team leader admits,
“I think there are many human issues around it. What you are doing is you are taking away from 
people flexibility they had before. So they don’t like that. Maybe it is good for them but they don’t like 
it. If they never had that flexibility, I think new people who joined Oilcom and know nothing but GID 
don’t see a problem, but if you had the flexibility before and it has been taken away, you see a big 
problem and you fight against it all the time. How do you fight GID? By finding things that do not 
work and by saying ‘well this does not work I must have two machines’ and things like that.”
The resistance o f companies led to lengthy delays and cost overruns. It also confirms the 
power effects o f GID. Like earlier IT standardisation drives, GID originally failed to deliver 
cost savings and improved performance because the large OCs wilfully restricted the power 
interactions to the episodic circuit. Hence, they reproduced existing configurations o f rules 
and domination. The outcome was unsatisfactory because interactions that produce enduring 
outcomes must reshape rules o f practice to enable power storage that maintains these effects.
To remove this power vacuum the committee instructed Excoms to make GID a governance 
issue. This was a vital decision because Excoms have tactical responsibility for business lines 
and define performance targets for OCs. With support o f Excoms, ITI became the sole 
provider o f “ongoing IT support.” Oilcom claims the move aims to leverage buying power 
and scale, simplify procedures and create a consistent approach to infrastructure installation 
and maintenance. Thus, the desktops under ITI control increased from 69% to 94% by the 
end o f 2001. The provision of IT as a global service follows similar efforts to streamline 
Oilcom services. An ITI consultant claimed.
“What will happen there is that the kit, the people, the infrastructure locally will remain as it is except the 
fact that who pays the bill at the end of the day is somebody else. The manager of that infrastructure, the
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manager of those people locally changes but in reality nothing has changed nobody changes on the 
ground, no infrastructure changes just basically it is who pays for it at the end that changes and how to 
pay for it.”
These are contentious changes because they involve control of money and appointment of  
managers. Law (1991b) argues that managers assume that they have a ‘store’ o f power to act. 
This normally takes the form of money because its liquidity enables ‘powers’ to conveniently 
convert it into a variety o f actions, which too are accumulated, deployed and converted. 
Being a relationally derived store o f power money allows ‘powers’ to exercise episodic 
power. Therefore, once operating companies allowed ITI to pay for the local IT services and 
appoint managers, the businesses lost control over the infrastructure.
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Obligatory Passage Points (GPP)
The Obligatory Passage Point concept is central to the Circuits of Power analysis. Simply put, 
when an agency wants to take charge o f organisational agenda, they define the existence o f a 
problem and identify solutions for resolving it. However, the agency only presents the 
solution in terms o f the resources they can provide. Thus, GPP covers an array of strategies, 
resources and artefacts that agencies trying to dominate organisational events claim are 
indispensable for solving particular problems. An GPP enrols interests o f different agencies 
into stable representations allowing the creation o f alliances necessary for achieving 
outcomes o f power. This is the main idea of the CoP framework.
Since innovations disturb the social integration circuit by introducing new meanings, their 
institutionalisation relies on attaining stability in rules o f practice as GPPs. The GPP concept 
has roots in the sociology o f translation that explains the mechanisms by which the social and 
natural worlds gradually take form resulting into certain entities controlling others. According 
to Gallon (1986), for actors to impose their definition o f the situation on others, they must go 
through four ‘moments’ o f translation namely problematisation, intéressement, enrolment and 
mobilisation. Let us explain how this process unfolded at Gilcom.
Problematisation
This is the ‘moment’ where an agency attempting to become a spokesperson defines the 
nature o f the problem and suggests ways o f resolving it. The IT division and external 
consultants initiated the ‘moment’ by referring to reports that showed Gilcom as inflexible 
and running a high cost for IT. Using a Gartner model and 1998 actuals. Information 
Technology International (ITI) showed that Gilcom’s average direct cost per annum was at 
least US$3,600. This figure was well above the $2,500 industry average. ITI claimed Gilcom 
should emulate ‘world-class peer’ organisations like IBM, Nestle and Unilever that manage 
their infrastructures with a focus on cost. The alliance presented their problem definition and 
a ready solution in GI to the committee. The board liked the GI proposal because it promised 
flexibility, cost reduction and hence improved profitability. Because ITI presented an obvious 
case for GI, nobody was able to challenge the views at the time. Since Gilcom lacks a 
command and control structure, even with the backing of the committee it was vital to build a
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GI support network. Thus, ITI identified and defined interested agencies in a way that made it 
central to the network o f relationships it created.
Intéressement
The episodic circuit discussion identified some o f the agencies involved in GI and their 
interests. The list includes the CMD, Excoms, Service companies, ITI and its expertise, large 
and small OCs, employees and external players Microsoft, Schlumberger and Gartner. 
Intéressement covers the actions that ITI undertook to impose and stabilise the identity o f  
these agencies. Generally, ITI informed them that participation in the project would improve 
their standing conditions, cut costs and increase the profitability o f the Group.
For instance, ITI invited their old nemesis, the large operating companies, to suggest features 
to include in GI. This was vital for the success o f GI because previous standardisation efforts 
failed because they alienated these powerful OCs. Thus, ITI forestalled the formation o f a 
unified alliance between the OCs that torpedoed earlier committee endorsed standardisation 
efforts. However, the intéressement was not easy. The Director o f the project admits the 
‘moment’ got off to a bad start because ITI wrongly assumed that the committee mandate 
would automatically cow local companies into accepting the infrastructure. He reveals,
“We set up a mandatory infrastructure. ...We thought that because the CMD mandated GI, there was no 
need to sell it. We were wrong! We actually spent more time and effort persuading OCs that they need to 
take this particular standard. We spent more time on this than on any of the previous standards and 
initiatives, which were optional. They could choose to take those or not. It was their choice. This was 
not their choice. So they were prepared to spend infinite amount of money and time arguing.”
ITI eventually showed these actors that it suited their interests to participate in the project and 
shape GI rather than use a system imposed without their input. For instance, ITI informed 
companies that GI would help them reduce costs and meet the CMD requirements for 
increased profitability. Cost cutting was critical because the oil price was low. ITI got a big 
boost in its intéressement drive when the CMD approved a requirement that, “The GIPT^ "^  
must have the unequivocal backing o f the Excoms if the project is to be successful.” The 
CMD asked Excoms to nominate project champions and make GI a governance issue.
Group Infrastructure Project Team
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The committee also instructed the Group IT Steering Group (ITSG) to support ITI. Before 
GI, the ITSG recommended the widely ignored IT infrastructure standards for operating 
companies (OCs). In addition, the CMD asked Chief Information Officers (CIO) o f each 
business^^ to support GI directly. The local IS departments initially opposed GI because it 
gave ITI control over their IT. The committee support changed GI from a system prescribed 
by the corporate centres into a governance issue. However, the Director o f projects admits,
“The main difficulty I think we had with that was while governance concerned the businesses, they had to 
keep reinforcing the message with the OCs. It eventually worked but it certainly did not work to 100% 
the first attempt. Thus, it was a message that needed continual replenishment.”
After costly delays, the companies accepted GID because they were already imder pressure 
from their Excoms to cut costs and knew the committee was determined to see it succeed. 
This was a major success for ITI because by conscripting the large OCs with the strongest 
power bases, the division deprived any lingering opposition o f the resources to question the 
legitimacy o f the GPP. Therefore, the support o f the committee and Excoms helped comer 
the entities ITI hoped to enrol and created a favourable balance o f power for the division.
Enrolment and mobilisation
Gallon (1986) reveals that moments may overlap. We believe enrolment and mobilisation 
overlapped at Oilcom. Enrolment is for the definition and attribution of interrelated roles to 
respective actors. GID enrolment relied on two basic statements. First, the agencies believed 
that GID would help profitability, despite the low oil price, by reducing costs. Second, in a 
departure from the consensual decision making approach, the agencies realised the CMD was 
determined to implement GI with or without their assent. Thus, they listened favourably to 
ITI’s claim that it was much better to participate and shape GI than use a completely alien 
system. Due to the ambitious GI schedule, ITI concurrently consolidated the alliances 
through bargaining and concessions and translated other actor’s wishes into a single will for 
which they (ITI) spoke. The platform for mobilisation was the GIPT. The GI proposal states.
“A common GI is only possible if the Businesses speak to the supplier (ITI) with a single voice. 
Consequently, a small group has been established to represent Businesses and Group interests. .. .The 
GIPT will set the specifications of the common GI and service levels, and will agree tariffs with ITI 
against best practice benchmarks.”
‘Business’ units here refer to the five silos under which Oilcom is organised such as Exploration and 
Production that sit above the individual operating companies (OCs) under an Executive Committee (Excom).
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ITI shrewdly allowed the more powerful operating companies (OCs) to dominate GIPT. In 
effect, a handful o f OCs from developed countries became spokespersons for silent operating 
units in over a hundred and forty countries. The weaker OCs never contradicted their 
‘spokespersons’ because they were neither invited to ‘speak’ nor had the expertise to present 
an effective counter case. ITI perpetuated the belief that what is true for a few is true for other 
OCs by stating that, “The GIPT will make proposals for a small number o f archetype 
companies, which will serve as a template to judge OU^  ^requests.” Although ITI never gave 
the large OCs a veto, they greatly influenced GI features and largely got what they wanted. 
The concession gave ITI legitimacy as the official spokesperson for the whole project 
because the large OCs believed the division represented their interests too.
Then next question then is, did the silent majority OCs follow their representatives? Yes, but 
for a short while. The GIPT alliance caused a lot of resentment. We saw that ITI claimed that 
the GID project could only deliver benefits if  the platform followed a standardised approach 
“with only limited flexibility to accommodate OU specific requirements.” Interestingly, 
because o f their huge financial resources, the large OCs were not badly affected by the locked 
down GID client because they could afford the unlocked but more expensive “Developer” 
machines. Apart from the reduced flexibility, the silent majority rebelled because GID clients 
were very expensive. The spiralling cost specifically enraged OCs in the Far East because 
local IT sourcing is cheaper in the region. ITI conceded as much by locating its server 
administration and GID scripting centre in Malaysia. The ITI take over o f desktops was also 
troublesome because Oilcom does not have 100% control o f most o f the OCs in the region. 
The cost o f the GID computer enraged many joint venture partners. In sum, the ‘silent’ OCs 
resisted GI because it eroded their capacity to control IT resources.
The GID architecture also suited OCs in countries with fast network connections because all 
data and applications reside on network drives. Users with slower connections faced 
problems with file synchronisation leading to frequent data loss. Searching for stored network 
files was also slow. At this stage, GI institutionalisation was incomplete because agencies 
saw it as a threat to their liberty and an impediment to work practices.
26 Organisation Unit (OU) is synonymous with Operating Company (OC).
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In response, ITI abandoned the core GI specifications in some locations and deployed GI- 
Lite, a variant o f the platform with limited remote and central management capability. 
However, this was not a compromise because the GI proposal issued in 1999 discussed 
incorporating “lower service solutions” without central ITI management. The real GI 
objective was to ‘take on’ large sites that were still under local control. Since, enrolment 
involves trials o f strengths and tricks accompanying intéressement (Gallon 1986), ITI 
organised a conference in May 2002 where it presented GI-Lite as a concession to the 
disgruntled OCs. They accepted the idea. In truth, ITI tricked OCs into accepting GI without 
modifying its architecture because GI-Lite was part o f the original design.
We believe the translation o f actors in the Oilcom internal PKI seems a success now. The 
positive outcome emanated from a combination o f the CMD facilitative and dispositional 
power and the successful translation o f various actors by ITI. Translation enabled ITI and a 
few powerful operating companies to represent many silent actors o f the Oilcom social and 
natural worlds that they mobilised. PKI, smart cards and Active Directory are central to the 
stability o f the network because they structure the power relationships.
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Social Integration circuit
Social integration or dispositional power focuses on the relation between rules governing 
meaning and membership. It is essentially the capacity o f agencies to produce intended 
effects on others even though they may not manifest this potential in action. However, since 
the circuit also deals with legitimate and illegitimate power, mle change is contentious 
because it disturbs episodic power. Introna (1997) warns that information systems often fail 
when there is a lack o f fit between the meanings the systems create and the existing 
organisational rules and norms. Yet sweeping change is what is required to create enduring 
episodic power effects that enable IS institutionalisation.
Before GI, Oilcom had failed to deploy global IT systems because o f the resilience o f its 
autonomous institutional order. The team responsible, ITSG^ ,^ faced resistance because 
Oilcom has traditionally been a loose federation o f OCs. The half-hearted standardisation 
efforts also soured social relationships, hardening the resolve o f OCs to defy the service 
companies. If Oilcom is so disjointed, how then has it thrived in the turbulent oil sector? We 
saw that the Group attributes its longevity to scenario planning under which Oilcom suspends 
corporate rules to survive challenges. In a way, the ease with which Oilcom disregards 
corporate rules highlights the disintegrative nature of its culture. A security consultant also 
attributed the longevity to the brand, which he claims is sacrosanct. In Chapter 5, we saw that 
brands are powerful tools for enforcing discipline in distributed organisations. The social 
integration circuit includes norms, rules and meanings that identity organisational groupings. 
Likewise, under “brand culture” the Interbrand model identifies elements such as beliefs, 
values, norms and symbols that are vital for group formation and cohesion (Interbrand 2001). 
This is a useful insight because brands define mles o f meaning and membership.
However, Oilcom never became cohesive because its structure and management actions 
enshrined decentralisation. The distributed stmcture encouraged the creation o f professional 
fraternities and sub-cultures that competed with the official agenda (Angell and Smithson 
1991). Therefore, deploying a global IT system was perilous because it was bound to 
contravene a sub-culture somewhere. For instance, while Oilcom officially runs PC 
platforms, a group quietly operated a full Apple Macintosh network for years. Thus, it was
IT Steering Group (ITSG) recommended IT infrastructure standards for OCs
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clear GID would fail unless there was a concomitant modification of the rules fixing relations 
of meaning and membership. With CMD and Excom support, ITI set out to either modify or 
contradict organisational meanings. First, ITI contradicted the legendary belief that autonomy 
was inviolable by rationalising IT support and funding arrangements. Thereafter, ITI 
controlled the user desktop and made it a launch pad for the new order.
How did the fixing of rules occur? ITI inscribed the rules and techniques of discipline into 
smart cards and Active Directory, the two most vital obligatory passage points for PKI. While 
the Group has over 100,000 employees in hundreds o f professions, in one fell swoop, GID 
used technical artefacts to ‘design’ and only permit two groups o f employees: ‘developers’ 
and ‘users’. This move cut across social and professional groups to create uniform user 
groups. In other words, GID produced a lasting field o f force for the articulation o f episodic 
agency conceptions that support PKI. Having ‘designed’ and ‘implemented’ the new users, 
Oilcom relies on PKI to keep them faithful to their roles.
The smart card or ‘corporate badge’ is central feature o f the new social order because it 
enforces the new rules and norms and thus stabilises associations at Oilcom. The card 
represents PKI because it stores user certificates. The internal authentication certificates have 
power effects because they moderate user activities directly depending on their Active 
Directory profile. The card stores the authentication certificate, private key, physical access 
features and a restaurant pass. The card uses a proximity and smart chip to identify 
employees to the physical access control systems and a magnetic stripe for the ‘stored value’ 
used in the restaurants. All the card functions are vital indicators o f membership.
If we believe the cost argument, then network access control is the real objective o f the card 
solution. However, to avoid resistance to network access control, ITI deliberately added 
physical access and restaurant access to the card. The food element is the most ingenious way 
of using smart cards to enforce PKI use and define membership. Getting food at work is an 
important feature o f professional life at Oilcom because o f severe time restrictions. We faced 
the pressure first hand when our contact revealed managers had complained that our research 
was taking too long and affecting people’s pay! Consultants receive hourly pay.
Lunch serves specific professional fimctions. First, most o f the elite Oilcom employees at the 
services company in London are often away on assignments to OCs across the globe.
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Therefore, lunch is an opportunity to network and catch up on office gossip and/or politics. 
Even without leaving the country, the company o f over 100,000 people is too big for people 
to see each other regularly during office hours. The London SC alone has over 3,000 
employees. Second, consultants use lunchtime to present work on ongoing projects and seek 
advice. Since SC consultants compete among themselves and with internal OC consultants 
for work, the lunch presentations offer a chance to market one’s expertise in a given area. 
Thus, the integration o f functions ensures that users bring the cards along.
Introna (1997) reveals that the acceptance o f new material conditions depends on their 
integration with the institutionalised order as encapsulated by norms, beliefs and values. 
Apart from being a useful device, employees readily adopted the card because they 
traditionally carried badges. The smart card did not disrupt social practices because even 
building structures assume their use. However, because ITI inscribed new rules that 
reconfigured the social groupings and political arrangements, the effect o f the card was more 
revolutionary than people realised. A senior Security Consultant gleefully reveals,
“All our Windows 2000 desktops/laptops are using Microsoft PKI for logon/authentication internally. The
users are not aware of this. This is how it should be!”
In contrast to the orphaned Bankrecht PKI, the prime reason for the success of Oilcom PKI is 
its stealth association with the desktop standard. GID itself benefited from sweeping changes 
in IT provision structures. To complete a remarkable canopy o f legitimations, Excoms linked 
GID to corporate governance. Officially, ITI insisted GID enhanced profitability through cost 
controls. In private, ITI officials readily admitted the real agenda o f GID, and its support 
technologies like PKI, Active Directory and smart cards, was to break down fiefdoms within 
the Group and increase information sharing.
Therefore, the smart cards are the most visible physical manifestation o f CMD attempts to 
transform Oilcom into a flexible and unified organisation. From our research, it appears that 
the smart card has not only successfully translated the actors and stabilised their associations, 
the agencies are also remaining faithful to their inscriptions. Using one card, employees can 
log onto any networked device such as desktop computer, thin client, laptop and PDA, at any 
Group location and access their data and settings from the network drives. As we explain in 
the system integration circuit, the ability to ‘roam’ and obtain the proper level of
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authentication depends on Group Policy, an Active Directory feature. The main beneficiaries 
o f ‘roaming’ are service company (SC) consultants whose jobs require frequent global travel 
to advise OCs. With prior approval and a little ceremony o f identification, ITI easily enables 
the card to access Oilcom offices globally. Inevitably, the operating companies see roaming 
as an intrusion on their space. The amalgamation o f physical and logical access features on 
one smart card allows ITI, with little consultation, to open the ‘gates’ o f an OC to a 
consultant because they centrally control all permissions within Active Directory.
The card also translates the interest of the committee and employees to exchange documents 
without worrying about version issues. In sum, the integrated card has greatly helped PKI 
institutionalisation at Oilcom. Since, Active Directory stores the entitlements details on the 
card, only authorised users access buildings and network resources. The smart card was able 
to enhance security, flexibility and information sharing by challenging key meaning and 
membership characteristics, notably the autonomous formal structure and culture.
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System integration circuit
The circuit focuses on the material conditions o f production and discipline. These are 
technological methods o f control over the physical and social environment and associated 
skills. The circuit is synonymous with facilitative power that explains the coordination of 
work practices and hence extends power beyond the exclusive concern with conflict. Clegg 
(1989) sees the circuit as the prime source o f change in the CoP because innovations in 
material conditions either empower or disempower agencies. The changes create new 
agencies and OPPs that may question existing rules, norms and episodic power.
We focus on Active Directory (AD) because it offers the technological means o f control over 
the Oilcom physical and social environment. System integration deals with domination 
because facilitative power regards episodic power exercise as always beginning from 
conditions. Webber (1964) defines domination as the likelihood that a given group will obey 
a command with specific content. To Latour (1991) non-human actors woven into the social 
fabric can account for stability and domination. Active Directory fits the description because 
it stores user credentials that enable PKI to keep GID a centrally controlled and rigorously 
enforced technology platform. In turn, GID structures moderate relationships at Oilcom.
Active Directory (AD) is a potent tool o f domination because it offers administrators a 
hierarchical view o f the network and a single point o f control for all objects therein. As a 
senior Security Consultant reveals, AD is such a critical infrastructure at Oilcom that “if  we 
can’t find people or certificates in it, we can’t operate this business.” Microsoft claims the 
AD logical hierarchy supports simplified management because it represents organisational 
business structures. However, the top-down organisation o f network resources is problematic 
in distributed global organisations. For instance, a security consultant concedes,
“It is clear Active Directory is a complicated animal to live with. It apparently has some restrictions and 
you have to be very thoughtful about how you lay out your directory schema, right from the very 
beginning because changing it is not easy at this moment.”
Let us assess how ITI uses PKI and AD security features for domination, surveillance and 
discipline. Under the social integration circuit, we saw that a multipurpose ‘corporate badge’ 
allows agencies to ‘roam’ Oilcom and access their files and settings irrespective of location
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and device. Roaming relies on IntelliMirror a Windows 2000 feature that only works with 
Active Directory. IntelliMirror uses policy-based configuration management to enable data, 
software and settings to follow users in distributed computing environments. IntelliMirror 
benefited from the sweeping reconfiguration o f Oilcom social groupings under GID. The 
fixing o f the redefined rules governing meaning and membership into social relations relies 
on yet another Active Directory feature: Group Policy (GP).
Group Policy provides the primary techniques and means o f controlling the Oilcom social 
environment because its settings manage the behaviours o f objects in Active Directory. 
Group Policy defines and controls how programs, networks resources and operating systems 
function for users. Even if  an administrator modifies properties o f a file, access to the 
resources still depends on group membership. In terms o f PKI, Group Policy controls auto­
enrolment, a process by which a Microsoft CA uses certificate templates to automatically 
issue, renew and install certificates. Therefore, the association of PKI with AD has political 
implications because, if  agencies have control over the directory, they decide who may 
request a certificate, fetch them from the directory and determine their validity.
The possibility o f delegation is the common riposte to accusations that AD is authoritarian. 
The feature allows the assignment o f responsibility for managing portions o f the network to 
other users. However, GP allows administrators to decide how much authority to delegate. 
The AD deployment faced similar delays like the wider GI project. Local IT divisions were 
concerned that an enterprise AD would certainly confirm ITI as the overlord o f IT. However, 
unlike Bankrecht, the AD deployment went ahead for two reasons. First, ITI relied on the 
formal power o f the CMD and Excoms to install the directory. Second, the local IT team 
believed AD would largely manage Address books like the X.500 enterprise directory it 
replaced. Indeed, early uses o f AD focused on the Address book. However, Active Directory 
(AD) is central to the reconfiguration o f rules and norms. Oilcom ensured that OCs would not 
know much about AD by recruiting a special team for its deployment and later moving most 
members o f the Europe-based team to Malaysia to offer IT backroom support. Since, even 
ITI is not conversant with AD, the manoeuvres deprived opponents o f the means of opposing 
the directory. This approach also extends to the wider ITI efforts to deny the existence o f  
PKI. For example, a security consultant claims,
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“There haven’t been key stages in the rollout of the PKI because the certificates were part of the delivered 
service solution which is the GID solution... People don’t know they have the certificates.”
Active Directory (AD) is a disciplinary system too. To Clegg (1989) disciplinary practices 
rely on the surveillance o f agencies through the collection, recording and comparison o f data 
about their activities. A senior Security Consultant reveals the Oilcom recruitment process 
starts with the creation o f a minimal user profile in AD that includes a surname, given name 
and initials. Once the profile has sufficient rights, the employee receives a smart card. The 
link of card with the AD profile and its privileges automatically regulates its use. In addition, 
since the ‘corporate badge’ includes the picture o f the user plus a chip that sends details to the 
physical access system about entry and exit times, it is a surveillance tool.
The directory incorporates micro-techniques o f power since it inscribes and normalises 
actions o f individuals and groups. Oilcom also requires employees and visitors to display 
their cards prominently on its premises. Unlike passwords that are only proofs o f what you 
know, the card combines the knowing aspect (PIN) and possession factor (the card itself). 
This is a more robust tool o f control. Since through smart cards, AD ensures that each agency 
sticks to their role, it is a tool of domination. Thus, ITI translated the agencies and kept their 
associations stable using technical artefacts. The empowerment o f ITI and disempowerment 
of local IT divisions relied on the fixing of rules of practice coupled with systemic integration 
using AD and smart cards as sources and centres o f control. ITI redefined social relations and 
causal power because it established strong networks o f control that supported the use o f PKI 
to underpin new standing conditions.
Outcomes
The Committee o f Managing Directors (CMD) has obviously achieved its objective o f better 
information exchange within the Group through GID. The desktop also enables Oilcom to 
gather more information about people connected to its network resources. For instance, the 
Director o f Global IT projects revealed that ITI can within fifteen minutes, identify all users 
with licensed software on the network. However, influential agencies admit Oilcom has so far 
failed to achieve its poster objectives o f cost reduction and increased flexibility. As the 
Director o f projects concedes, “I think the value o f what we have done is much more in terms 
of a business enabler rather than a cost reduction.” Likewise, a vendor from the corporate
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badge provider warns GID will hamper the flexibility o f the Group because it is too rigid. An 
Oilcom security consultant agrees. He admits,
“The reality is that you create a huge solution that when you want to make one small change it has an
effect on the wider structure. You cannot engineer for one circumstance because this is very expensive.
However, it takes a while to make the changes that benefit everybody.”
We saw elsewhere that it takes weeks to script software not pre-installed with the desktop to 
operate on GID clients. Likewise, despite the main the logic of GID being the speed of 
replacing faulty PCs, rectifying problems takes longer than predicted. For instance, when the 
card is faulty users cannot logon at all. The Helpdesk cannot help either because, being 
remotely based, they can only take over a user’s computer when they are logged on. In the 
situation, the user either gets a new card, or as often advised by the Helpdesk, they turn their 
computer off and try the next day. This is short o f the dynamic support promised.
PKI as part of Oilcom life
An alliance o f Oilcom agencies that includes the CMD, Excoms, ITI and big OCs along with 
external players notably Microsoft, Schlumberger and Gartner has wrestled power from 
hitherto autonomous operating companies. The outcomes are more durable than episodic 
power effects because PKI, smart cards and AD can reproduce the conditions for their 
institutionalisation in the general stock o f knowledge. Conversely, PKI and its support 
technologies would not have achieved wide acceptance without the structural changes 
introduced as part o f GI.
However, even with PKI holding it together, GID failed to achieve systemic integration at the 
start because it interrupted work through its lengthy logon procedures. Mobile workers and 
employees in companies with low bandwidth felt the pain the most. The system also 
fi'equently crashed during major software releases because all machines at sites concurrently 
attempted to download updates o f over 150MB. This killed the connection. ITI deployed GI- 
Lite to placate OCs and mobile workers in low bandwidth areas who resented the interruption 
of their work practices. ITI also introduced a CD distribution service that every six months 
delivers software updates, patches and McAfee to a vocal group o f about 1,000 employees 
who work from home. The changes collectively enabled GID to achieve systemic integration.
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Oilcom agencies take the system for granted now because they no longer openly accuse it o f 
threatening their freedom of action. Furthermore, because the system crashes less frequently, 
ITI tactical manoeuvres have mollified irate workers over its impact on work practices. The 
incorporation o f self-help features in the design o f GI also helped systemic integration. The 
Director o f projects teasingly observes this was an attempt by ITI to “outsource some o f this 
support back to our customers.” This move initially caused uproar with employees fervently 
opposed to doing IT support. However, good documentation and the “follow the sun” Help 
Desk network made the changes an acceptable part of organisational life at Oilcom.
From infrastructure to institution
In Chapter 2, we saw that infrastructures are regulating skeletons that provide security and 
stability rather than liberty o f action. Certainly, PKI has created more secure and stable IT 
structures compared with user ID and password authentication. The outcome has reduced 
fragmentation and improved information sharing at Oilcom. However, agencies only reaped 
the benefits at the expense o f their freedom of action. PKI lies at the heart o f GID and ensures 
it stays a centrally controlled technology platform with limited flexibility. The changes 
proved politically explosive because they demanded a reconstitution o f norms, rules and 
meanings as well as techniques o f production and discipline o f a pluralistic and distributed 
organisation. However, GID succeeded because ITI enrolled interests o f various agencies into 
stable representations creating alliances that enabled the standardisation.
A key reason for the success is that ITI astutely embedded PKI into other structures such as 
GID and smart cards to an extent that the infrastructure became transparent to users. Thus, 
unlike Bankrecht, Oilcom introduced PKI by stealth (Townsend 2001). ITI claims this is how 
it should be. One consultant even insists Oilcom has no PKI at all. By storing the certificate 
and private key on the card, PKI built on the long tradition o f using cards and badges at 
Oilcom. Users also found the card helpful for mobile work because it enables access to files 
around the Group without the inconvenience of passwords. The card is also evidence of 
membership, because without it a person can neither enter buildings nor use computers. Thus, 
as personified by the smart cards, PKI effortlessly supports work at Oilcom and is part o f it.
Well then, has the PKI been institutionalised? We can say yes to a certain extent. To Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) institutionalisation starts with habitualised actions routinised in the
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general stock o f knowledge. Before 2000, the predecessor of ITI, Services International 
attempted to arrest IT fragmentation with the provision of pre-configured Windows 95 and 
NT server images. However, because o f the “Not Invented Here” syndrome the OCs 
customised the images to suit their local needs. Therefore, ITI failed to routinise the 
meanings into the stocks o f knowledge making it impossible to use the experience in future 
projects. However, the incorporation o f PKI ensured that the GI desktop remained stable. 
Thus, PKI has created the background of stable practices that precede institutionalisation 
because, with the locked down GID, agencies know their network privileges. However, like 
other institutions, the PKI simultaneously empowers and controls agencies. Using the card, 
PKI allows employees to ‘roam’ the organisation and access their files and settings regardless 
of location and device. However, the privileges are constrained by roles.
Stinchcombe (1968) argues that the key to institutionalising a value is the concentration o f  
power in hands o f those who believe in it. The destiny of Oilcom PKI lies in the powerful 
hands o f the CMD, ITI, Excoms and Microsoft. Each o f the agencies has a stake in seeing the 
PKI succeed. After Jepperson (1991), we argue that the PKI is an institution because it 
represents and reinforces the rules that bind Oilcom together. PKI is the foundation o f  
reciprocal typification o f actions between ITI, users and OCs. For instance, PKI ensures that 
only employees with ‘developer’ machines can install software on their PCs. Others either 
use pre-installed software or send the applications for GID scripting.
After Berger and Luckmann (1967), we argue that like other institutions, Oilcom uses its PKI 
to predefine and channel patterns o f conduct o f its human and organisational agencies. Since 
PKI is part o f other structures and agendas like GID, smart cards and organisational 
restructuring, its existence is independent o f the agencies. The agencies could not avoid it 
even if  they tried because ITI astutely attached the PKI to facilities that are central to Oilcom 
membership. Therefore, PKI has power of employees because o f the physical access, lunch 
and network access facilities attached to it. More tellingly, employees cannot escape the 
reality o f the PKI even when, as we have showed that they are neither aware o f its existence 
nor understand its mode o f operation.
In conclusion, Oilcom stealthily folded PKI into a larger infrastructure that includes a locked 
down GID client. Active Directory, smart cards and Exchange 2000. Along with network 
rationalisation, PKI benefited from a radical change o f the politics, IT support structures and
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culture. Oilcom either used existing power structures or created new ones to support PKI, 
Conversely, PKI holds together the identified components and keeps various agencies faithful 
to their inscriptions. Therefore, PKI is an undeniable fact that Oilcom agencies cannot wish 
away. However, this is not a definitive outcome because by definition, the circuits o f power 
are unstable since outcomes circulating in rules and techniques o f production often challenge 
obligatory passage points. The biggest potential source o f instability appears exogenous. 
Since, ITI does not control external PKI, the risk o f organisational outflanking looms large.
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CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: Bankrecht
At Oilcom, ITI consolidated PKI by embedding it into social relationships and practices. The 
practices include values, beliefs and norms that determine whether a technical artefact fits 
into an actual breathing organisation or not. As we emphasise in the next chapter, this finding 
alone is a significant contribution o f our dissertation because it dispels the common belief in 
the literature that public key infrastructures can operate outside organisational practices. On 
the contrary, the Bankrecht project follows the trends promoted by vendors in which PKI is 
an obligatory passage point for secure e-commerce regardless o f context. The argument goes 
that if  global e-commerce is to thrive, organisations desperately (Ellison and Schneier 2000) 
need an infrastructure for large-scale permission and identity management. Put bluntly, “at 
present PKI interoperation best (and sometimes exclusively) satisfies the security 
requirements seen as critical to internet-based e-commerce (Baum 1999).”
As such, PKI at Bankrecht exactly fits the bill o f what Clarke (2001) call, “the hammer that 
came to hand when the nail was discovered.” What do we mean? We denote that since 
Bankrecht originally adopted PKI as a technological solution outside organisational practices, 
its objectives have kept mutating according to what supporters believed could keep the 
infrastructure alive. Therefore, while the underlying PKI technology (hammer) has remained 
stable, the uses (nails) have constantly evolved. The only times Bankrecht PKI has attained a 
semblance o f stability is when its supporters aligned it with a broader agenda. However, since 
these are largely opportunistic localised agendas, PKI supporters have struggled to 
institutionalise it across the Group despite over ten years o f trying.
Episodic circuit
Because PKI objectives at Bankrecht were highly malleable, the agencies involved changed 
regularly at various stages in its lifecycle. However, unlike Oilcom, power plays at Bankrecht 
largely remained in the episodic circuit because the sustenance of the infrastructure relied on 
ephemeral objectives. The failure to engender innovation in the techniques o f production and 
discipline prevented the possibility o f power storage, a key requirement for maintaining 
power effects. Thus, PKI supporters at Bankrecht often resort to a ‘fire fighting’ approach
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that involves active efforts to make other agencies use the infrastructure against their will. Let 
us assess the episodic circuit in detail.
In line with the traditional definition o f power as the ability o f individual A to make B do 
something they would otherwise not have done, let us identify the agencies involved in 
Bankrecht PKI and their standing conditions. We saw elsewhere that Bankrecht X initiated 
the PKI back in 1992. The original As were a small team that included a senior manager, two 
middle managers (one o f whom is now a Vice President) and a technician. The Bs were 
employees o f the centralised Bankrecht X. The objective o f the PKI team was to increase 
security, because the move from mainfi*ames to client-server systems had led to the 
proliferation o f user passwords. The team believed that a combination o f X.509v3 certificates 
and smart cards would stop employees from writing down passwords and hence risking the 
security o f the entire bank. Maintaining security was critical because carelessness may have 
landed Bankrecht in trouble with the stringent Swiss secrecy laws.
In pushing the PKI solution, the Bankrecht X team relied on solid standing conditions. The 
team belonged to a powerful IT division with sizeable financial resources and equal standing 
with other business divisions. The division had control over IT and operated a standardised 
desktop architecture with a single domain across Switzerland. Therefore, the division had the 
capacity to change security behaviour. The server platforms division later joined the original 
team and strengthened the support network for the PKI solution. The team derived its 
standing conditions from its official responsibility for managing mainframes, all servers and 
developing middleware that controlled user applications. The enrolled agencies selected a 
Siemens smart card solution and started deploying the PKI across the bank.
However, the PKI bandwagon came to a shuddering halt because the 1998 merger unravelled 
the field o f force that had supported the solution since 1992. The Bankrecht X team originally 
mobilised support for the PKI by aligning their security goals with the readiness o f the top ' 
bank management to obey the Swiss laws. Therefore, the championing role for PKI 
strengthened the capacities o f the IT division. However, the merger caused a drastic change 
in the balance o f power between the IT division and the previous power targets, the 
employees. First, while the PKI originated in a centralised bank, a clash o f cultures forced the 
merged Group to organise itself divisionally. Under the new structure, the IT division saw its 
standing conditions eroded because it no longer controlled a budget and became a subsidiary
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o f business divisions. The IT team lost the capacity to exercise power because the divisions 
became autonomous and spent their budget as they saw fit. This caused a paradoxical role 
reversal where the divisions actually became the As and the IT security team the B.
Apparently, all divisions o f Bankrecht X lost power after the merger. Bankrecht Y, the 
smaller o f the two merger partners actually secured all the top management positions in the 
new entity. Financial industry analysts claim that this was because Bankrecht X had a huge 
financial hole and was struggling badly. This weakened its hand in negotiations. Therefore, 
unlike at Bankrecht X, the business divisions now have a veto over IT projects. This was a 
big reversal for the IT division because as we discuss elsewhere in this dissertation, power 
derives from the central control o f resources and ability to effect decision making. Therefore, 
since the business divisions usurped the control o f financial resources and the authority to 
make decisions about technology, the IT division lost power.
Since, the merger had eroded the pre-configured standing conditions o f the IT division, the 
Switzerland-based team understood that the only way to embed PKI into the new institutional 
order was to justify it through a service that helps employees in their work. In other words, 
the IT division had to re-emphasise the legitimacy o f the PKI. To Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) legitimation is vital for sustaining an idea because it explains and justifies its 
existence. Similarly, Stinchcombe (1968) argues that legitimacy creates readiness in other 
centres o f power to support actions o f other people. The need to legitimate the solution arose 
because IT Switzerland hoped to transmit it to employees o f Bankrecht Y and later other 
global divisions that did not have individual recollection o f the institutional order under 
which the PKI was developed. Thus, IT Switzerland created what Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) classify as a “corresponding canopy o f legitimations” to associate the PKI with 
concrete social processes. Since the best way o f legitimating an institution is making it useful 
(Stinchcombe 1968), the IT team made user convenience the key PKI objective. Why did 
they abandon security? According to a Vice President,
“We knew that we could not sell security to the bank, we could only sell convenience. So, end users 
would not want a smart card that could only provide security, they could simply ask for ease of use. 
...The users were clearly asking for convenience. Nothing else. ... The consequence of selecting Single 
Sign On as the dominant objective of the whole exercise was to bring convenience to the end user and 
increase security. But security was only a by-product. You are not selling that to anybody. You do 
not sell security to end users. They don’t care.”
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User convenience was an excellent selling point because, since the two banks had separate 
applications for the similar functions, the merger worsened the already bad password 
proliferation problem. The situation left senior users with over twenty passwords leading to 
even worse security practices. The users complained in strong terms about what they termed 
a “silly strategy” o f the IT division that created an ID and password for any new application. 
User groups even claimed that forgotten and blocked passwords were hampering their work. 
Top management asked the IT team to solve the password problem. Hence, despite its lost 
political influence, user convenience gave the IT team the excuse to deploy its PKI solution. 
The team also redesigned the solution to emphasise convenience because they were aware 
that users would abandon the smart cryptocards if  it required excessive intervention. The 
Vice President reveals his team aimed to make cryptocard use more convenient than 
alternatives. Consequently, convenience was a good nail for the PKI hammer.
In Chapter 6, we saw that the clash o f cultures between the two banks has its roots in the 
different institutional order their business focus created. Despite mergers and acquisitions 
abroad, Bankrecht X retained strong Swiss roots because it largely focused on the local 
market. In contrast, Bankrecht Y focused on the international market. However, since 
Bankrecht X was the bigger o f the merger partners, its IT team tried to impose the centralised 
PKI solution after the merger. The drive failed because the IT team and the wider Bankrecht 
X had lost their power over business units due to divisionalisation.
However, despite losing discretion over user routines, the security team retained facilitative 
and dispositional power in Switzerland. This is because over 95% of the Swiss users have a 
highly standardised end-user platform called End User Platform Domestic (EUPD). Having 
showed the usefulness o f the card, the IT team shifted focus to security. The IT team engaged 
in an extensive user education program that emphasised the importance o f the cryptocard 
solution to security. By first showing the convenience o f the PKI and later its security goals, 
the IT team got a sympathetic audience because Swiss employees are acutely aware o f the 
role o f secrecy in their profession and country. Failure to respect customer privacy has direct 
personal consequences in terms of a potential six months jail term, heavy fines and dismissal. 
After the campaign, card usage increased fi’om 25% to 87%. From this evidence, we conclude 
that Bankrecht Switzerland (BS) has generally used its PKI to export secrecy to the digital 
world. Therefore, in terms o f the CIA model, BS has focused on the confidentiality element.
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Not Invented Here: Exporting the PKI solution
We previously saw that the resistance o f different agencies has restricted the power effects o f 
the PKI at Bankrecht to the episodic circuit, even in Switzerland, for three reasons. First, the 
solution was ‘invented’ in a centralised Bankrecht X but had to be used in a totally 
divionalised Bankrecht AG after the merger. Therefore, to ensure that the system remained 
alive, the security team adapted it to the new circumstances. The team opportunistically 
shifted the focus o f the PKI from a security solution to a tool that solved the problem of  
proliferating passwords. Second, the original solution was problematic, because it assumed a 
well funded IT department with a strong power base to force its use. We have seen that after 
the merger, the IT division became an impoverished subsidiary o f business divisions.
Third, the PKI solution suffered fi’om a clash o f cultures within the new Group because of 
regional differences. To overcome the problems, the Zurich security team appointed ‘local 
champions’ to spearhead the PKI project in other regions o f Switzerland. The standing 
conditions o f the champions derived from their limited authority delegated from Zurich. The 
association with the head office enabled the ‘champions’ to mobilise support for the PKI. 
Since even within Switzerland cultural differences weakened the shared meanings centred on 
banking secrecy laws, what were the prospects o f institutionalising the PKI in foreign 
divisions? We explore this process through the efforts o f the Swiss security team to fix the 
PKI as an obligatory passage point for the transformation o f Bankrecht AG into a secure and 
pre-eminent integrated global investment services firm.
Obligatory Passage Points
To recapitulate, the concept o f obligatory passage points is central to the circuits o f power 
analysis. The concept is crucial for understanding institutionalisation because it defines 
strategies, resources and artefacts that agencies attempting to control organisational agenda 
claim are requisite for solving specific problems. Having learnt that the absence o f a broad 
agenda delayed PKI institutionalisation in Switzerland, the security team saw the integration 
o f foreign divisions after the 1998 merger as an opportune moment for exporting their 
solution. This was what the original PKI designers planned in 1992. Since, the PKI had 
helped enrol interests o f different agencies in Switzerland they hoped to repeat the outcome 
abroad. To achieve their objective the team sought to make the PKI solution an OPP linking
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and translating actors such as management, business divisions, employees, Swiss security 
expertise, regulators, business partners and customers.
The security team claimed the PKI solution was critical for achieving the management goal 
o f making Bankrecht X “pre-eminent global integrated investment services firm and the 
leading bank in Switzerland” after the merger. The team did not expect stiff resistance 
because it believed its association with the head offices and the appreciation o f the resolve o f  
top management to transform Bankrecht into an integrated global group gave it authority to 
implement the PKI abroad. Our analysis focuses on attempts by Bankrecht Switzerland (BS) 
to enrol and control the London-based Bankrecht Investment (BI) with the PKI solution. 
After Gallon (1986), we assess the ‘moments’ o f translation that BS used in attempts to 
impose its definition o f the situation on Bankrecht Investment.
Problematisation
To reclaim control over IT systems lost after the merger, Bankrecht Switzerland (BS) 
identified the inconvenience and insecurity o f passwords as a key problem facing the Group. 
The Swiss IT security team not only notified BI and the Group’s top management about the 
problem, it also presented its ‘home grown’ PKI as the answer. For evidence, BS referred to 
the loss o f productivity and escalating helpdesk costs. The team also highlighted a belief by 
Swiss users that the creation o f a separate ID and password for all new applications was a 
“silly strategy.” BS warned that the situation was worse across the Group after the merger 
since 120 applications were in heavy use. Besides, the increased use o f client-server systems 
had eradicated the benefit o f Single Sign On (SSO) offered by mainframe architectures.
Since the merger had deprived the IT team of its control o f financial resources and forced the 
move fi*om a centralised to a divisionalised structure, BS knew the only way to make BI and 
other foreign divisions adopt the PKI was through building alliances with other agencies. 
Hence, BS claimed that since BI and the Group top management wanted to reduce password 
problems and create an integrated global financial services firm respectively, they should 
support the deployment o f the PKI solution. In the process, the Swiss team established the 
PKI as the OPP in the network o f relationships it constructed.
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Intéressement
In this ‘moment’, we discuss the efforts o f BS to impose and stabilise the identity o f the 
agencies it defined through problematisation. The agencies include BI, top management, 
regulators, customers, shareholders, business divisions and employees. BS promised different 
benefits to the various agencies. For top management it was the creation o f an integrated firm 
and improved compliance. Despite having a history o f taking little interest in technology, BS 
informed the managers that PKI deployment across the Group would support the integration 
of various divisions. This would satisfy a key goal o f the 1998 merger. BS also notified 
management that the global PKI roll out would ensure that the Group complied with the 
Swiss banking secrecy laws despite pursuing a model o f banking “at any time, in any place, 
by any device.” This was a compelling argument because poor risk management and absence 
of tools to enforce compliance in foreign divisions troubled Bankrecht X. Therefore, the PKI 
appeared an efficacious tool for showing regulators and business partners that the bank took 
risk control seriously. Since the PKI supported business integration, management believed it 
could also convince shareholders that the merger was, after all, a wise decision.
To Bankrecht Investment, BS promised convenience o f use and deployment, and better 
security. The BS team claimed the adoption o f their solution would be painless to BI because 
they had experience o f deploying a PKI solution for 40,000 users in Switzerland. The Vice 
President summed it up as, “Because we know how to use it, we have deployed it.” The 
experience argument was a double movement attempting to render the Swiss PKI solution an 
automatic choice and discount competitor solutions, notably Microsoft PKI. BS stuck to 
convenience as a key objective for pushing PKI to foreign divisions and informed BI that the 
Swiss experience would be beneficial. BS believed the OPP was a success. They were wrong.
The experience argument did not convince BI because they too had previously deployed an 
Entrust-based PKI, although it turned out nobody used it. BI expressed concern that since 
Switzerland had ‘invented’ the solution, it did not meet the specific needs o f the London- 
based investment division. BI objected to the centralising features o f the Swiss PKI solution 
and demanded their removal if  they were to adopt the solution. BI believed the PKI managed 
from Switzerland would only increase their dependence on the headquarters and reduce their 
desired 24*7 availability o f information. Timely access to information is more vital to 
investment banking operations than to the Switzerland-based private banking and wealth
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management business. The London-based merchant bankers also privately derided the risk- 
averse culture o f the Swiss and their number o f holidays and feared this could paralyse their 
work. Therefore, BI asked the Swiss team to modify the solution, which they saw as a threat 
to their time-pressured work practices.
BS could not discount the views o f BI for several reasons. First, the Swiss security team 
needed the good will and financial help of London to deploy the PKI abroad, since it did not 
control funding for IT projects. Second and probably most important, BI was originally part 
o f Bankrecht Y, the more internationalist and highly distributed merger partner. We have 
seen that since Bankrecht Y dominated top management positions, BI probably had more 
fnends in high places than BS after the merger. Despite operating from the Zurich head 
office, BS did not control enough resources to compel BI to adopt the PKI against their will. 
On the contrary, being a profitable operation BI had more capacity to mobilise resources and 
form alliances to limit, resist and escape BS’s exercise o f ‘power over’ them. To the 
finstration o f the Swiss team, top management was unwilling to force PKI onto BI fearing it 
may disrupt operations such as when a re-organisation exercise led to a drastic reduction in 
private banking profits from the first quarter of 1999. Claiming that “Many things are not 
seen totally at the top”, the Director o f IT Security argues that Bankrecht management 
instructed BS to deploy PKI only if  it was not disrupting banking services.
Third, BI initiated its own bout o f ‘intéressement’ by offering the Swiss team free access to 
the Entrust licenses that cost the investment bank $0.5 million but were never used. BI 
promised to adopt the Swiss solution on condition that the BS team integrated the Entrust CA 
into their SCI-PKI solution. This was an attractive proposition because BS was itself in a 
process o f replacing its own ‘home grown’ CA and proprietary network protocols with open 
standards. At the time, many people in Switzerland favoured a Baltimore PKI solution 
because they believed it was less prone to bugs from US intelligence than Entrust. Although 
they could not prove the existence o f Trojan horses, since World War II Switzerland and 
United States have often clashed over banking secrecy (Guex 2000, Schneider 2002). For 
instance, VeriSign policies oblige subscribers to revoke certificates at the issuer’s (VeriSign) 
request and surrender the private key to US authorities. The fear that US products could be 
bugged probably explains why the Swiss are major developers o f cryptographic systems.
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Despite these concerns, after close to a decade o f research and pilot projects, Bankrecht 
seemed ready for a Group-wide PKI solution. However, it never happened. When BS 
integrated the Entrust CA into their solution, BI adopted Microsoft PKI instead. Thus, BS 
failed to ensure that its assumed ally BI stuck to their part o f the deal. We explore this 
outcome under enrolment because intéressement does not necessarily lead to alliances. The 
purpose o f this ‘moment’ is to comer the entities for enrolment. We assess the measures BS 
adopted to keep the PKI alive under the mobilisation moment.
Enrolment
To Gallon (1986) enrolment constitutes multilateral negotiations, trials o f strength and tricks 
that accompany intéressement and enable it to succeed. The purpose o f the ‘moment’ is to 
define and attribute interrelated roles to respective actors. To enrol BI, Bankrecht Switzerland 
had to ensure they were willing to adopt the PKI solution. When BI granted BS access to 
their Entmst licenses, this seemed a possibility. The question then is why was BS unable to 
hold Bankrecht Investment (BI) to their promise to adopt the integrated solution? Enrolment 
failed because o f the seemingly rational BI arguments, the weakened standing conditions of 
BS and their failure to see the big picture. BI attributed their rejection o f the Swiss PKI on 
cost and support concerns. On cost, BI credibly argued that the solution was too expensive 
compared to Microsoft PKI. From rough BI estimates, Microsoft certificates cost about £4 a 
year per user because the division had a worldwide software license. The Director IT Security 
at BS admits their solution was more expensive and states,
“The costs are high. I do not have a very good impression about what they are because in BS we do not
even know how much we have invested in the project or the different projects surrounding cards ...
However, as an estimate we pay per certificate -  including tokens, cost and support -  around £200
annually per user We hope it is lower.”
The costs cover secure servers, key management, and personnel. The costs were not only 
high but also unpredictable. However, this seemingly rational BI argument failed to add that 
like other infi-astructures, the costs o f running a PKI come down with scale. Thus, despite 
dressing their objections in judicious arguments, both parties admit the rejection o f the PKI 
was political. While BI expressed concern about the lack o f 24-hour support in Switzerland, 
privately the division dismissed BS promises that the solution would have delegation 
capacity. They discounted the use o f delegation and argued that the support model would
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increase the control o f BS over their activities. Therefore, Bankrecht Investment insisted the 
PKI should be “deployed for the right technical reasons and not for political reasons.”
The engineer responsible for charting the PKI direction at BI also argues, “The service that 
BS is providing has been designed by Switzerland alone.” He claims the solution does not 
address the specific needs o f the investment banking and securities division. The Zurich- 
based Vice President who formed part o f the original PKI team classified this fear as the Not 
Invented Here (NIH) syndrome. He agrees that BI rejected the Swiss solution because they 
would have had to live with an application they did not invent. As we saw in the Oilcom 
study, the NIH syndrome is a common feature o f global organisations because they run 
diversified businesses in numerous jurisdictions under localised organisational structures. The 
Vice President claimed the Microsoft CA is a mere toolkit but not a working solution. BI 
counters that the product would get better and has lower support and development costs.
Since enrolment is a trial o f strength and tricks, we believe BS committed elementary tactical 
blunders in their dealings with BI leading to a failure to translate intéressement into 
enrolment. First, the Swiss division naively allowed BI to make cost a deciding factor in PKI 
adoption. Since infrastructures are heterogeneous, embedded into other structures and are 
socio-technical in nature due to their links with practice (Ciborra 2000, Star and Ruhleder 
1996), it is impossible to ascertain the real cost o f running one. As such, since the Swiss team 
did not control any budget but BI did and Microsoft was obviously cheaper than Entrust, the 
cost argument should not have arisen in the first place. However, even if  BI had forced the 
cost issue upon BS, we believe they could have got a better outcome by focusing not on the 
costs o f connecting but the opportunity cost o f the absence o f a PKI. A little spin on the 
argument would have won favour with top management because they were looking to create 
an integrated global firm and the PKI is a tool for such an agenda. Tellingly, BI understood 
that the failure to deploy a global PKI and Active Directory would cost the organisation dear 
in terms of future integration costs. Revealingly, a Bankrecht Investment PKI engineer did 
not blame cost for this failure but technical and political issues.
Incidentally, the engineer is an employee of US IT contractor, Perot Systems. He claims that 
outsourcing has enabled BI to agree divisional IT solutions and deploy them without thinking 
about organisational political implications. However, this is unconvincing. We believe BI 
brought in Perot not to reduce politics within the Group but to reinforce it. We saw that the
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ability to produce and achieve collective goals depends on material conditions, which are 
technological methods o f control and associated skills and means. Despite its loss o f power, 
Bankrecht Switzerland still controls the IT infrastructure that supports wealth management, 
the bank’s core business. Therefore, the only way London could avoid the claws o f Zurich is 
by proving that it has the capacity to provide a credible and cheaper alternative to the Swiss 
PKI solution. Perot Systems is thus a vital ally in BFs quest to reproduce existing 
configurations o f rules and domination that support its independent IT.
After comparing proposals from Switzerland and London, each justifying their own PKI 
solution, the divisions decided to go separate ways. BI elected to install and run its own 
hierarchy o f Microsoft Certification Authorities (CAs). Although cost was the main reason, 
the Swiss Director IT Security added, “They are probably not unhappy about the fact that this 
enables (BI) to remain independent o f Switzerland as regards PKI.” Thus, BS failed to 
establish its PKI solution as an OPP for a secure and integrated Bankrecht AG.
Mobilisation
Having failed to enrol BI with the experience angle, BS continued to explore ways o f keeping 
the dream of deploying their PKI solution across the Group alive. Fortuitously for the Swiss 
team, the wrangle with BI alerted top management to the potential conflicts and confusion 
that a failure to coordinate PKI activities at Group level could cause. Emboldened by this 
opening, BS tactfully abandoned the push for their PKI solution fi*om a technical experience 
angle and instead emphasised the costs o f disintegration arising from separate PKIs. As we 
observe elsewhere, the Swiss team should have used the same argument to anchor its earlier 
intéressement drive because top management had a similar agenda. Management quickly 
grasped the dangers at hand.
We should mention that in fulfilment o f our research access obligations we submitted a report 
to Bankrecht on 12^  ^December 2002, which highlighted the lack o f coordination o f PKI and 
the inherent risks to future interoperability. The report covered the views o f both BS and BI 
regarding PKI activities in Group. The report seems to have pleased BS more than BI. For 
instance, on 17^  ^December 2002 Director IT Security wrote that.
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“Thank you for the report - it gives us good feedback on how our solutions and views are perceived by 
"unbiased" people. On top of that, there are also a number of very interesting hints about how (BI) judges 
our approaches to PKI and tokens - this is not always very transparent to us.”
The BS team shifted from the experience angle and highlighted conflicts and paralysis 
created by divisional PKI arrangements. They claimed that the lack o f PKI coordination was 
not only impeding current business, defeating the objectives o f the merger, pursuing the same 
course o f action could totally paralyse operations and lead to unbearable future integration 
costs. This was a fundamental statement in the BS quest to mobilise support for the PKI 
solution because nobody could contradict it. The lead PKI engineer at BI had admitted as 
much. Crucially, top management was sensitive to any statements that implied that the 
merger was not working properly. The attitude is understandable because commentators had 
dismissed the merger as an effort to save Bankrecht X from collapse without business logic. 
Therefore, Bankrecht was unwilling to vindicate its critics.
Gallon (1986) regards mobilisation as the ‘moment’ for determining the legitimacy o f the 
spokesperson. An actor who becomes a spokesperson translates the wishes o f other actors 
into a single will for which they speak. Thus, since Bankrecht Switzerland (BS) articulated 
the wishes o f top management for an integrated group and was unopposed by BI, it became a 
macro-actor. BS became a single voice that spoke for silent actors like customers, business 
partners, employees and regulators who had a stake in a successful Bankrecht. However, 
what BS lacked was a powerful agenda upon which to anchor the unison voice it had created. 
The re-branding drive that started in late 2002 offered the required platform.
Mobilising PKI support through branding
In Chapter 6, we saw that the re-branding initiative implemented in June 2003 abolished all 
subsidiary brands and replaced them with a single corporate brand. The drive added credence 
to BS claims that divisionalised PKI arrangements would create anarchy within the Group. BI 
normally retorted that these were manageable risks over-emphasised by BS to achieve 
political objectives. However, branding convinced top management of the significance o f the 
BS apocalyptic claims. Why then was branding able to galvanise support for a centralised 
PKI? First, top management believed the branding initiative was a great opportunity to 
achieve its cherished but elusive ‘integrated business model’ or ‘one firm’ approach. Second, 
Bankrecht could not risk the failure o f the drive because it was an extremely costly venture.
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For instance, the bank wrote down about CHF 1 billion for abolishing a subsidiary brand that 
was capitalised on its balance sheet.
Ironically, the actions o f BI triggered the confirmation o f Switzerland as the legitimate 
spokesperson for an integrated firm agenda. BI brought management wrath down upon itself 
by contravening branding regulations in their naming o f the root CA and certificates for their 
divisional PKI. The powerful branding team called ‘Project Orlando’ promptly reprimanded 
BI over their actions. A Swiss IT team based in the Wealth Management & Business Banking 
(WM&BB) division took the opportunity to stress the vitality o f PKI coordination across the 
Group. Its new member, the Director IT Security, wrote,
“On Group level there is an urgent need for governance for PKI activities as there is aheady a number of 
CAs in operation and others planned by the different members of the Group, The primary goals of the 
governing body (should be) setting the framework for (...) internal PKIs by issuing guidelines ...; 
supervising PKI activities in (...) to force conformance with above regulations and coordination 
among different applications and user communities...”
The WM&BB IT team suggested the creation o f a Centralised Certificate Management 
(CCM) scheme. They issued a ‘request for proposal’ document to solicit opinions o f different 
Bankrecht divisions about a centralised PKI. In his response to the document, the Director IT 
Security appealed to project Orlando to evaluate PKIs already deployed to identify the ones 
acceptable to Bankrecht AG and define their purposes. In his view, this would minimise the 
number o f separate PKIs. Because o f the potentially huge financial and market implications 
o f failed branding, management asked the WM&BB team to lead the CCM initiative and 
instructed BI to participate. WM&BB invited BI, divisions in Switzerland and the US, and a 
private law firm to form a CCM interest group under Orlando.
Starting March 2003 Orlando set out to establish a centralised PKI as spelt out in 1992 by the 
Bankrecht X security team. In the first action against independent PKIs, the CCM team 
decided to move all divisional websites to Bankrecht main domain. This was a significant 
decision because it effectively installed Switzerland-based WM&BB as PKI coordinator 
across the Group. Second, the WM&BB IT team barred divisions fi*om either ordering 
certificates or assigning this task to a third party. WM&BB claimed this was because from a 
legal perspective only the owner o f the domain is entitled to make such arrangements. 
WM&BB argued this favours centralised certificate management. BI was the obvious target 
of the directives. As we saw, BI not only triggered the branding crisis that led to the
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formation of the cross Group PKI coordination team, it relied on third parties for its needs. 
Therefore, the CCM scheme reduced the number o f intermediaries and confirmed WM&BB 
as the undisputed spokesperson for PKI at Bankrecht AG.
WM&BB organised a workshop that rubber-stamped its position as a macro-actor that spoke 
for top management, the brand, the PKI solution and surprisingly, BI. WM&BB manoeuvred 
BI into endorsing its network o f alliances by appointing one o f its senior managers as 
coordinator o f the CCM scheme. While in the past BI easily dismissed the PKI as ‘made in 
Switzerland’, they could not make similar claims with their own manager coordinating CCM. 
Therefore, branding coerced hitherto warring divisions into an accommodation that brought 
the dream of a centralised PKI closer. The magnitude o f the feat only gets clearer when we 
remember that in three months the brand-inspired CCM drive achieved more than what the 
team achieved in 11 years o f research, pilot projects and re-invention o f PKI objectives.
Since an OPP enrols interests o f different agencies into stable representations to create 
alliances for achieving outcomes o f power, should Bankrecht expect the branding forced PKI 
compromise to endure? We are doubtful for these reasons. First, although the Orlando 
project re-distributed power for PKI management, it was unable to erode the standing 
conditions of business divisions because they still control IT funds. For instance, WM&BB 
warned that without extra funding for CCM responsibilities, “we’ll have to keep managing 
certificates in a decentralised manner.”
Second, despite setbacks that led to the creation o f the Centralised Certificate Management 
(CCM) scheme, our sources indicate that BI, recently renamed Bankrecht Investment Bank, 
continues to lobby management and the branding team that CA and certificate names are 
strictly technical issues best left to the independent divisional IT teams. This is no surprise 
because as Callon (1986) reveals, translation involves dissidence where agencies question, 
discuss, negotiate and potentially reject the authenticity o f the spokesperson. We believe the 
arrangements are precarious because branding only achieved the CCM outcome through the 
episodic circuit without affecting rules and techniques o f production. The latter are critical for 
reproducing episodic power because they constitute the field o f force that enable strategies 
espoused in the circuit to make sense in an organisational context.
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Social integration
Under this circuit, we analyse the relationship between the PKI solution and rules o f meaning 
and membership. Despite efforts to control policy from the ‘Corporate Centre’ with an 
emphasis on shared values, culture and the brand, Bankrecht is anything but a cohesive social 
arrangement. Let us explain why. The first reason for social disintegration is the Swiss origin 
of the bank. Switzerland is a small but diverse country. While Swiss bankers have a shared 
understanding o f the importance o f the stringent Banking Secrecy laws, there are sharp 
regional differences. Bankrecht AG has two head offices because Bankrecht X (BX) and 
Bankrecht Y (BY) had offices in Zurich and Basel respectively. Although both cities are in 
the German speaking area, Basel is more cosmopolitan because it is located on the Rhine 
where the borders o f Switzerland, Germany and France meet. To a French-speaking Swiss 
respondent, the two cities speak different dialects o f Swiss-German. Basel residents also 
speak limited French and English. However, he adds,
“Zurich does not really 'speak' French and they are actually trying to get rid of French as the primary 
foreign language and replace it by English... Culture is difficult to define... I usually place the Basel- 
people in a separate category from the other Swiss-Germans (i.e. they happen to vote on the same side as 
the French-speaking people on various issues). I must point out that Zurich is in a category of its own 
and many Swiss-Germans resent the people there as being too snobbish...”
Regional cultural differences forced the PKI team to create documentation, learning programs 
and structure helpdesk support in German (North), French (West) and Italian (South) and 
English. The sharp cultural differences between the two merger partners only aggravated the 
regional differences. BY, the smaller bank, organised itself on the lines o f a dynamic 
American-style financial institution. This bank had a young board o f directors composed o f  
former management consultants, academics and veterans o f international expansion. BY 
never actively tried to change the cultures o f the numerous investment hanks, derivative 
houses and asset managers it purchased in the late 1980s in the United States and the UK. On 
the contrary, old guard Swiss bankers managed BX. In a sharp difference to BY, this hank 
actively sought to re-model acquisitions on its own image. Observers claim BX ‘attempted to 
conquer the world with Swiss culture.’ Unlike BY, that opened branches abroad soon after its 
creation, BX only ventured abroad after it became Switzerland’s largest bank in the 1960s. 
The banks also had different business structures. BY had autonomous global divisions while 
BX operated a rigidly controlled hierarchical structure with all decisions emanating from its
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Zurich corporate centre. Earlier efforts to merge the two banks reportedly failed because BX 
refused to abandon its structure in favour o f more dynamic arrangements at BY. Observers 
claim that with problems mounting, BX jumped at the merger to stave off collapse.
The cultural differences hampered PKI institutionalisation because the different meanings 
assigned to the solution forced the security team to re-empbasise its legitimacy constantly in 
other business divisions. This is why attempts by the former BX team to force the PKI 
solution on the new entity failed. We argue that this was because the original PKI and its 
objective of security conceived at BX, resulted in a conflict o f understanding between the two 
sets o f employees. Put differently, the PKI designed to reflect the bureaucratic requirements 
of BX failed to make sense in the new environment with new meanings. This is why user 
convenience became a central tenet o f the PKI drive. The spin on the PKI objective made 
good sense to most employees because the merger bad doubled user applications and 
passwords. Since, Bankrecht was not ready to eradicate duplicate applications owing to the 
politics o f the process, users found the cryptocard a helpful support for work. Redefining the 
PKI objective was the only feasible alternative because the Swiss team lacked the capacity to 
either modify or contradict the meanings held by employees.
To consolidate the new interest, the security team launched a big educational campaign to fix 
the rules o f meaning and membership attached to the PKI. This was vital for the social 
integration o f the PKI in Switzerland because it cemented its new role as a useful tool. 
However, the cryptocard is not a critical tool for membership since employees use different 
cards for physical and network access. Users could leave their cards at home and/or lose them 
but still access resources because management stopped the security team from enforcing card 
use. Management intervened because the PKI demanded more sweeping changes to the rules 
of meaning and membership than what was politically feasible. With its weak control o f  
resources, the security team accepted the outcome to keep the PKI alive. Thus, the PKI failed 
to achieve wide social integration because o f the absence o f direct alignment with rules of 
membership. However, despite the poor fixing in rules o f membership, cryptocard usage 
jumped from 25% to 82% when it became obligatory for internet surfing.
Let us conclude this circuit with a brief comment about the Bankrecht brand. Under the OPP 
section we saw that progress on a Group-wide PKI came after the rationalisation o f brands 
and enforcement o f the ‘one firm’ approach in 2002. Why then did the security team not use
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the brand to drive PKI deployment earlier? The answer is that since all power and money 
went to the divisions after the merger, corporate management lacked the resources to enforce 
rationalisation. In admitting defeat, management claimed that diversity is strength. Of course, 
this contradicted the official goal of having an ‘integrated business model’ or ‘one firm’ 
approach that implied a consistent corporate culture across the globe.
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System integration
To reiterate, this circuit deals with the material conditions o f production and discipline. It also 
explains the coordination o f work practices through a link with facilitative power. We have 
argued that PKI institutionalisation has been problematic at Bankrecht because the solution 
has both remained outside work practices and contradicted rules o f meaning and membership. 
The PKI solution failed to attain systemic integration with its original focus on security 
because employees and management saw it as an impediment to work practices. However, 
87% of employees later adopted the PKI when it helped their work by arresting the password 
nightmare. The security team did not modify the technical features o f the PKI, but simply 
aligned it with the prevailing institutional order.
However, developers refused to use the card because they did not perceive its usefulness. For 
example, they did not share concerns about proliferating user passwords because their job 
barred them from using banking applications. In general, the group had different norms, rules 
and meanings from the rest o f the employees and saw the cryptocard as a nuisance. Without 
shared meanings over the role o f the cryptocard, the security team attached the PKI to 
techniques o f production and discipline. The security team used its standing conditions, 
notably control over IT in Switzerland and shared meanings about secrecy laws, to make 
cryptocard logon mandatory for internet browsing in February 2002. The developers 
‘voluntarily’ adopted the cryptocard because mandatory certificate-based logon transformed 
it from a nuisance to an essential gateway to the internet, a vital tool for their work. Although 
the enrolment o f developers only added 5% new users, it was significant because they have 
the skills to evade most technical controls.
A major reason developers resisted the cryptocard is because they knew it was a tool for 
surveillance and discipline. According to the Director IT Security, “The bank wants to 
monitor who is communicating and what they are downloading from the Internet. People 
intervene if  you download things you are not expected to download.” An IT support specialist 
agrees. He reveals Bankrecht Switzerland employees are aware o f the internet monitoring but 
they still use it. The bank does not monitor the information downloaded but keeps a log o f  
website URLs and compiles a monthly tally for each individual. From the information, the IT 
division selects frequently visited inappropriate websites and blocks them. As spelt out in the
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internet access policy, the culprits may also face disciplinary action. If employees have many 
websites blocked in quick succession, senior administrators reprimand them. For example, 
managers questioned an employee who visited a website o f a rival bank about three times a 
day because they thought he had a stock account with them. Bankrecht forbids stock dealing 
with rivals. However, he argued the website had clearer charts. Therefore, the conversion of 
the cryptocard into a disciplinary tool enabled the PKI to achieve systemic integration in 
Switzerland. The PKI disciplinary features relied on the surveillance o f employees through 
the collection, recording and comparison of data about their internet activities.
Enterprise Directory
If the PKI achieved systemic integration in Switzerland, why was it so difficult to deploy it at 
Bankrecht Investment and other divisions? The explanation largely lies with the failed 
attempt to deploy an enterprise directory. At Oilcom, we saw that Active Directory (AD) 
provides the technological means o f control over its physical and social environment. 
Likewise, in Chapter 6 we saw that a key component o f the Bankrecht Switzerland PKI under 
the “Security Base Services” layer is an LDAP directory. The directory provides the material 
conditions for controlling the Bankrecht Switzerland environment because it stores PKI 
credentials and access control data that authenticates the cryptocard. The PKI credentials 
include the encryption and authentication certificates and private keys. In the event of card 
loss or an employee leaving the bank, the directory also supports key recovery because it 
stores a copy o f the encryption certificate private key for cloning the certificate. Therefore, 
the directory helped PKI achieve systemic integration in Switzerland because it upholds the 
bureaucratic and formalised procedures embedded in the infrastructure. Like AD at Oilcom, 
this directory offers the Swiss IT team a hierarchical view o f the network and a single point 
for controlling the behaviour of network objects and actions o f agencies.
However, the biggest problem with this hierarchical directory structure was that it still 
assumed the powerful IT division at Bankrecht X that controlled all computer resources in the 
bank. We saw that the merger disempowered the IT division. Bankrecht Investment rejected 
the Swiss efforts to create an enterprise wide Active Directory citing technical and political 
reasons. We believe the technical reasons are political too. For instance, BI complained that 
since Switzerland designed the directory structure and its support model alone, it would raise
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administrative strains. This is tme because while Active Directory (AD) relies on a logical 
hierarchy to manage information this conflicted with the divisional Bankrecht stmcture.
The acceptance o f a common AD would have given Bankrecht Switzerland control over the 
whole infrastmcture for the following reasons. In Switzerland, the directory affected 
organisational power distribution because it gave the security team a better capacity to 
monitor and control activities o f other agencies. BS argued that the goal o f the directory was 
to improve information flows within the bank in support of the ‘one firm’ philosophy. 
However, BI rejected the argument insisting that a central directory implied a single body of  
administration that would increase the dominance o f the network by Switzerland.
Bankrecht Switzerland also promised to delegate administrative duties to BI. This idea was a 
non-starter as well because it still envisaged the discarded institutional logic o f Bankrecht X. 
In this stmcture, the IT division was a benevolent ‘dictator’ that rigidly enforced standards 
and occasionally shared its powers with grateful business divisions. We believe BS attempted 
to reconstitute this order stealthily using Active Directory, because the Group Policy feature 
gives administrators power to decide how much authority to delegate. In practice, Bankrecht 
Switzerland asked BI to surrender control over IT to boost the wider ‘corporate interest’ o f an 
integrated group. Incidentally, this ‘corporate’ interest was itself politically constmcted 
because to BS it meant the extension o f Swiss caution to a foreign division that they believed 
was wilfully aping the mistakes o f American banks. Conversely, BI saw itself as a bulwark 
against reactionary tendencies espoused by its Swiss bosses.
BI believed that a Swiss-controlled enterprise directory would disempower it by limiting its 
influence over the IT infrastmcture it funded from its own resources. BI pointed out that its 
businesses such as equity trading demand a 24*7 IT services yet Switzerland did not have 
this provision in its support arrangements. Therefore, London would have had to work on 
Swiss time. BI also claimed that the Swiss could not manage the directory for the entire bank 
because they had more holidays than the UK.
Under these circumstance the success o f the directory relied on either BS inducing or forcing 
BI to adopt the directory. Compulsion would not work because Switzerland’s weakened 
resource control translated into little causal power. The Swiss IT team lacked inducements 
because the divisions controlled IT funds. Lastly, BS could not rely on top management
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because o f concerns AD could disrupt work. Therefore, the enterprise directory idea failed 
owing to BS’ limited control o f resources, a failure to reshape rules o f practice and its 
interruption o f techniques o f production. The failure presented a colossal obstacle to PKI 
institutionalisation because the directory is critical for maintaining user discipline. Even 
attempts to force a global PKI under the guise of branding are precarious because the CCM 
scheme does not cater for a common directory. In addition, BI is attempting organisational 
outflanking with a concerted effort to convince management that the Swiss PKI is both 
disruptive to work and is more costly than Microsoft PKI. Therefore, without a directory to 
‘store power’ won through branding, the centralised Swiss PKI looks vulnerable.
Outcomes
The PKI solution has tremendously improved security and user convenience in its native 
Switzerland. The success is owed to the willingness o f the security team to redefine its 
objectives to fit changing organisational meanings. Throughout its life in Switzerland, the 
PKI has relied on changing legitimations to keep track with concrete social processes. 
However, whatever the changes, the PKI benefits from the backdrop o f shared meanings 
emanating from the strict Swiss banking secrecy laws. Thus, the PKI not only reflects the 
Bankrecht AG institutional order but also responds to wider pressures within Switzerland.
Despite over a decade o f research and pilot projects, the Swiss PKI has failed to become a 
Group-wide solution. We show that power and politics explain this failure. The PKI was 
problematic even in Switzerland until February 2002 because it reflected the institutional 
order o f Bankrecht X that disappeared with the merger. Put differently, the PKI was a 
packaged solution whose survival relied on being unbundled for the different conditions. 
Williams (1997) argues that implementation problems for packaged solutions often reflect 
lack o f fit between the social relations in the developer firm, which become embedded in the 
software, and the actual circumstances of the user (Avgerou 2000, Silverstone and Haddon
1996). Ciborra (2000) also warns that hospitality for systems with panoptic abilities (Zuboff 
1988) may turn into hostility because users require circumspection to embed the incongruous 
systems into work routines.
The conflict with work routines in the new Bankrecht AG has been a critical hurdle to PKI 
institutionalisation because this stopped top management from actively supporting it. The
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security team proved ingenious in constantly aligning the PKI solution to changing meanings 
and membership rules in Switzerland. However, these legitimations emphasised secrecy and 
offered nothing to foreign divisions that prized availability. Bankrecht Investment, the most 
vocal division, claimed Switzerland had rigged the PKI and its support model to increase its 
control over the activities o f foreign divisions. Although BI officially rejected the solution 
with rational total cost o f ownership and disruption o f work arguments, privately they insist 
the Swiss PKI is technically inefficient and politically motivated.
PKI as part of Bankrecht life
In early 2002, PKI attained systemic integration at Bankrecht Switzerland when the smart 
cryptocard became mandatory for internet access. After Berger and Luckmann (1967), we 
argue that the link o f the cryptocard with internet access enabled institutionalisation because 
it controlled the actions o f recalcitrant developers and users by setting predefined patterns of  
conduct. Consequently, while before certificate-based internet logon became mandatory the 
PKI was optional, the removal of the password option made the cryptocard an undeniable fact 
of Bankrecht Switzerland life. The PKI became external to employees and persisted whether 
they liked it or not because the criticality of the internet to work enabled the security features 
on the cryptocard to resist attempts to evade them. In brief, the cryptocard graduated from a 
nuisance to an essential support for work practices that agencies took for granted.
However, the PKI remains highly visible because o f frequent problems with cryptocard 
lockouts that require intervention from the IT support division. In early 2003, BS issued new 
certificate pairs on the cryptocard for all employees in Switzerland using an Entrust CA to 
phase out the old proprietary or ‘home grown’ CA. Originally, the certificates supported 
certificate-based login to a hundred banking applications. Bankrecht Switzerland also enabled 
the use o f the certificates for encrypting internal e-mail from June 2003. This was after a 
secure e-mail pilot project involving one hundred users that tested Microsoft Outlook and 
Entrust plug-ins in July 2002. It uses an authenticating certificate for signing e-mails and an 
encrypting certificate to decipher. However, PKI institutionalisation is incomplete because 
about 2.5% of all employees reftised to use their cryptocards and hence have remained 
outside the scope o f the system. However, to Bankrecht AG this is a negligible number.
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From infrastructure to institution
Certificate-based logon certainly offers Switzerland more security and stability of action than 
the user passwords and scripts that it replaced. Despite problems with developers, the 
majority o f employees adopted the PKI after an extensive educational exercise. The solution 
succeeded in Switzerland because BS shrewdly linked it to work processes and structures 
such as the LDAP directory and smart cryptocards. However, unlike Oilcom, the Bankrecht 
cryptocard is not ultimate evidence o f membership because the use o f separate physical and 
logic access cards has allowed some users to ignore the certificate scheme.
The clash o f cultures between Bankrecht X and Y slowed down PKI institutionalisation in 
Switzerland. However, the problems are even worse abroad. The PKI became divisive after it 
required a uniform modification o f rules, meanings and techniques o f production in a 
distributed organisation. Institutionalisation failed because o f dissidence in the ranks o f  
powerful actors that BS had enrolled to support the PKI. BI led the voices questioning the 
authenticity o f BS as spokesperson for an integrated and secure Bankrecht AG. The London 
division officially baulked at the PKI cost but covertly questioned its political motivation. 
This organisational outflanking sowed doubt in the minds o f top managers and reduced their 
determination to push the radical social and political change envisaged by the Swiss PKI.
Consequently, the merger caused a fimdamental change in the politics, IT support structures 
and culture o f Bankrecht AG. There was an open clash between the meanings embedded in 
the PKI and the new organisational rules and norms. We argue that the institutionalisation 
problems are not because the PKI is technically inefficient but because the system lacked 
support from existing institutional structures. Unlike Oilcom, this became critical because BS 
lacks the standing conditions to create new support structures for the PKI solution.
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CHAPTER 8: 
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This is our closing chapter and it proceeds as follows. The first section gives an overview of 
the research. Next, we present our theoretical, methodological and practical contributions. 
Thereafter we discuss the import o f the research approach focusing on design limitations and 
adequacy of the framework. We conclude with ideas for further research.
Overview of the research
This study began with a general interest in large information infrastructures and their impacts 
on managerial and decision-making structures o f global organisations. Infrastructures reach 
beyond single events and incorporate other structures, social arrangements and technologies. 
Thus, their institutionalisation may have political implications in pluralistic organisations. We 
outline our arguments, motivation and scope o f the research in Chapter 1. The chapter takes 
readers to the subject matter with a ‘sneak preview’ o f the storyline we develop later in the 
dissertation. We also set the tone for the rest o f the dissertation and present debates 
surrounding PKI and power. We focused on PKI for two reasons. First, PKIs are vital for e- 
commerce, e-business and e-govemment security because they support authentication and 
authorisation in stranger-to-stranger transactions. Second, the real objective o f PKIs is to 
restrict the actions o f users and eventually create a stable and secure operational environment. 
Since “we all hate the constraints o f security controls on our freedom of moving about and 
reading, talking and writing (Parker 1997),” a PKI can potentially cause user disaffection.
Chapter 2 reviews literature on cryptography and its effects on organisational power and 
responsibility structures. To our chagrin, both cryptography and general IS infrastructure 
literature is mainly technical in focus. For instance, a focus on interoperation issues 
dominates PKI literature. The belief is that the main hindrance to PKI interoperation is the 
lack o f technical capacity to connect infrastructures owing to incompatible implementations. 
However, recent literature on PKI has exposed flaws in this purely technical approach. First,
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authors warn that cryptography may not live up to the hyped vendor claims because it was 
originally a communication security tool not a web security solution. Second, encryption 
algorithms routinely fail because security is a process not a product. Third, critics counsel 
that since it is difficult mathematically to ensure that individuals properly use their keys, it is 
vital to focus on procedures. Despite this new realism, the literature still largely attributes the 
low uptake o f PKI to technical factors not organisational problems.
Since a public key infrastructure shapes its context and vice versa, we assess how insights 
from political and organisational theory can enrich technical security approaches. We start 
with a review o f the literature discussing the role o f power and politics in IS adoption. 
Thereafter, we explore the technical security literature focusing on cryptography. To show 
how a public key infrastructure becomes a catalyst for organisational power and politics, we 
use the concepts o f infrastructure and institution to link technical security and power.
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework. We review the elusive concept o f power, how 
to gain and manage with it. Accepting that there is no single all-embracing concept o f power, 
we explore the relational notions advanced by Law (1991b). These are ‘power to’, ‘power 
over’, ‘power storage’ and ‘power discretion’. Law observes that power networks are never 
purely social because they are a product o f a fabric that integrates social relations and 
technical, architectural, textual and natural non-human actors. He believes that the Circuits of 
Power (Co?) can explain the relationships in this socio-technical network. The Co? offers a 
central tradition o f power that includes different debates and explains well-grounded 
alternative conceptions. The chapter also briefly considers insights from Structuration Theory 
on power and legitimation o f institutions.
Chapter 4 examines the philosophical aspects of this dissertation and its relationship with the 
broader IS research traditions. The first part focuses on epistemological assumptions and their 
impact on how researchers understand the world and communicate this knowledge. Next, we 
assess the three major IS research epistemologies namely positivist, interpretive and critical. 
We give reasons for our selection o f the interpretive tradition. Thereafter, we briefly discuss 
the philosophical roots o f computer security. The chapter then examines research strategies 
with a focus on case studies. We give our rationale for selecting this strategy and explore 
different case study types, designs and controversies. Next, we describe the selection o f the 
study organisations and our research decisions. An examination of data collection techniques
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follows. We assess the contributions and limitations of the native CoP in data collection. 
After this review, we introduce three data collection themes. Lastly, we describe our data 
analysis procedure. Starting from the broad CoP lenses, we apply the iterative data analysis 
approach entitled telling-showing-telling.
Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings from the two case studies. We use our own themes to 
present the findings. Starting with the business environment theme. Chapter 5 discusses the 
history and current governance structures o f Oilcom. The governance structures link to the 
social aspects theme. The technology adoption theme starts with a discussion o f GID, a 
mandatory desktop infrastructure. GID is a vital system because it gives the context for the 
use o f PKI and explains its success. Chapter 6 begins with a summary o f the two phases o f  
the pioneering PKI efforts at Bankrecht AG. Under business environment, we explore the 
import o f banking secrecy to the profitability and survival of this archetypal Swiss bank. 
Under social aspects, we explain the cohesive power o f the Bankrecht brand. Technology 
adoption also reflects the omnipotence of banking secrecy laws. The theme traces the two 
phases o f PKI evolution starting 1992. PKI efforts end in disarray in the first phase with the 
creation o f numerous independent divisional Certification Authorities. However, branding 
intervenes in the second phase to bolster the tottering efforts to create a group-wide PKI.
In Chapter 7, we bring the findings from the two studies together and analyse them with the 
CoP framework lenses. Using the telling-showing-telling characterisation, this chapter tells 
readers what the data in the previous two chapters showed. We use the framework to explore 
the political undercurrents o f the two PKI projects based on the theoretical ideas presented in 
Chapter 3. We discuss each case study separately but, where appropriate, we compare the 
findings as we go along. Overall, the findings support the arguments outlined at the beginning 
of the study. We show that since PKIs restrict freedom of action, they affect power and 
responsibility structures and hence the infrastructure may face institutionalisation hurdles.
The two cases demonstrated that shifting power balances is not only the desired outcome of 
PKI deployment, the institutionalisation o f the infrastructure itself relies on power. As we 
emphasise later, we believe this socio-technical study offers a useful explanation of the 
political ramifications o f PKIs that should enrich the dominant technical approaches.
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Contributions
This section discusses the contributions o f our research. There is a close link between the 
three types o f contributions because the Circuits o f Power provides both the theoretical 
foundation for the research and informs our methodological approach. We group the 
contributions into theoretical, methodological and practical subdivisions.
Theoretical contributions
As stated in Chapter 3, we build on the works o f other IS researchers who have used the 
Circuits o f Power (CoP) framework notably (Introna 1997, Silva 1997, Silva and Backhouse
1997). Silva (1997) adapted the framework for IS research from Clegg (1989). However, 
there are differences between our contributions and previous research. First, we evaluate a 
pervasive technology that changes work habits and opens up the organisation to the outside 
world. Second, apart from their scope, PKIs focus on security - a “moving target.” Hence, our 
contribution is two fold. First, we assess the efficacy o f the framework in informing and 
guiding information security studies. We use the two empirical studies to provide a more 
detailed appraisal of the framework’s utility in explaining the relationship between power and 
institutionalisation. Second, since the CoP links context and process, it helps us challenge the 
philosophical foundations of security literature.
Starting from the episodic circuit, the study underlined the vitality o f mobilising resources 
and alliances to achieve PKI institutionalisation. While the focus o f current PKI research is 
on creating interoperable infrastructures, we show that the decisive factors are organisational. 
Findings from both Oilcom and Bankrecht showed that Microsoft PKI was inferior to 
solutions from vendors like Entrust and Baltimore. For example, security consultants at 
Oilcom described Microsoft PKI as unsuitable for large e-business applications. However, 
despite its debatable technical efficacy, Oilcom and Bankrecht Investment (BI) selected 
Microsoft PKI because its supporters mobilised a strong field o f force. BI used a seemingly 
rational and correct observation that Microsoft PKI was cheaper than Entrust. However, they 
revealed that they chose the solution because it kept their IT independent o f Switzerland. We 
conclude that as long as powerful interests wish a system to succeed, they will mobilise 
resources to achieve the outcome irrespective o f whether it is technically efficient or not.
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We found substantial PKI institutionalisation at Oilcom and partial success at Bankrecht 
Switzerland. Power and politics influenced both outcomes. At Bankrecht, there was a failure 
to create a socio-technical network durable enough to support PKI and generate conditions 
and effects o f power. Management vetoed the forced use o f the early PKI version because of 
a fear that onerous security requirements would harm time-sensitive businesses. However, 
when the security team presented the PKI as a support for user convenience, both managers 
and employees accepted the solution. Unfortunately, this alliance collapsed after the merger. 
However, the chances o f a centralised PKI recently improved not because o f technical 
reasons but owing to the constitution of a network o f alliances to support a re-branding 
initiative. Overall, success will depend on whether the Zurich-based Wealth Management & 
Business Banking division can hold the alliances together. At Oilcom, system integration was 
problematic too at the start. Group Infrastructure (GI) disrupted work practices by increasing 
network logon times. GI also assigned employees more IT support responsibilities. Hence, 
system integration was vital for both PKIs because o f its link with work practices.
However, the social integration circuit was the most decisive at both organisations. In making 
the changes, Oilcom built on the existing institutional order notably the use o f smart cards 
and badges. Unlike Bankrecht where employees viewed the cryptocard as an inconvenience, 
the Oilcom card is proof o f membership because it incorporates physical and logical access 
functions. Of course, the ability o f the card to control membership relied on PKI and Active 
Directory features that belong to the system integration circuit. This was at the individual 
level. At the organisational level, Oilcom changed norms, challenged the autonomy of  
operating companies, restructured user groups and made the changes durable using the 
system integration circuit. The changes in the institutional order ensured that the PKI- 
supported systemic integration remained stable long enough to achieve episodic outcomes o f  
power. Since the CoP framework considers power to be circulating through the episodic, 
social integration and system integration circuits, it gives a fuller picture o f the impact o f  
power in PKI institutionalisation.
Bankrecht had PKI too but failed to change the social rules and norms for two reasons. First, 
the merger dismantled the alliance that supported PKI. Second, a bewildering spate of 
restructuring exercises led to the situation where the business divisions, the power targets, 
eventually became more powerful than the IT team. Thus, systemic integration enabled by
242
the PKI did not generate conditions for power because without social integration in the new 
Bankrecht entity, the security infrastructure never made contextual sense.
We saw that the structures o f both organisations had features that hampered the exercise of 
power. Let us focus on Oilcom. The Group is a distributed organisation by tradition with 
operating companies (DCs) largely autonomous. This structure made it difficult to drive 
projects from the top. Oilcom also operated on a consensus basis. Under these circumstances, 
despite the dispositional and facilitative power o f the Board and its representatives such as 
service companies and Excoms, no project proceeded without the consent o f the OCs. The 
PKI drive under GID totally went against these arrangements. Therefore, the redefinition o f  
rules decisively helped PKI institutionalisation.
While the social integration circuit was decisive at both organisations, our findings show the 
symbiotic nature of the circuits. At Oilcom, systemic integration succeeded because o f  
changes in the institutional order. However, the stability o f the new order rests on systemic 
integration elements notably Active Directory and smart cards. In turn, the social integration 
circuit ensures that the artefacts make sense in the new context. Bankrecht had problems with 
its PKI because the solution lacked the support of organisational processes after the merger 
and hence did not make sense in the new order.
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Methodological contributions
There is a close link between our methodological and theoretical contributions because we 
used the Circuits o f Power framework as both theory and methodology. We use the two case 
studies to assess the efficacy o f the framework in guiding research design, data collection and 
analysis in information security. While we build on the work o f Silva (1997), we abandoned 
his “interviews and data collection guide” to overcome repetitions and tone down ominous 
language. Instead, we created three themes to cover the business environment, technology 
adoption and social aspects. The decision was useful because we not only studied a difficult 
topic o f power and politics, we focused on the sensitive area o f security with one study based 
in secrecy-crazed Switzerland. To facilitate replication we include a sample set o f questions 
developed with our themes in the Appendix. The rest o f this subsection discusses our 
methodological contributions.
Hard systems thinking still dominates security approaches despite its declining appeal in 
information systems design. As the obsessive focus on PKI interoperability issues shows, the 
approach assumes that IS institutionalisation problems are technical not social or political. As 
such, security professionals believe that once the technology functions properly, the value- 
consensus employees will accept it. Shunning this orthodoxy, we use an interpretive approach 
to examine the role o f power and politics in security practice. Our methodology relies on the 
ideographic view. To reiterate, this approach emphasises letting the subject unfold its nature 
and characteristics during the study. With this background, we adopted a case study research 
strategy because o f its ability to explain the link between PKI, power and work practices. An 
explanation o f this problematic interaction is vital because PKI only become useful to 
organisations if  embedded in everyday work practices.
We saw that defining work is complex and politically sensitive (Star and Bowker 1995). 
Therefore, we make a useful methodological contribution to security research by introducing 
an approach that captures the essentially contested nature o f organisational life. Unlike the 
objective school that seeks general laws, the case study strategy enabled us to evaluate a full 
variety o f evidence and opinions in real life organisational settings. A major flaw of the 
technical literature is its inability to elicit the different organisational views regarding 
technology. The few opinions expressed tend to come from interested parties such as senior
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management, IT security and the external consultants. We show that since one person’s 
infrastructure may be another’s barrier it is important to understand the political landscape 
that supports PKI use. Moreover, due to the rapid change in work practices, decision 
processes, roles and responsibilities, interviews give a more realistic picture o f security 
problems than static techniques such as checklists.
As such, we show that an emphasis on interoperability has hampered PKI institutionalisation 
because it focuses on symptoms (interoperation) instead o f politics, the real cause o f the 
problems. Social scientists define power as the ability o f an individual to make another do 
something they would otherwise not have done. Security authors have also defined security in 
power terms. Schneier (1999c) argues that security products are useful “precisely because o f  
what they don’t allow to be done.” Likewise, Anderson (2001) warns that organisational 
issues are not just a contributory factor in security failure, they can often be a primary cause.
This dissertation shows that the risk o f political conflict is highest in distributed global 
organisations due to different cultures, objectives and the limits o f hierarchical control. For 
instance, respondents at Oilcom claimed colleagues stole their work. We also found mutual 
mistrust at Bankrecht with the Zurich head office describing its London-based investment 
division as reckless. London in turn accused Zurich of relying on reactionary practices that 
suit defence organisations not banks trying to make money. The problem is that while 
Switzerland office specialises in wealth management and hence respects the stringent 
banking secrecy laws, BI prizes availability due to the time-sensitive nature o f their securities 
and exchange businesses.
The rich repertoire o f sources we used in the case study strategy enabled us to unravel the 
conflicts in PKI institutionalisation. The detailed description unearthed the aptly named “Not 
Invented Here” syndrome from which we get our title. The syndrome combines the mixed 
interest nature o f organisations with the zero-sum character o f technical artefacts. Kling 
(1980) believes organisations rarely accept large solutions because the zero-sum nature o f  
technical artefacts ensures that the inclusion o f given features precludes preferences o f other 
stakeholders. Bankrecht Switzerland had trouble exporting its complete PKI solution to other 
divisions because it was a packaged solution. Oilcom and Bankrecht AG changed the PKI 
technical features and objectives with varying degrees o f success. These insights would have
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been difficult to unearth if  we had restricted ourselves to research tools such as questionnaires 
and checklists under a sociological positivism school.
Our methodology also showed that the interaction between the underlying PKI standard and 
power and responsibility structures fans political conflict. The ITU-T X.509 standard, seen as 
the conventional public key infrastructure (PKIX), is particularly susceptible to politics. First, 
PKIX superimposes hierarchical and authoritarian structures such as Active Directory onto 
decentralised organisations. The model is problematic because, as we saw elsewhere, the 
rapid change in work practices, decision processes, roles and responsibility discourages 
inflexible technologies. These findings show that unless the security team assembles a 
powerful alliance o f interests, PKIX solutions will be problematic in distributed 
organisations. Second, PKIX certificate extensions encourage politics. The extensions started 
with the X.509v3 certificate to counter accusations that PKIX was authoritarian and 
hierarchical. The goal was to encourage the tailoring o f PKIX to organisational processes. 
However, because o f mixed interest and because PKI controls freedom o f action, interested 
parties use the X.509v3 extensions to enshrine their political goals. Powerful actors may use 
the extensions to determine who uses the keys and for what purpose. For instance, they can 
also denote their fields o f interest critical and totally ignore competing voices. Therefore, 
politically minded groups can use PKIX extensions to change work and its representation.
Since PKIX offers many options in dynamic business environments, it is difficult to define a 
framework that enables separate PKI entities to communicate with each other. Indeed, vendor 
interpretations of the X.509v3 format have accentuated the interoperability problems. A 
politicised context hurts interoperability because for a PKI to support specific organisational 
needs it has to embed administrative routines. This is the purpose of the X.509v3 extensions. 
However, once an organisation customises a PKI to fit its business processes, it differentiates 
it from other infrastructures. Therefore, interoperability can never be automatic as expected 
under the ITU-T X.509 standard. Hence, if  these large organisations cannot consolidate their 
internal PKI islands because o f politics, it does not matter how many Request for Comment 
(RFC) documents created, interoperability will remain difficult to achieve.
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Data collection Insights
As part o f the methodological contribution, we provide insights into data collection and 
research access procedures that would specifically benefit researchers focusing on the role 
power and politics in information security management. Previous applications o f the Circuits 
o f Power framework have largely relied on secondary data. Silva (1997) claimed his use of 
secondary data is justifiable “when access to original source is difficult to obtain.” A more 
recent study that uses a socio-technical approach (Willison 2002) also uses secondary data. 
The author insists his approach is appropriate because it overcomes the trouble involved in 
gaining access for IS research especially “those who focus on security.”
However, we decided against secondary literature because it does not fully depict the richness 
o f conducting an empirical study o f power. Hence, we navigated the research access 
minefield by using a “pragmatic, almost opportunistic approach” to getting access (Buchanan 
et al. 1988), We summarise our observations as follows.
Our approach appreciates that realities and constraints o f conducting social research always 
test well-constructed academic views. We took the advice o f Buchanan et al. (1988). First, 
we used friends at both organisations to gain access. At Oilcom this was two former LSE 
students and at Bankrecht AG a columnist o f a security publication. Second, we toned down 
threatening language and removed the repetitions in the questions suggested by Silva (1997), 
after problems with the first interview. Thereafter we coined a generic title “Organisational 
and management implications o f introducing a PKI.” To overcome potential bias, we used 
both interviews and documentary analysis to triangulate our findings. We also presented 
views from interviews for the comment o f respondents at various levels o f the hierarchy. This 
procedure greatly helped clarify and eradicate biased views.
As the researchers who opted for secondary literature testified, studying power and politics is 
difficult in any event. The difficulty drastically increased because we focused on the role of 
power in PKI institutionalisation with one o f the studies at a Swiss bank. The approach 
allowed us to study this novel technology in the few organisations that use it on a large scale.
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Practical contributions
Our practical contributions derive from the adoption of the CoP framework to provide 
theoretical coherence to security work. In Chapter 1, we saw that the “year o f . . .” syndrome 
dominates security practice. Briefly put, it is a voracious quest for the best technical fix to 
eradicate security threats. However, since both the products and problems targeted frequently 
run o f fashion, investment in a plethora o f gadgets has not increased security. In a seminal 
insight into security practice, the SANS Institute identified seven management errors that 
lead to computer security vulnerabilities. Briefly, practitioners reveal a prevalence o f 
reactive, short-term fixes and a failure to understand the relationship between security and 
business problems (SANS 1999), Likewise, Ross Anderson believes fashion has led 
companies into spending too much money on the wrong security threats (Reiser 2002).
Through the literature review and empirical data, we showed that security practice lacked the 
tools to account for the capricious interaction between the at once restrictive and flexible 
PKIX features, organisational structures and user resistance. Practitioners comfortably 
discuss aspects of PKIX such as Certification Authorities and directory services. However, 
there is limited knowledge on how PKI interacts with organisational processes, policies and 
procedures. In line with the prevalent fire-fighting approach, many practitioners regard 
security either as an event that happens when an intruder breaks into a computer system or 
when another worm exploits a known flaw in a common operating system. Security also 
traditionally enforced a fortress mentality to foil external attackers. As we saw elsewhere, 
even ‘modem’ tools such as firewalls enforce similar principles. However, the practices are 
deficient because they focus on specific technologies not the entire security domain. They 
also ignore the insider threat in pursuit of hackers. However, since “the information security 
problem is basically a problem of politics and regulation, rather than technology (Reiser 
2002),” let us summarise the practical contributions of the CoP framework.
The framework shows security as a process that affects the entire organisational fabric. We 
saw elsewhere that, like systems rationalism, the PKIX model treats organisations as 
machines that reliably relay orders to enhance top management control. Conversely, the CoP 
framework treats organisations as mixed interest social arrangements with technical support. 
Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) reveal that information security research chiefly explores the
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formal automated part o f an information system. Indeed, computer security traditionally 
relied on tools such as checklists and risk analysis. However, the tools are static and wrongly 
assume security is measurable. In contrast, the CoP is dynamic because it intimately follows 
the interaction o f the PKI with concrete social processes throughout its lifecycle. We believe 
the CoP analysis is more useful in explaining the unpredictable field o f information security. 
The fi-amework directly shows how the effects and conditions o f power that a PKI generates 
circulate through the episodic, social integration and system integration circuits.
Our findings show that despite officially talking about reducing the Total Cost o f Ownership 
(TCO) and increasing information sharing and security, political considerations drove PKI 
deployment and use. The IT divisions at both organisations saw PKI as a chance to reclaim 
the powers lost to end users at the advent o f the personal computer. This became an all- 
consuming ambition because the demise o f the mainfi*ame computers meant that the IT 
division at the head office had little control over applications on the end user PC. The low 
cost o f PCs also convinced top management to delegate procurement decisions to the 
businesses removing the IT division’s last vestige o f power. From the perspective o f Barnes 
(1986, 1988), the IT departments became mere authorities that lacked discretion since the 
business divisions controlled the money. The divisions selected the services to use and 
wilfully customised the IT infirastructure to suit their local needs.
Therefore, despite claiming that the top management call for “free flowing information” at 
Oilcom and the creation o f an integrated bank at Bankrecht was the reason for PKI, 
reclaiming power topped the agenda o f both IT divisions. Hence, PKI reflected the meanings 
that the IT teams subjectively assigned to events and actions. To convert perceptions into real 
needs the divisions used a “corresponding canopy of legitimations” to associate the PKIs with 
concrete social processes. Oilcom was more successful because management made PKI a 
support for corporate governance. The perceptions became real when the IT team convinced 
the management committee to link GID with cost control and profitability.
We reviewed the prevalent belief in the value-consensus literature that resistance to the 
progress o f technology is pathological and must be purged (Knights and Murray 1994). 
However, some o f these concerns may be genuine because PKIs affect work practices. Our 
findings show that the political conflict over PKI benefited both firms. At Bankrecht, the 
fight slowed the deployment o f a PKI whose features, cost and support arrangements could
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have hampered work at Bankrecht Investment. The Swiss division created the solution under 
a centralised IT division with assumptions informed by a fear o f the stringent banking secrecy 
laws. However, the PKI became a misfit after the merger because political mayhem wrecked 
the centralised stmcture, subsequently empowering foreign divisions that prized availability 
over confidentiality o f information. The conflict forced the Swiss team to focus on password 
proliferation, which was a real problem. Oilcom also experienced dissidence leading to small 
operating companies rejecting their representatives on the project team. The discord forced 
the deployment of a less centralising GI version entitled GI-Lite. If both organisations had 
simply quashed the resistance, work could have suffered.
While politics hampered PKI at Bankrecht, its masterly was the reason for the success o f the 
infi*astmcture at Oilcom. If understanding politics improves the success o f IT projects, why 
do researchers on PKI and practitioners ignore it? We believe this is because most people 
involved with PKI are mathematicians, engineers and computer scientists. Therefore, they 
routinely produce papers that describe “a mathematical utopia” and often produce “provably 
secure cryptosystems” that may never work in real life organisations.
Let us now assess the specific contributions o f the various elements o f the CoP to security 
practice. From the episodic circuit, the CoP can help practitioners evaluate the power 
required to accept a security infrastructure. Pfeffer (1992) classifies this as diagnosing the 
political landscape that involves the following. First, the security team should identify the 
dominant political subdivisions and their social relationships. Second, establish their views 
about the new system. Third, establish their standing conditions. Fourth, evaluate how they 
acquire and exercise power. We saw that Oilcom usually conducted ‘stakeholder analyses’ 
prior to deploying large IT systems. This assesses the impact o f the systems on different 
groups and evaluates whether they will support or oppose it. Oilcom skipped this analysis for 
GID because the project had restricted time and financial resources. They also assumed that 
since the system had the support o f the Board, the companies would accept it unconditionally. 
The failure to assess episodic power led to numerous delays and unanticipated cost overruns. 
The delays undermined the official line that GID was a cost reduction since the budget 
increased three fold. Similarly, the Bankrecht Switzerland security team failed to appreciate 
the changing episodic power configurations and paid with the rejection of the PKI solution.
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The system integration circuit is synonymous with facilitative power and deals with the 
coordination o f work practices. However, the link between PKI and work practices causes the 
following problems. First, PKI automatically becomes a subject o f power struggles because 
as we saw in Chapter 2, representing work is messy and politically sensitive. If a security 
team captures what it feels are work practices and configures the PKI accordingly some users 
may feel the technology was not ‘invented’ for them. Second, since the system integration 
circuit also deals with disciplinary techniques, new technologies are always contentious. This 
is especially true with products such as PKI whose cardinal role is to limit freedom of action.
Sociology of translation and security practice
Few social science frameworks link information security and business problems because 
computer security has roots in objective science. However, since organisations are mixed 
interest, it is problematic to view security as purely technical. Therefore, we enlisted the CoP 
fi-amework to provide broad insights into why security tools and techniques are essentially 
political. While the framework offers a plausible narrative o f power in security practice, it is 
complex and may baffle practitioners. Hence, as efforts continue to simplify the entire 
fi*amework for practice, we suggest that professionals use the Sociology o f Translation ideas 
incorporated in the Obligatory Passage Points to mobilise support for security projects. Let us 
assess how the ‘moments’ o f translation can support security practice.
Problematisation is a crucial step in winning support for security projects. First, like air- 
conditioning the benefits o f security are not immediately obvious to the Returns on 
Investment (ROI) obsessed chief financial officers. Second, the profession has a tarnished 
reputation because despite years o f investment in hyped products, organisations remain 
insecure. Our findings show that despite the wishful claims o f the trade press, security teams 
have limited dispositional and facilitative power. Hence, security practitioners need political 
skills to win funding and convince users that security is not a nuisance.
Successful problematisation and intéressement require the appreciation o f what Markus and 
Pfeffer (1983) term as the organisation’s paradigm. The paradigm covers values such as 
language and symbolic content that shape attitudes and beliefs about the legitimacy and 
rationality o f decisions and actions. Security systems that openly contradict the dominant 
organisational paradigm face more resistance and risk failure unless supported by power and
251
responsibility structures. The problems are rife because agencies use language and symbols to 
mobilise political support and quieten opposition. Early GED versions violated Oilcom’s 
paradigm by attacking the autonomy of operating companies. However, PKI succeeded 
because it relied on the dispositional and facilitative powers o f the CMD and Excoms. Hence, 
symbolic skills are as vital as technical efficiency in institutionalisation.
Practitioners can also derive direct lessons from the enrolment ‘moment’. This is a vital step 
for consolidating alliances because it attributes interrelated roles to respective actors. 
Enrolment is critical for institutionalisation because it involves multilateral negotiations, 
trials o f strength and tricks that ensure the success o f intéressement. The Zurich team failed to 
enrol BI because o f tactical blunders that gave credence to the latter’s misgivings. At Oilcom 
enrolment succeeded, partly, because the IT division cunningly presented GI-Lite as a 
compromise to disgruntled local companies. However, this was a trick, because the original 
GI proposal incorporates GI-Lite features. Therefore, while expertise in security is useful, it 
is obviously not enough in mixed interest organisations without political skills to accompany.
Lastly, mobilisation gives practitioners the skills to establish themselves as the legitimate 
spokespersons for information security and control its agenda. It has been widely claimed that 
security is o f strategic importance to modem organisations (Parker 1997). However, security 
remains a maligned bad cousin o f the IT department that rarely controls its own destiny. For 
example, there is no agreement on a common name for security teams. An outcome of the 
lack o f a precise purpose and name is that security can belong to the IT department, 
inffastmcture team, corporate security, risk management, physical security and sometimes 
even the finance division. In brief, many organisations lack proper responsibility structures 
for security. This anarchy in security management spurred the development o f ISO 17799. 
The standard shuns the reactive approach and attempts to establish proper security 
management responsibility. However, ISO 17799 cannot help the security teams if  they lack 
the political skills to portray themselves as the macro-actor that translates the wishes of other 
actors on security. The Oilcom team succeeded in its mobilisation drive because it translated 
the wishes o f other actors for a profitable and secure firm into a single agenda: Group 
Infi-astructure. However, the Bankrecht team failed to become a legitimate spokesperson 
because it relied on opportunistic localised agendas that had no organisation-wide resonance.
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Research Design Limitations
Our research design anticipated the difficulty o f gaining permission to conduct studies on 
PKI that assessed the role power and politics in its institutionalisation. Hence, we adopted 
non-threatening language, pre-emptively answered concerns about time and confidentiality 
and offered a report o f our findings. However, this design may pose problems for scholars 
attempting to produce a similar investigation for the following reasons. Gaining permission 
would be the first challenge. Obviously, it is difficult to recreate the serendipity that aided our 
research. Second, researchers would also face the hurdle o f convincing respondents to talk 
about power and politics candidly. This is always problematic because agencies speak from 
positions o f comparative power and vulnerability that researchers may compromise. To 
conduct a similar study, researchers would require strong rapport and trust with interviewees. 
Buchanan et al, (1988) describe this as “Getting on” and argue it leads to highly personal 
relationships with the respondents. It involves constant renegotiation o f access to the lives 
and experiences o f the individual respondents such that you can get personal and potentially 
sensitive and embarrassing information (Buchanan et a l  1988).
Establishing an understanding with respondents is central to this sort o f study because it 
determines the quantity and quality o f data collected. We built this trust by explaining our 
research agenda and listening carefully to the respondents. Our background in newspaper and 
magazine journalism probably helped us elicit sensitive views. Clearly, the demands o f the 
approach may handicap researchers with different skills.
The reliance on the trust o f respondents poses specific problems. First, while earning trust 
takes time, it was difficult to spend much time with respondents at both organisations. At 
Oilcom, we visited the London head office for several hours at a time. We were ushered into 
a meeting room for the interviews by our gatekeepers and escorted out of the building as soon 
as they were over. Bankrecht was even worse because the bank allowed us a working day to 
conduct the bulk o f the interviewees in Zurich. Part of the reason for the time pressure was 
that many respondents were senior managers including a Vice President, Director of IT 
Security and project leaders. Fortunately, both firms allowed us to record the interviews. We 
also continued the study off-site via e-mail and documentary analysis.
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Furthermore, Buchanan et al, (1988) warn that because you have to get on personally with 
respondents, they may demand censorship rights over the information that you gather. 
Bankrecht originally offered to participate in our research on condition that we sent the 
questions to the Director IT Security to consolidate the answers to each. At Oilcom, one 
vendor threatened us with legal action if  we reproduced graphics o f their solution that we had 
obtained during the research.
Respondents may also use the research as an opportunity to spy on other employees and 
departments. Bryman (1998) warns that researchers may be, “asked about the information 
they glean from a different ‘side’ o f the organisation.” Hence, research in organisations is 
something o f a political minefield. For instance, at Oilcom when we asked a security 
consultant about the eArchitecture project, his answer was a question, what do you know 
about eArchitecture? It may not be fair to infer a sinister motive because he may not have 
known the project details. Alternatively, he may have wanted to know what other people 
thought about it before committing himself. Hence, researchers should not automatically 
assume that following our research design would yield similar results.
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Adequacy of the Theoretical framework
The presence of multiple paradigms to understand the interrelationships between power, 
politics and information technology pose problems for researchers (Keen 1981). The 
paradigms are grounded in political science, management, sociology and marketing (Keen 
1981, Saunders et al. 2000). The different paradigms have thwarted efforts to create a 
consistent research body on organisational power and politics. As such, we selected the CoP 
framework because it includes different views of power. However, like other CoP informed 
studies, we encountered some problems using the framework. After Silva (1997), we group 
them into ethical, censorship and time categories.
First, the pre-occupation with achieving specific outcomes (Pfeffer 1992) could lead to 
managers to ignore ethical concerns such as user satisfaction. This is because such concerns 
often contradict the management desire to control the IS and extend their power. Our findings 
show that the PKI affected the work practices at both organisations. However, despite 
problems o f increased workload, reduced flexibility and slow data access speeds, Oilcom 
managed to institutionalise Microsoft PKI because the IT team constituted an effective field 
of force. In their desire to extend control over all IT systems across the Group, the Bankrecht 
Switzerland team was ready to disregard user concerns. However, this effort faltered because 
of weak social integration.
Still, the sensitive nature o f the information that CoP studies requires may put researchers in a 
position where they may support conduct that disregards ethical issues to retain research 
access. As part o f our pragmatic approach, we promised Bankrecht AG a report o f our 
findings. We believe Bankrecht Switzerland may have used our report for fan internal PKI 
wrangles. For instance, we witnessed a shift in the thrust o f the argument for a central PKI, 
controlled by BS, from technical expertise to the cost o f integrating disparate infrastructures 
and failure to work as a Group. These were the main observations o f our report. This turn o f  
events may have disappointed our sources at BI because they cancelled follow-up interviews.
Furthermore, we believe that in an effort to offer a framework that encompasses different but 
complementary approaches to power, Clegg may have included too many ideas. The circuit 
has roots in organisational and political theories. For example, Silva (1997) reveals that the
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social, system integration and exogenous contingencies link process with context. The ideas 
from the sociology o f translation explain the role of science and technology in structuring 
power relationships. In our experience, the multifarious views o f power make the use o f the 
framework a potentially explosive intellectual effort.
This problem also crops into the methodological application o f the framework. In an effort to 
keep the ‘circulating’ concept, Clegg ended up repeating and throwing themes across the 
whole circuit. This causes problems in research that may actually undermine the strength of 
the circuit, which is an ability to inform studies that generate information o f a personal 
nature. We argued elsewhere that getting useful information depends on ‘getting on’ with 
respondents. One way o f discouraging respondents is by using an interview schedule with 
repetitive questions and threatening terms such as power and resource control. Thus, while 
the ‘circulating’ idea is nice when the CoP merely gives a metaphysical underpinning for 
power concepts, the thinking does not translate well into methodological terms.
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Suggestions for further research
The Circuits o f Power framework ably illuminated the role o f power and politics in PKI 
institutionalisation. Its major contribution lies in giving theoretical coherence to security 
practice. We saw that the quest for reactive, short-term fixes and a failure to understand the 
impact o f technologies on organisations characterise security practice and research. The result 
is a huge gulf between technical security research and practice. The CoP framework enabled 
us to bridge this gap because it explains the relationship between PKI features, organisational 
structures and work practices. This dissertation is unique because it focuses on the internal 
impact of PKI as opposed to the external technical interoperation agenda.
From our experience undertaking this research, we would like to outline ideas for further 
research. First, researchers should explore the development o f appropriate vocabulary from 
the CoP to aid empirical data gathering. Since it is difficult to gain access to conduct research 
especially when the study involves power and security, researchers currently have two 
options. Ideally, we should use the CoP elements such as domination and control prominently 
in research proposals and interview schedules. The obvious danger is that few organisations 
would grant access to such studies because power is contentious. Alternatively, we could use 
a less direct approach that relies on generic themes that still add up to the main thesis o f the 
CoP framework. This is the reason why we coined the three themes to guide our data 
collection. The downside is that this approach may encourage unorthodox applications o f the 
framework. Hence, we encourage research that would systematically assess elements o f the 
CoP to develop ‘standardised’ language and notational features that would make the 
framework easier to use in empirical research.
As for practical contributions, we explored the usefulness o f the ‘moments’ o f translation in 
analysing the political landscape o f an organisation. Practitioners can directly use the 
‘moments’ to create alliances to support security projects. However, like the mainstream 
CoP, the sociology of translation ideas, as presented in the daunting obligatory passage 
points, need unpacking at two levels. Researchers may create easier alternative titles for the 
terminology o f the ‘moments’. Second, further research may extract the ‘moments’ from the 
broader CoP framework and present it as a mini-framework for analysing and mobilising 
support for security projects. We may extend this idea to other elements of the framework
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such that security practitioners select the relevant circuit depending on organisational need. 
This process may imitate the ‘need to know’ approach to security.
In conclusion, rather than being a final word, we regard our thesis as an opening remark in 
what we hope will become a long discussion o f the role o f power in security practice. Our 
evaluation o f the technical features o f PKI should dispel fears that we believe that security is 
all about power and politics. However, we provide a novel insight by showing PKI as a 
power tool that expressly restricts organisational action. Obviously, it will be foolhardy to 
abandon research into technical aspects of cryptography to channel all resources into power 
and politics because many issues are unresolved. For instance, Blanchette (2000) wonders 
whether certificates should bind public keys to identities or roles. Even the certification 
models are still in infancy. Besides, quantum computing may in the intervening decades 
render today’s ciphers such as RSA useless. All that said we believe that the technical side o f  
PKI is reasonably well developed. In brief, what security practice needs is research with an 
appreciation o f how ciphers operate in real life organisations. Our dissertation highlighted the 
limitations o f purely technical approaches to PKI that dominate security research. We show 
that far from being pathological, power and politics are central to PKI institutionalisation.
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Issues to discuss
Business environment
History o f  the organisation and its mission 
Position in the market
Strategies and tactics used to maintain or improve this market position 
Role o f technology adoption in the firm s market position 
Organisations that influence the adoption o f new technology 
Procedure fo r adopting information systems and/or innovations 
Technology adoption drivers: legislation; market uncertainty; partners 
General expectations from technology adoption e.g. efficiency
Technolosv adoption process
Rationale fo r the emergence o f the Cryptography [PKI] project 
Why was this infrastructure but not another security solution selected?
Which people/groups were behind the introduction o f PKf^ services?
What were the main objectives?
Have these objectives been realised?
How did different stakeholders view the introduction o f this PKI?
In what terms do they characterise the PKI?
Architecture o f the PKI/technical platform 
Scope o f  the PKI: - departmental; organisation-wide; external 
What is the PKI mainly used for?
Why were these applications selected?
Do you think the infrastructure offers adequate: Security; evidence; options 
How was the PKI introduced? -: Explanations, negotiations or instruction 
What were the key stages in the adoption o f the PKI?
Were other stakeholders won over by the explanations or coerced into accepting it? 
How were the arguments fo r the adoption o f  the PKI presented?
Who is directly affected by the PKI?
What are their interests in organisational activity -  roles/responsibilities?
Does the PKI enhance these interests?
Who benefits most from the functionality o f this system?
Does the PKI impact on work practices?
What about the division o f work/responsibilities?
Has it affected the organisational structure?
28 In PKI services we include: Single Sign On; secure E-mail; encrypted data streaming; communication 
between servers and browsers; Virtual Private Networks; secure Credit card transactions
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What procedural changes in user departments have occurred due to the system? 
Have departments adopted their design to suit the new system?
Are the work practices the system presupposes acceptable to you?
Any other points o f strain between the PKI and the institutional order?
Is PKI usage attached to tenure o f office (you either . . .or  ...?)
How have the strategies and tactics to boost PKI acceptance evolved?
Can you say the PKI is now an accepted component o f organisational life?
Any examples o f  how this is manifested?
Social aspects o f the or2 anisation
Departments/divisions o f the Oilcom company 
Who shapes organisational objectives/mission/strategy?
Different types o f  people/professionals employed by your company 
Material resources, techniques and skills required to perform tasks 
How are employees achieving these goals?
Groupings that allow influence over organisational activities
What are the different professional/social groupings in this organisation?
How does one become and remain a member o f the groupings you know?
What is the relationship between the PKI and these groups?
How was the adoption o f  the PKI interpreted?
Whose idea was it to see PKI in that way?
Has the PKI affected the standing o f these groups?
How have different groups reacted to it?
Has this security infrastructure been resisted/resented?
Any manifestations o f  this resistance/resentment?
What are/were the causes o f this resistance?
What resources/tactics were employed to resist it?
What has management done about this resistance/resentment?
What are the general mechanisms o f control and discipline in your department? 
Are there any control and discipline mechanisms embedded in the PKI?
Do you think these mechanisms (if any) affect PKI acceptance?
What other resources are deployed along with the PKI to achieve control?
Are all employees subject to the same regime o f control enabled by the PKI?
Many thanks for your time!
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Selected definitions
Certification 
Authority (CA)
This is an organisation or technical system trusted by one or more 
users to manage public key certificates throughout their lifecycle. The 
CA issues, manages and revokes certificates, when necessary. It also 
creates and manages Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) for 
discontinued certificates.
Cipher
Ciphertext
Client-Server
architecture
Cryptanalysis
Cryptography
Cryptology
Data Encryption 
Standard (DES)
Encrypt/
encipher
GSS-API
IETF
Ciphers are also known as algorithms. Ciphers are either a 
mathematical fimction or any general system for hiding the meaning 
o f information. Modem cryptography uses keys to eradicate the need 
for security to rely totally on the secrecy of the algorithm.
This is a message {plaintext) transformed into gibberish using either a 
symmetric or an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm.
Under this versatile network architecture, user computers (clients) 
rely on the more powerful computers (servers) for resources such as 
files, devices and sometimes, processing power. The architecture 
provides more usability, flexibility and scalability than centralised 
mainfi-ame computing systems.
Cryptanalysis is widely understood as the ability to practically ‘break’ 
a cipher and recover plaintext fi*om the ciphertext alone. Broadly, it 
also occurs when a cryptanalyst finds a weakness that proves that a 
cipher does perform as well as claimed by its manufacturers.
Cryptography is the art and science o f keeping messages secure. 
Cryptography has traditionally been synonymous with secrecy or the 
science o f concealing the meaning o f messages.
Cryptology is a branch o f Mathematics that covers both cryptography 
and cryptanalysis. It is generally the science o f information secrecy.
IBM developed DES in 1976. DES later became the most popular 
block symmetric cipher. In 2001, the US chose the Rijndael algorithm 
as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to replace DES.
Encryption is the transformation o f data into a format that is 
practically impossible to understand {ciphertext) without the recipient 
having additional information. Decryption is the reverse process.
Generic Security Services Application Program Interface (GSS-API) 
is a standard for implementing cryptographic authentication services. 
GSS-API allows applications to share user credentials without re­
authentication. It supports secret key and public key cryptography.
The Internet Engineering Task Force is a community concerned with 
the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of 
the Internet. IETF specifies protocols and related standards.
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LDAP
Public Key
Infrastructure
(PKI)
Registration 
Authority (RA)
Relying Party
RSA
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is an offshoot o f the 
standard X.500 directory. LDAP is a set o f protocols that define 
access procedures for directory information. The protocol is much 
simpler and easier to program than the complex X.500 access 
standard. LDAP also demands fewer network resources than X.500. 
Microsoft’ Active Directory implements LDAP.
PKI is a pervasive security substrate that supports the use o f public 
key cryptography applications. A PKI is combination o f hardware, 
software, roles, policies and procedures that jointly help create, 
manage, store, distribute and revoke public key certificates.
This function provides an interface between subscribers and the CA. 
The RA uses offline means to perform administrative duties such as 
confirming the subject’s identity, validating their eligibility for a 
certificate and ensuring that they possess the corresponding private 
key for the public key requested. The CA issues the certificates.
The term refers to a person, machine or any other end entity that 
depends on a certificate issued by a CA to a specific organisation and 
digital signatures verified with the certificate to conduct transactions.
The most widely used asymmetric algorithm. Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir 
and Leonard Adleman developed the algorithm in 1977. RSA gets its 
name from their initials.
Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL)
X.500
This is an open standard developed by Netscape Corporation. SSL 
provides data encryption, server authentication, message integrity, 
and optional client authentication for TCP/IP connections. All major 
browsers and web servers incorporate SSL meaning that the 
installation o f a certificate instantly turns on their SSL capabilities.
The standard defines the structuring o f global directories. X.500 
directories are hierarchical in design with different levels for each 
category o f information for example country, region and city.
